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Epistemic Logics of
Imperfect Information for
Multi-agent Communication
Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen
Department of Theoretical Philosophy
Siltavuorenpenger 20 A, FIN-00014 University of Helsinki
Abstract. To express knowledge and communication in multi-agents
systems, a hybrid of possible-worlds and game-theoretic semantics is
defined for the language of independence-friendly (IF) first-order epis-
temic logic. The language distinguishes between specific and non-specific
knowledge by hiding worlds. Identification on stratified domains is via
imperfect information that agrees with cross-world references by coor-
dinating information sets with world-bound aspects of individuals. Ap-
plications range from intentional identities (cross-modal anaphora) to
reasoning and communication about focussed knowledge.
Modelling and model checking
web services
Holger Schlingloﬀ1,2
1 Institut fu¨r Informatik, Humboldt-Universita¨t zu Berlin
Rudower Chaussee 25, 12489 Berlin
2 Fraunhofer Institut FIRST, Kekule´straße 7, 12489 Berlin
Abstract. Web services are a new paradigm for business agents com-
municating via standardized protocols over the web, mutually oﬀering
and accessing services. Typical languages used in this context include
BPEL4WS, WSDL, SOAP, and others. Whereas many current indus-
trial activities on web services are aimed at topics like standardization
of formats and interoperability between sites, there are also speciﬁc se-
mantical problems which should be dealt with: Usually, web services can
be combined to complex business process architectures, they oﬀer the
possibility of retraction, and allow approximative and time-dependent
results. Moreover, in the design of a web service security aspects such
as authentication, authorization and non-repudiation must be taken into
account. We outline some of the approaches which have been proposed
for the formalization of the above problems, and report on methods and
tools for the speciﬁcation, model checking and automated testing of web
services.
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Abstract
Recent works suggest to model the reputation of the agents in order to evaluate
the sincerity of an agent. The very first step of this mechanism is the detection
of fraud and lie. However, most of the works concerning reputation consider this
detection as implicit either because it is obvious in their specific application or
because they assume that this detection is already made. In the present paper, we
propose a definition of the concepts of lie, deception and fraud. From these defini-
tions, we also propose a decentralized detection of lie and deception. Finally, this
detection mechanism is used to maintain a representation of the agents’ reputation.
1 Introduction
Agent communications is a very important issue in multi-agent systems. Agents have
to interact in order to solve a problem, exchange informations, etc. The collective ac-
tivities within the system strongly depend on the good functioning of communications
and can fail if some communications are, voluntarily or not, wrong. Some guarantees
such as authentication, integrity, confidentiality, etc. can be obtained by the use of se-
curity techniques. However, there are also some threats upon the veracity of the content
of the messages. If the system is open, malicious agents may be introduced in order to
lie to other agents and disturb the good functioning of the system.
Recent works [21, 5, 18, 3, 17] suggest some solutions to this problem by the cal-
culation and the use of other agents’ reputation. The reputation of an agent is usually
evaluated based on its previous behavior. The more an agent had bad behaviors, the
lower its reputation is. Therefore the very first step of this evaluation relies on the
detection of a fraudulent behavior. There are few works [12, 1, 23, 16] about formal-
ization or detection of fraud and lie. Most of the works about reputation consider this
detection as implicit either because it is obvious in their specific application or because
they assume that this detection is already made (e.g., in E-commerce, the user judges
the outcome of a transaction and gives the feedback).

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The goal of the work described in this paper is to detect some agents that lie. More
specifically, we focus on the detection of agents that send messages which are incon-
sistent when considered together. Therefore we first need to define precisely lies, de-
ceptions and violations in this context. Then, a framework in which agents can detect,
in a decentralized way, when lies occur is built and agent’s reputations updated. In
section 2, we define the concepts of lie, deception and violation. These definitions are
used in section 3 to show how an agent can locally reason about lie and deception. We
distinguish in particular different situations where an agent simply observes some com-
munications, detects that a lie occurred or identifies a given lie or liar. In section 4, we
describe a system that can detect lies by the way of a collaborative activity of agents,
where each agent locally updates its own reputation model about other agents, and then
uses reputation in its behavior when interacting with other agents.
2 Definitions of lie, deception and violation
It is generally admitted [23] that fraud is composed of two parts: a violation and a de-
ception. A violation appears when an agent acts contrary to a given obligation. A de-
ception occurs each time an agent   manages to make another agent  believe something
  either does not believe or that is contrary to one of   ’s own beliefs. FIROZABADI et
al. [12] followed this decomposition in order to formalize the different concepts in-
volved in the definition of fraud: obligations and violations using standard deontic
logic (SDL) [27, 8], actions performed by agents using a logic of action [14, 9, 19] and
local beliefs of agents and deceptions using doxatic logic [10].
Based on their work, we define the concepts of lie and deception to address the
specific case of communication. In this section, we briefly present the modal operators
that are used and a speech act representation to be able to define the concepts of lie and
deception that are described at last.
2.1 Background
The formalization of violations and deceptions requires the use of four modal operators
taken from the modal logics quoted above. In the remaining of the paper we use the
axiomatizations given in [12].
Violation The  operator, defined in Standard Deontic Logic [27, 8], denotes an
obligation such that  means “it ought to be the case that  ”. A violation can then be
written as:
	 (1)
The same operator is also used to denote the violation of a prohibition:
	
 (2)
Action A logic of action [14, 9, 19] provides two modal operators to represent that
an agent performed an action:
 
 means “agent   brings it about that  ”;
 
 means “agent   tries to bring it about that  ” but does not give any informa-
tion on the success of the action.
These two operators are logically related by the following formula:
 

 
 (3)
Deception The doxatic logic provides the 	 operator to represent an agent’s local
belief. 	   means that agent   believes  . FIROZABADI et al. [12] combine the 	
operator with the logic of action to represent deceptions (agent   deceives the agent  )
by the two following formulae:
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It is often interesting to detect the intention of an agent to deceive and not only its
success. The two following formulae denote an attempt to deceive:
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2.2 Representation of agent communications
In order to formally define what are lies, deceptions and frauds, we need to represent
communications that are specific actions performed by agents. The speech act the-
ory [22] defines each speech act by a performative and its associated preconditions
and postconditions. Preconditions should be verified by the sender in order to be able
to send the message, while postconditions represent the state of the world the sender
wishes to reach. Various languages, including these preconditions and postconditions,
exist (e.g., [11, 15]). We choose to use FIPA’s as none of the formalisms is best suited
for our purpose and because complete specifications are easy to find. In the FIPA spec-
ifications, the feasibility preconditions (noted FP) correspond to the preconditions and
the rational effects (noted RE) to the postconditions.
We use these notations to represent that an agent has emitted a speech act by the fact
that it tries to reach the rational effect of the speech act. If 


 is the  th speech act
sent by agent   to agent  , the action of successfully sending this speech act is written
by:

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Since the receiver is autonomous, it may not take the message into account, and
the sender cannot be certain that the rational effects are applied. The notation below
denotes only that the speech act has been sent without information about its success:
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ﬁﬀ (9)
2.3 Lies, deceptions and violations within communications
The sender of a speech act is also an autonomous agent. It is therefore possible that
an agent sends a speech act without believing that its feasibility preconditions are true.
We define such a case as a lie.
Definition of a lie  
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According to this definition, a lie from agent   to agent  is an attempt to reach the
rational effects of a speech act whereas its feasibility conditions are not satisfied. If the
lie is successful, a deception occurs as the rational effects are reached (we may aslo
omit the 	  operator in this definition).
Definition of a deception
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These formalizations can now be used to forbid lies in the agent communications.
In the FIPA specifications, the sincerity condition assumes that an agent does not lie.
This assumption is not realistic in open systems as it is impossible to have any guaran-
tee on the internal implementation of the agents that enter in the system. The sincerity
condition is made explicit by the following obligation:
Sincerity condition
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This writing of the sincerity condition has two usages: (i) it can be used by agents
to reason about this obligation and eventually to decide to violate it; (ii) it can be used
by other agents to detect violations of this obligation and update their representations
of the liars.
Violation of the sincerity condition
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We use the formulae defined in this subsection in order to detect liars. Since a
deception is a successful lie (formula 3 links formulae 10 and 11), deceivers may also
be detected. Moreover, a fraud can be detected if a deception and a violation occur.
Next sections focus on the detection processes.
3 Detection of Lies
In decentralized multi-agent systems agents have different beliefs. Some of them may
detect lies whereas some others may not. In this section, we first distinguish different
roles that an agent can play in a collaborative detection of lies. This detection process
is then described.
3.1 Agents that Observe and Evaluate a Target
An agent may be unable to detect alone that another agent lied. According to its own
local beliefs, it can, however, participate to a collective activity that aims at detecting
liars. We consider three possible ways for agents to participate: an agent can either be
the Target of the detection process or can be used as an Observer or an Evaluator.
An agent   , on which the fraud detection process focuses, is labelled as a Target.
A set of messages sent by the Target is considered. We note  any set of messages
sent by agent   : 
	

 

ﬀ
An Observer is an agent  that has observed some of the messages sent by a target  
(where   ):
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An Evaluator is an agent that confronts observations about a set of messages from
a given target   : .  /0 . It is then able to detect if at least one lie exists or if the
target has been sincere with respect to this set of messages.
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3.2 The Detection Processes
There are two kinds of processes for lies detection. The detection can occur after the
observation of contradictory messages or during the evaluation of the sincerity of a
specific target.
3.2.1 Observation-driven detection.
This detection can be performed by observers. An agent  is an observer of a target
  . Agent  believes that a set of messages .  has been sent and that the sincerity
condition holds. For each message ='). :
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If agent  assumes that the sender did not violate the sincerity condition we obtain:
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This formula can be expanded into:
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The last part of this formula (16c) is, the only one determining for the truth value
of the whole formula. Then, agent  assumes that 	   ﬀ holds.
If the assumption that 	   ﬀ holds leads to an inconsistency, an incorrect belief
exists either in this assumption or in the previous beliefs of agent  . If this inconsistency
is only caused by some assumptions of sincerity about agent   , then there exists at least
one lie within the set of messages sent by   . The following formula expresses this
situation:
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Consequently, agent  both plays the roles of observer and evaluator. It plays the
role of evaluator since it believes that there is a lie in  . It is important to note that
the process allows agent  to detect a lie occurred within the set of messages sent by
agent   , therefore   is a liar; however, it is impossible at this stage and it may remain
definitively impossible to detect which messages ='  are lies.
3.2.2 Target-driven detection.
In this case we consider another agent, the Beneficiary. A beneficiary (noted 
 ) is an
agent that requires to know if a target   has lied in the past. The following process is
used to gather some information about agent   :
1. Agent 
 asks some agents to become evaluators of the target   ;
2. Each evaluator : looks for agents that have observed some messages sent by  
and asks them for their observations;
3. An evaluator : confronts the observations that it received and may detect a lie if
there is an inconsistency (this process is described in the previous section);
4. At last, each evaluator sends its own result to the beneficiary which merges them.
The choice of the target may be free or may be influenced by the occurrence of a
conflict. In section 3.2.1 we define observation-driven detection as the detection of an
inconsistency in the feasibility preconditions of some messages sent by the same agent
  . However, if the messages involved in the conflict come from different agents, it is
more difficult to know which one has lied. Moreover, the inconsistency may arise due
to the application of the rational effects of some messages. In this case, all the agents
that sent one of these messages are considered as targets for target-driven detections.
4 Reasoning about Lies
Each time a lie is detected, the beneficiary of this detection should use this information
to update its representation of the target. The information is usually merged in an
evaluation of the sincerity of the target: its reputation. Figure 1 shows how an agent
links lies detection with reputation.
Lies Detection Trust Decision
Interaction with
external observers
and/or evaluators
Consistency
check and
sa k
t,b
with other agents
Communication
sa k
t,b
sa k
t,b
UseUpdate
Agent b
recovery
Accept or 
refuse 
Beliefs
Local
Reputation 
of
other agents
Figure 1: Using Lies Detection and Reputation in Agent Communications.
The lies detection module implements the processes described in section 3.2. Dur-
ing these processes the beneficiary may have to communicate with other agents (ob-
servers and evaluators) and uses its local beliefs to check if an inconsistency occurs.
This process can result in an update of the reputation attached to some agents. Then, if
the message  
  
 has not been detected as a lie, it is transmitted to the trust decision
module that decides to accept the message (trust the sender) or refuse it (distrust the
sender).
In this section we focus on the reputation of other agents and on the trust decision
module. First, we describe different ways to use the detection of a lie in order to update
reputations. We then show how an agent can use the reputation attached to other agents
to avoid being deceived in the future.
4.1 Using different kinds of reputation
Even if a target has lied to another agent, it is not always a liar. In the same way, an
agent that has not yet lied may not remain sincere in all its future communications.
Then, it may be useful to estimate the sincerity of the target by a degree rather by a
boolean value.
We represent reputation as a real number in the interval


	
. An agent which
reputation is

is considered as a systematic liar whereas an agent with a reputation
of 

would be always sincere. In addition to this interval, an agent’s reputation can
take the value “unknown” if there is too few informations about it.
Our aim is not to propose a specific function to compute a reputation from several
observations and evaluations. This function depends on the application and several dif-
ferent propositions exist [18, 20, 26, 28, 6, 13]. On the other hand, we are particularly
interested by the source of observations and evaluations. Actually, informations com-
municated by other agents in order to estimate a reputation may not be as reliable as
those that are observed or evaluated by the agent itself.
Therefore, there are several different reputation values attached to a same target.
First, it depends on the agent that encapsulate the value. In a decentralized system,
an agent computes the reputation attached to a target from its local beliefs and two
distinct agents can obtain different results. Moreover, section 3.1 shows that the local
beliefs of an agent allows it to play the role of observer and/or evaluator. It also means
that an agent sometimes needs to rely on other agents to obtain some observations
or evaluations. If an agent considers the information communicated by other agents
is less reliable than the one observed or computed by itself, it can maintain different
reputations for the same target that differ from one another by value and reliability.
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Figure 2: Trust Decision Process.
According to the source (internal or external) of the observations and evaluations,
three kinds of reputation are distinguished:
  Individual Reputation is based on an agent’s own observations and evaluations.
In particular, an agent that has detected a lie by the way of an observation-driven
detection (section 3.2.1) updates its individual reputation for the target;
  Witness Reputation is based on observations communicated by other agents (the
witnesses). Thus, an agent confronts these external observations in order to de-
tect if there is a lie and, consequently, updates its witness reputation;
  Neighbor Reputation relies on an external detection of lies. It is the integration
of different reputations values communicated by other evaluators. It is usually
updated by target-driven detection of lie (section 3.2.2).
An agent can use one of these reputations in order to decide if it can trust another
agent. We need to consider an additional concept, the Confidence, to handle the specific
case where an agent does not have relevant estimations about another agent in any kind
of reputation. Confidence is a general disposition to trust. It is used by default to lead
an agent to trust or distrust another agent which reputations are unknown. Confidence
is not attached to a specific target.
Figure 2 shows an ordering of these reputation concepts that we think is common
sense and that may be used in general case: Individual Reputation is considered the
most reliable type of reputation by its owner since it is based on its own observations.
Witness Reputation is less reliable since observation comes from other agents and may,
therefore, be false. Neighbor Reputation is the less reliable of the three values since
most of the information is external. Confidence not comparable to the other types since
it does not target any agent; it is a general disposition to trust. Therefore Confidence
comes last. However, it is clear that this ordering can vary in specific situations.
4.2 Preventing Future Deceptions
The aim of the trust Decision module is to decide whether the agent should trust or not
a given target regarding a particular information. We consider here the specific case of
communications where this information is a message sent by the target and where the
decision process leads the agent to accept the message or refuse it. However, we think
that this decision mechanism is general and can handle other situations where an agent
should decide whether it trusts or not a target (e.g., anticipating if the target will fulfill
or not its commitments, whether it will obey or not a norm. . . ). Figure 2 shows how
the various kinds of reputation presented in the previous section are used to implement
the trust decision process.
Logically the agent considers in priority its most reliable belief: its Individual Rep-
utation about the target. The Individual Reputation can be sufficient to decide to trust
(respectively distrust) a target if it has an high (respectively low) value. This is repre-
sented in figure 2 by two thresholds  
 
and   
 	 
. If the Individual Reputation is
greater than  
	 
, the agent trusts the target and accept the message it received from
it. At the opposite, if the Individual Reputation is less than  
 
  
, the agent distrusts
the target and refuses its message. Otherwise, the Individual Reputation does not per-
mit the agent to decide whether the target should be trusted or not. These other cases
consist in specific values of the Individual Reputation: either the “unknown” value, or
a moderate value (between  
 
and    
  
).
A similar decision function is then applied to the second most reliable reputation:
the Witness Reputation. This value is also compared to two thresholds (  $
 
and
  


 	 
that can be different from the thresholds used for Individual Reputation) in
order to decide whether to trust or not the target. If this value is still not discriminant,
Neighbor Reputation is considered for decision. As a last resort, the agent’s Confidence
makes the decision.
At the end of this decision mechanism, the agent has decided whether to trust or
distrust the target. Then there are two ways to deal with the message received:
Trust decision The message  
  
 is accepted. The rational effects are applied by the
receiver:  ﬂ  
  
 ﬀ and 
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 
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 ﬀ are added to its local beliefs.
Distrust decision The message  
  
 is refused. The receiver does not apply the ratio-
nal effects, but notes that the message has been sent: 
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  
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are added to its local beliefs.
The main interest of the trust decision module is to preserve the agent from being
deceived by some undetected lie. There are lies that are not detected by the lies detec-
tion module. Reputation can then be used not to believe messages sent by agents that
have often lied in the past.
At the end of this decision process two undesirable cases may happen: (i) messages
that are not lies may be rejected; (ii) undetected lies coming from agents with a high
reputation may be accepted. If the former case should be avoided, the receiver does
not have to definitely reject the message. It may rather asks some justifications to
the target or to other agents. In the latter case, a deception occurs. The lie may be
detected a posteriori if another message received later leads to an inconsistency with
the undetected lie. However, few lies may remain undetected forever.
5 Conclusion
The work presented in this paper is related to two categories of existing works. The
first category is the formalization of fraud with regards to the actions performed by
agents. LOMUSCIO et al. [16] formalize violation in the bit transmission problem
with deontic logic. However, their axiomatization is based on a representation of the
world as a global state, which is composed of the state of each agent of the system
plus the state of the environment. It is, therefore, necessary to enumerate each state
of every agent and each state the environment may be in. In an open system, it is
impossible to do this, since agents may come from different designers and their internal
implementation is not available. FIROZABADI et al. [12] suggest a formalization of
fraud in two parts: a formalization of violation and of deception. They propose a logical
formalism to represent how an agent should behave (obligations) and what an agent has
done (actions) in order to define a situation of violation and deception is represented
by considering the agents’ local beliefs. We propose in this paper to extend their work
in order to formalize and detect lies within agent communications.
This extension allows us to show how some agents can detect that an agent has lied,
and how they use this information to update a reputation model of the other agents.
Reputation modeling is the second category of related works. Several different pro-
posals [18, 20, 26, 28, 6, 13] exist to represent and to evaluate the reputation of some
agents. However, most of these works focus on the evaluation of reputation but does
not consider the very first step of this evaluation: the detection of a fraud. We use a
reputation model issued from some previous work [17] to link the detection of lie to
the updating of agents’ reputation.
All the related works quoted above focus on one specific category without consid-
ering the others. One of the main interest of the work presented here is that it links
all these categories to propose a mechanism that integrates the detection of lies, the
representation of reputation and its use to prevent future deceptions. Moreover, this
mechanism is decentralized and does not require the existence of a central entity. We
are currently working on an implementation of this mechanism.
This work can still be extended in a few directions. A first extension consists in
the formalism that we have chosen to represent violations and lies. A violation has
been represented as an action that contradicts an obligation expressed with the help of
standard deontic logic. It would be interesting to introduce an explicit representation of
norms instead of the plain obligations. Thus, a violation would refer to a norm and we
could benefit from some existing works [7, 4, 25] to define specific behaviors in case of
a violation. Moreover, the reputation attached to an agent could also be contextualized
by the norm violated or respected. Since several works about norms use deontic logic
for obligations, we believe that our work remains open to the future introduction of
norms. Moreover, the notion of time as not yet been taken into account. Using a
temporal logic together with an ACL such as TACL [2] will allow to distinguish agents
that really lies from agents that may have changed their opinion about an aspect of the
world.
The formalization of lies relies on the specifications of FIPA-ACL [11]. The justi-
fication of this choice is that the detection of a lie requires the representation of a sin-
cerity condition. The prevention of future deceptions also requires the representation
of the success of a speech act (the rational effects in the FIPA specification). However,
our work is not bound to the use of FIPA-ACL and other languages may be used if they
represent the required preconditions and postconditions. For example, it is possible to
use KQML [15] by using its sender preconditions and receiver postconditions. We are
also exploring the social semantics approach of ACLs. Indeed, it does not need, for an
agent that emits a speech act, to make strong assumptions on the internal representation
of the receiver [24].
Another extension of this work would be to use lie detection in the messages ex-
changed during lie detection. If an agent lies when it sends a message containing an
observation or an evaluation of a target, it can lead some other agents to believe that
a liar is sincere (or the opposite). This problem is the main reason why different lev-
els of reliability are distinguished for reputation (section 4.1). However, the messages
containing some observations or evaluations may be considered as classical messages
and may also be detected as lies or be rejected if they are sent by an agent with a low
reputation.
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Abstract
ATEL is one of the most expressive logics for reasoning about knowledge, time and
strategies. Several issues around the interpretation of this logic are still unresolved. This
paper contributes to the ongoing discussion by showing that agents do not have to know a
speciﬁc strategy for doing something in order to have a capability. Furthermore we claim
that agents can possess so-called strategic knowledge that is derived from their knowl-
edge of strategies being played. In order to prove these claims we present an alternative
interpretation of ATEL over extensive game forms. For the deﬁnition of abilities we use
strategy domination, and to deal with strategic knowledge we include strategy proﬁles in
the model. We illustrate the interpretation issues mentioned using several small examples.
Furthermore we show how perfect recall and perfect memory can be characterized.
1 Introduction
Reasoning about knowledge, time and strategies is important in the analysis of multi agent
systems. Several logical frameworks and languages have been developed to capture these
notions. In this paper we discuss one such language called ATEL [15], which is a logic to
reason about knowledge, time and strategies. This logic can be applied to the formal analysis
of a wide range of systems, for instance distributed protocols, synchronisation and security,
but also to any issue that can be modeled as an extensive game, such as argumentation,
auctions of language games. In this paper we are concerned with the interpretation of ATEL.
The original interpretation of the language featured attractive computational properties, but
suﬀered from some counterintuitive properties, which led to a number of reﬁnements [16, 9, 8].
In this paper we provide a new interpretation for ATEL. In order to keep things simple we do
this for turn based systems, but we see no reason why the approach could not be extended
to the more general class of concurrent systems.
The history of ATEL started with the deﬁnition of Computation Tree Logic, a logic for
branching time models [4]. Using this logic one can express many temporal properties of
distributed or concurrent systems, such as ‘all possible computations will reach this state’ or
‘this state eventually occurs in at least one computation’. It was discovered by Alur and oth-
ers [1] that this logic could be extended to reason about multiagent systems without changing
the complexity of model checking. They extended the language with coalition operators and
called it Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL). Using ATL one could express properties
like ‘This coalition can ensure that a state is reached’ or ‘This coalition cannot avoid that p
always holds’. Van der Hoek and Wooldridge realized that it would be useful to reason about
the knowledge of agents within ATL, and extended the language with a knowledge operator
calling it ATEL [15]. They gave the knowledge operator a very intuitive interpreted systems
semantics [6] but did not alter the notion of a strategy used in the coalition operator. The
result was that agents were assumed to always be able to make diﬀerent choices in diﬀerent
states, even if the agent could not distinguish these states. Assuming that agents can make
diﬀerent choices in states they cannot distinguish is counterintuitive [9] and diﬀerent seman-
tics along the lines of imperfect recall ATL [13] were developed by Jonker, Van der Hoek and
Jamroga [9, 8].
In plain English, ATEL originally assumed that a coalition of agents can achieve something
if a strategy to achieve it exists. This condition has been strengthened in the sources cited:
• A coalition of agents can achieve X if they have a uniform strategy (or strategy-under-
incomplete-knowledge) that achieves X [9]
• A coalition of agents can achieve X if they have a uniform strategy of which they know
that it achieves X. [9, 8]
In section 2 we deﬁne the notion of a uniform strategy formally, but it can be thought of as
a strategy with extra restrictions so that it does not use facts that an agent is not supposed
to know. One of the main points of this paper is that this latter condition is too strong.
A coalition does not have to be able to identify a strategy of which they know it will be
successful. A coalition of sensible agents will choose, if they cannot identify a foolproof
strategy, the best strategy that they can come up with. More precisely, they will choose a
strategy that is not dominated by any other strategy. We say that a coalition of agents can
do X if any undominated strategy achieves X. We will deﬁne domination later in this paper.
A second point of this paper is that the knowledge of a coalition does not have to depend
only on the state of a game or system, but also on the strategies they employ. It seems
safe to assume that agents know what strategies they employ, and that this gives them extra
information about the future. This phenomenon can be called strategic knowledge [5]. The
interpretation developed here addresses this issue by assuming all agents know their own
strategy. We stress that this is intended not as the ﬁnal answer on this issue, but as a
demonstration how one can incorporate some form of strategic knowledge.
The language CTL is in fact a syntactical restricted subset of the language CTL∗. The
same is true for ATL and ATL∗ and also for ATEL and ATEL∗. The unstarred versions have
received the most attention, because they have a low model checking complexity [16]. In this
paper however we are more interested in the meaning of interpretations for the languages than
in complexity. Therefore we prefer to work with atel∗, the language without restrictions,
rather than to deﬁne an interpretation only for ATEL.
In section 2 we present necessary deﬁnitions. Section 3 contains examples. In section 4
we deﬁne an interpretation for atel∗. Section 5 uses the logic to analyse the examples of
section 3. In section 6 two theorems are proven and section 7 is the conclusion.
2 Extensive Game Forms
Games are models for interaction between agents with diﬀerent and possibly competing ob-
jectives [12]. An extensive game gives a detailed description of such interaction. It shows
which decisions are made in order to reach an outcome. It can be represented in a game tree,
where each leaf corresponds to an outcome and each node corresponds to a choice between
options. The preferences of all agents are part of an extensive game. In many cases one
wants to study the structure of a game independent of the preferences of the agents. In that
case one can use the idea of a game form, which is an extensive game without preference
function. The notion of an extensive game goes back to Kuhn [11]. We have adapted the
next deﬁnition from Osborne [12]. Since the structure encodes the fact that agents may not
be sure what exactly the current state is when making a decision, we speak of an extensive
game with imperfect information.
We have adopted notation fashionable in game theory [12] and notation used in coalition
logic [16]. The set of all agents is denoted Σ and Γ is used for a subset of agents. Individual
agents are denoted X,Y . For game forms and game form interpretations F,G are used.
Strategies are called S, T or SΓ, TΓ, to indicate for which group the strategy is. A game
form and a strategy together form a model, denoted by M . Formulas are denoted φ,ψ and
atomic propositions p, q. P is a set of propositions. They are interpreted using a function
π. Actions are a, b and histories are called h, h′ or j. To improve readability, we sometimes
abuse notation a little bit and write XY for the set of agents {X,Y }.
Game Form A game form is a tuple (Σ,H,Ow,∼), where Σ is a ﬁnite set of agents and
H is a non-empty set of histories. The set H must be preﬁx-closed, which means that for
any sequence ha ∈ H also h ∈ H. We use the special symbol  to denote the empty sequence.
The set of all actions available after h is denoted A(h) = {a|ha ∈ H}. A history h ∈ H is
terminal if A(h) = ∅. The set of all terminal histories of H is denoted Z(H).
The function Ow(h) : H \ Z(H) → Σ deﬁnes which player chooses the next action.
Intuitively the agent Ow(h) owns the history h, but we can also say that it decides h, controls
h or has the initiative in h. For each agent X ∈ Σ, the relation ∼X is an equivalence
relation between histories, where h ∼X j expresses the fact that agent X cannot tell the
diﬀerence between having gone through history h and history j. One condition applies: if
Ow(h) = X and h′ ∼X h then also Ow(h′) = X and further A(h) = A(h′). This condition
ensures that an agent knows when it can select a action and that it knows which actions are
available. This deﬁnition is taken from Osborne and Rubinstein [12], deﬁnition 200.1, where
it is called an extensive game form. We have extended the information sets such that agents
also have information when they are not in charge, which is a common extension for logical
purposes [14, 3].
Game Form Interpretation A game form interpretation is deﬁned as a tuple (Σ,H,Ow,∼
, P, π). The ﬁrst elements (Σ,H,Ow,∼) are a game form. The set P contains propositions
and π : H → 2P is a function that assigns to each history the set of propositions that are true
in the ﬁnal state of that history. The idea is that these propositions can be used to refer to
certain histories, for instance to histories where an agent achieves a certain goal.
Strategies A strategy SΓ for a coalition Γ is a function that takes a history h such that
Ow(h) ∈ Γ and returns a non-empty set of actions SΓ(h) such that SΓ(h) ⊆ A(h). This
means that strategies can be non-deterministic. We sometimes call the strategy SΓ a strategy
profile to indicate that it contains a strategy for every agent in Γ. There is no fundamental
diﬀerence between strategies and strategy proﬁles in this paper. A strategy SΓ is uniform
iﬀ for all h, j with h ∼Owh j it is the case that SΓ(h) = SΓ(j). A uniform strategy thus
prescribes the same actions in histories that an agent cannot distinguish.
For the purposes of this paper, we think of a game form as a description of a commonly
known protocol for interaction between autonomous agents. All agents have preferences
and it is common knowledge that these are private, thus not known to other agents. It is
also commonly known that agents with diﬀerent objectives cannot communicate outside the
structure of the game. If an agent adopts a certain strategy, for instance to reach a certain
goal, then the agent itself knows which strategy it is playing, but other agents do not know
this. If a coalition of agents has a goal, then it is assumed that agents have the right means
of coordination in order to select a group strategy.
Mental capabilities are included in the deﬁnition of a game form. We assume that if an
agent is for instance forgetful, that this has been encoded in the equivalence relation in the
game form. The relations in the game form thus represent what an agent knows from all its
sources, not just its observations. Under this assumption it makes sense to relate properties of
agents, such as perfect recall and perfect memory in section 6, to properties of the equivalence
relations.
3 Scenarios
To illustrate the principles of ATEL covered in this paper we will ﬁrst have a look at some
examples. The ﬁrst game form we study is game form G1 in ﬁgure 1. In this game agent A
can ﬁrst choose between action 1 and action 2. Agent B then chooses for either action 3 or
action 4. The dashed line indicated that agent B does not know what agent A has done when
B has to choose. For this game form we are interested in the strategic abilities of agent B.
In the original ATEL interpretation agent B has a strategy in t0 to satisfy q. If A chooses
action 1 it would chooses action 3, if A chooses action 2 it would choose action 4. However,
at t1 agent B doesn’t know whether agent A has played action 1 or 2. In terms of Jonker [9],
agent B doesn’t have a uniform strategy to satisfy q in t0. In t1 things are a bit diﬀerent.
Agent B does have a uniform strategy to achieve q, but doesn’t know which one. In terms
of Jonker and Van der Hoek and Jamroga, it cannot identify the right strategy. If agent B
would want to satisfy p, it would be able to identify a uniform strategy in t1: choosing action
3.
But what if agent B would want to satisfy p ∧ q? At t1 it wouldn’t be able to identify a
uniform strategy, since it doesn’t know whether agent A has played action 1 or 2. Nevertheless,
it has a ’best bet’ strategy: playing action 3. In the view of the agent, this strategy might
make it reach its goal. There is no other strategy that is better than this one, so we call
this strategy undominated. It would be dominated if there existed a strategy that performed
better in some of the indistinguishable states, and equally in the others. We will deﬁne this
more formally in section 4. Let us now assume that we are in the left situation, after action 1.
We notice that if agent B plays his ’best bet’ strategy, it will achieve his goal. We therefore
say that agent B is able to satisfy p ∧ q, or that p ∧ q is achievable for agent B.
Game form G2 in ﬁgure 2 illustrates that an agent can have several undominated strategies.
We assume the current situation is the one after action 2. Agent B wants to make p true
in the next states. The agent has two actions to choose from, and it cannot identify which
action is best for achieving p. In the left situation, the appropriate strategy would be action
4. In the right situation, the appropriate strategy would be action 5. For the middle situation
however it does not matter which strategy the agent chooses. Either action leads to a desired
state. Thus, the agent has two strategies that might make him reach his goal and to him it
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is not clear whether to use one or the other, they are both undominated. The best he can do
is to randomly choose one of the two. Fortunately, since agent A has played action 2, agent
B will reach his goal with any of his undominated strategies. Therefore, we say that agent B
is able to satisfy p, or that p is achievable for agent B.
Both in game forms G1 and G2, the ability of agent B to reach his goal was facilitated by
agent A’s choice. In G1, we saw that agent B was able to satisfy p and q because agent A
had chosen to play action 1. We say that agent A has the ability to give agent B the ability
to satisfy p and q. The fact that agent A moves before agent B does, does not imply that
agent B cannot enable agent A to reach certain goals. If agent B decides beforehand to play
action 3, it in a way gives agent A the ability to satisfy (eventually) p and q.
In ﬁgure 3 another game form is depicted. This game form is unusual since agents lose
information, according to the relations indicated. Agent A seems not to remember, after
action 1 that it has chosen this action. Similarly, B knows the diﬀerence between histories 1
and 2 but one step later it cannot distinguish 13 and 23. These peculiarities are discussed in
section 3 and section 6.
The last scenario pictured in ﬁgure 4 deals with the question whether agents can lose
abilities by choosing certain strategies. This is a minor issue, not very related to the previous
issues. Nevertheless it illustrates one issue in the interpretation of ATEL. Assume that the
leftmost state is the current state. The interesting property of this model is that the agent
has the ability to make p true in the next state. It cannot get rid of this ability in one step. If
we assume that agents can unconditionally commit to strategies, so that they cannot change
later their strategy, than A would be able, by committing to go to the rightmost state, to
causing itself not to be able to achieve p. This is not what we think of as intuitive. Therefore
we assume that agents can always change their own strategy at a later moment.
Finally, we turn back to game form G1 again. Consider the scenario where agent A has
decided to play the strategy of choosing action 2. At time t0, this inﬂuences the knowledge
of agent A. It now knows for example that agent B won’t be able to satisfy p ∧ q anymore.
This is called strategic knowledge [5]. It is a kind of provisional knowledge; provided that an
agent will follow the strategy it has committed to, it has more knowledge about the future.
The same holds for a coalition; provided that they follow the same strategy and that this
is common knowledge between them, their knowledge about the future increases. The next
section shows how strategic knowledge, along with the other principles explained above, can
be formalized using a new interpretation of atel∗.
4 Strategic Temporal Epistemic Logic
The language atel∗ is the smallest language L such that for any formula φ,ψ ∈ L, any
coalition of agents Γ and any agent X it is the case that:
φ ∨ ψ ∈ L ¬φ ∈ L φ ∈ L φ U ψ ∈ L
φ ∈ L KXφ ∈ L  Γ	 φ ∈ L
This language is in fact a mixture between ATL∗ and epistemic logic [6]. The reader will
be familiar with disjunction (φ ∨ ψ, ‘or’) and negation (¬φ, ‘not’). The temporal operators
, U and say something about the future. φ means that φ is true in all future states.
The formula φ U ψ expresses the fact that at a certain point in the future ψ becomes true,
and until that time φ is true. The next-state operator φ expresses the fact that in the next
state φ is true. The epistemic operator KXφ indicates that agent X knows that φ holds. The
coalition operator  Γ	 φ expresses that the set of agents Γ can ensure that φ holds.
We interpret formulas φ over a model M and a history h and write M,h |= φ if the formula
is true. Unlike previous interpretations we include strategies in the model. A model M is a
pair (F, SΣ) where F is a game form with interpretation and SΣ a strategy for all agents.
We deﬁne the neutral strategy S0Γ as the strategy which returns all available actions:
S0Γ(h) = A(h). Strategies for diﬀerent coalitions can be combined using the function combine
into a function for a larger coalition. The strategy combine(Γ, SΓ, T ) is equal to SΓ for agents
in Γ and equal to T for other agents:
combine(Γ, SΓ, T )(h) =
{
SΓ(h) if Ow(h) ∈ Γ
T (h) if Ow(h) /∈ Γ
A model M = (F, SΣ) contains information about all strategies that the agents currently
use. An agent only knows his own strategy. It knows it will follow that strategy, but assumes
that nothing more is known about others than that they adhere to the neutral strategy S0Σ.
Thus, when evaluating the knowledge of an agent about the future, we use the model that
is the result of the agent using its strategy, while the others use the neutral strategy. This
strategy is in fact the least restrictive strategy indistinguishable to the agent. We deﬁne it
using the operator k(M,X) which is deﬁned as
k((F, SΣ),X) = (F, combine(X,SΣ, S0Σ))
The function k is used in the deﬁnition of the knowledge operator.
In order to deﬁne the meaning of the strategic operator  Γ 	, we use the idea of
undominated strategies. Informally a strategy S dominates T if S is strictly better than T for
reaching a certain goal. A coalition of rational agents, we assume, will not play a strategy
if that strategy is dominated. To deﬁne domination, we ﬁrst we need to deﬁne two other
operators. The operator update is similar to k: it returns the model that represents the view
of agents in coalition Γ after the adoption of strategy SΓ. Agents in Γ adhere to SΓ but other
agents can act in any way they want:
update(M,SΓ) = (F, combine(Γ, SΓ, S0Σ))
Furthermore, we call a strategy SΓ successful (success(M,h, SΓ, φ)) in history h (for
Γ with respect to φ) if and only if update(M,SΓ), h |= φ. A strategy SΓ dominates a
strategy TΓ with respect to a model M , a goal φ and a history h if two conditions are met :
There is a history h′ ∼Γ h such that success(M,h, SΓ, φ) but not success(M,h, TΓ, φ), and
secondly there is no history j such that success(M, j, TΓ, φ) but not success(M, j, SΓ, φ).
This deﬁnition of dominance makes the domination relation transitive and asymmetric. These
properties ensure that any nonempty, ﬁnite set of strategies contains at least one strategy not
dominated by another strategy in the set. We say that achievable(M,h,Γ, φ) if for all
undominated strategies SΓ it is the case that success(M,h, SΓ, φ). The reason that we
quantify over all undominated strategies is that we imagine that a coalition picks randomly
any undominated strategy, since it has no reason to prefer one undominated strategy over
the other. Therefore success is only guaranteed if all undominated strategies are successful.
Using all these notions we deﬁne the interpretation of atel∗ as follows:
M,h |=p iﬀ p ∈ π(h)
M,h |=¬φ iﬀ not M,h |= φ
M,h |=φ ∨ ψ iﬀ M,h |= φ or M,h |= ψ
M,h |=KXφ iﬀ ∀h′ : h′ ∼X h =⇒ k(M,X), h′ |= φ
M,h |=φ U ψ iﬀ ∀j ∈ Z(H(SΣ, h))∃i∀k : |h| ≤ k < i =⇒
M, j0 . . . jk |= φ) ∧M, j0 . . . ji |= ψ
M,h |= φ iﬀ ∀h′ ∈ H(SΣ, h) : M,h′ |= φ
M,h |= φ iﬀ ∀a ∈ SΣ(h) : M,ha |= φ
M,h |= Γ	 φ iﬀ achievable(M,h,Γ, φ)
The set H(S, h) contains all histories of H that start with h and are consistent (after h)
with the strategy S. It can be deﬁned recursively. H(S, h) is the smallest set H ′ such that
h ∈ H ′ and ∀h′ ∈ H ′,∀a ∈ S(h′) : h′a ∈ H ′.
5 Examples
In section 3 we have introduced four game forms. In this section we use these game forms
to show the interpretation of example formulas. For all examples the model Mi is deﬁned as
(Gi, S0Σ). The ﬁrst examples deal with temporal properties.
M1,  |= t0 ∧ t1 ∧  t2 Initially t0 holds, then t1 and then t2
M1,  |= (t2 → ¬t1) If t2 holds, then not t1
M1,  |=  U t2 Eventually t2 holds
We have argued that in the game form G1 after action 1, the agent B can achieve p,
but not q. It can also achieve p ∧ q but it does not know that it can achieve this fact. The
translations of these facts are given here. In model G2 similar properties hold and these are
also given.
M1, 1 |= B 	 p B can make p true in the next state
M1, 1 |= ¬  B 	 q B cannot make p true in the next state
M1, 1 |= B 	 (p ∧ q) B can make p and q true in the next state
M1, 1 |= ¬KB  B 	 (p ∧ q) B doesn’t know it can make p and q true
M2, 1 |= ¬  B 	 p B cannot make p true in the next state
M2, 2 |= B 	 p B can make p true in the next state
M2, 2 |= ¬KB  B 	 p B does not know it can make p true in the next state
In game form G3, agent A does not remember the choices it has made in the past. Agent
B does not always know its previous observations. This is expressed in the next statements.
The next model, G4, shows that agents cannot in general commit themselves to act against
their future preferences.
M3,  |= KA  A	 p A knows it can make p true in the next state
M3,  |= ¬  A 	 KAp A cannot know p in the next state
M3, 1 |= KB q B knows q is true in the next state
M3, 1 |= ¬ KBq In the next state B does not know that q is true
M4,  |= A 	  p A can make p true in the next next state
M4,  |= ¬  A 	 ¬  A	 p A cannot ensure it cannot make p true
M4,  |= ¬  A 	 ¬  A 	 p A cannot ensure that next it cannot make p true
Turning back to game form G1, we give an example of how an agent can have strategic
knowledge. Suppose that agent A has committed to the strategy of playing action 2. It then
knows that agent B will not be able to achieve the satisfaction of p∧ q anymore. Let SA,B be
the strategy proﬁle consisting of the strategy of playing action 2 for agent A and the neutral
strategy for agent B. We can then represent the knowledge described above as:
(G1, SA,B),  |= KA¬  B 	  p ∧ q A knows that B won’t be able to satisfy p ∧ q
6 Perfect Recall and Perfect Memory
Agents have perfect recall if they never forget their previous observations and the actions
they have chosen [12]. Similarly the have perfect memory [10, 2] if they do not forget their
observations. Traditionally game theory has focused on perfect recall agents, but artiﬁcial
agents in multiagent systems often do not have these properties. For the complexity of solving
games, or model checking temporal formulas, it is relevant whether the systems have perfect
recall of perfect memory [10, 7]. Therefore we present here two theorems that characterize
whether a game form interpretation has perfect recall and perfect memory. Especially we want
to illustrate the diﬀerence between perfect recall and perfect memory, since this diﬀerence does
not appear in temporal logic without strategies, but does exist in games and strategic logics.
Making use of the strategy proﬁles that we have included in the model is necessary for the
proof of the perfect recall property. The authors are not sure whether a diﬀerent theorem
regarding perfect recall could hold for previous interpretations of atel∗.
It can be argued that perfect recall is not a property of a game, but a property of a player in
a game. However we think of the equivalence relations ∼X in a game form (Σ,H,Ow, [∼a]a∈Σ)
as representing the knowledge of the agents. We thus assumed that the capabilities of the
agents have been included in the equivalence relations. Thus we view perfect recall as a prop-
erty that a game form can or cannot have. We deﬁne perfect recall in terms of observations;
an agent has perfect recall if it remembers all its observations, including the actions it has
chosen. Let the OX(h) be the function returning the ordered list of all observations and
actions chosen by agent X in history h. Then an agent X has perfect recall if and only if
h ∼X j ↔ OX(h) = OX(j). The function OX can be deﬁned recursively. The observation
function of ha contains all observations of h, plus maybe the action a (if Ow(h) = X) and
the observation made in ha. Using such recursive deﬁnition, it is not hard to show that the
property of perfect recall is equivalent to the next two properties.
ha ∼X jb → h ∼X j
Ow(h) = X ∧ ha ∼X jb → a = b
This characterisation of perfect recall is the one we use in the next theorem.
Theorem 1 Let F = (Σ,H,Ow, [∼X ]X∈Σ) and X ∈ Σ. X has perfect recall in F if and only
if for every P, π, every φ, every strategy SΣ and every h:
((F,P, π), SΣ), h |= KX φ→ KXφ
Suppose that X has perfect recall in F and let P, π, φ, SΣ, h be given. Let G = (F,P, π)
and suppose that (G,SΣ), h |= KX φ. Deﬁne M ′ = (G,S′Σ) = k((G,SΣ),X). Let a ∈ SΣ(h)
and jb ∼X ha. From the perfect recall properties we know that h ∼X j. From the deﬁnition
of k one can see that for any h′ it is the case that SΣ(h′) ⊆ S′Σ(h′). Using (G,SΣ), h |= KX φ
we can conclude that M ′, j |= φ. If Ow(h) = X then Ow(j) = X and we know that b = a
and therefore b ∈ SΣ(h) ⊆ S′Σ. If Ow(h) = X then S′Σ(j) = A(j) and thus b ∈ S′Σ(j). From
M ′, j |= φ and b ∈ S′Σ(j) we can conclude that M ′, jb |= φ. Since we have shown this for
an arbitrary jb ∼X ha we conclude that (G,SΣ), h |= KXφ.
For the second half, assume that for every P, π, every φ, every strategy SΣ and every h:
((F,P, π), SΣ), h |= KX φ→ KXφ
Let G = (F,P, π) and let ha ∈ H. Take jb such that ha ∼X jb. Let P = {p} and deﬁne
π such that π(j′b′) = {p} iﬀ h ∼X j′ and b′ ∈ A(j′). Let S = S0Σ. This interpretation ensures
that (G,S), h |= KX p. We can derive from the assumptions that (G,S), h |= KXp. Thus
for every a ∈ A(h) it is the case that (G,S), ha |= KXp. Since ha ∼X jb, we conclude that
(G,S), jb |= p. By deﬁnition of π(p) this gives us h ∼X j.
Let G = (F,P, π) and let ha ∈ H be such that Ow(h) = X. take jb ∈ H such that
ha ∼X jb. From the previous part we can already conclude that h ∼X j. Let P = {p}
and let S = SΣ be a strategy such that S(h) = {a}. deﬁne π such that π(j′b′) = {p} iﬀ
b′ = a and j′ ∼X h. These deﬁnitions ensure that (G,S), h |= KX p. We can derive
(G,S), h |= KXp. From the deﬁnition of next we know that (G,S), ha |= KXp and thus
that (G,S), jb |= p. By deﬁnition of p we conclude that a = b. This concludes the proof.
An agent with perfect memory remembers all its previous observations. Let MX(h) be
the function returning the ordered list of all observations by agent X in history h (excluding
the actions it has chosen). We deﬁne that an agent X has perfect memory if and only if
h ∼X j ↔ MX(h) = MX(j). Again, one can deﬁne the observation function M recursively.
Using such recursive deﬁnition, it is not hard to show that the property of perfect memory is
equivalent to ha ∼X jb → h ∼X j.
Theorem 2 Let F = (Σ,H,Ow, [∼X ]X∈Σ) be a game form and X ∈ Σ. X has perfect
memory in F if and only if for every P, π, every φ, and every h:
((F,P, π), S0Σ), h |= KX φ→ KXφ
In this theorem, instead of just any strategy we use the neutral strategy S0Σ. An important
property of this strategy is that k((F, S0Σ),X) = (F, S
0
Σ).
For the ﬁrst half of the proof, let X have perfect memory in F and assume that P, π, φ
and h are given. Let M = ((F,P, π), S0Σ) and assume that M,h |= KX φ. Let a ∈ A(h) and
jb any history with jb ∼X ha. From the perfect memory property we know that j ∼X h. We
can derive that k(M,X), j |= φ. Since M contains the neutral strategy, k(M,X) = M and
thus M, j |= φ. This means that M, jb |= φ. Since we have shown this for an arbitrary jb
with with jb ∼X ha we can conclude that M,h |= KXφ.
For the second part, assume that for every P, π, φ and h: ((F,P, π), S0Σ), h |= KX φ →
KXφ. Let ha ∼X jb be given. Deﬁne P = {p} and π such that π(h′a′) = {p} iﬀ
h′ ∼X h and a′ ∈ A(h′). This deﬁnition ensures that M,h |= KX p. We can conclude
that M,h |= KXp. From this formula one can derive that M,ha |= KXp and thus that
M, jb |= p. this means that π(jb) = {p} and thus that j ∼X h. Therefore X has perfect
memory in F .
7 Conclusions and Further research
We have presented the logic atel∗ and given a new interpretation to the operator associated
with strategic ability. Its advantages over previously suggested deﬁnitions are that the mean-
ing corresponds, in the authors’ opinions, best with the natural meaning of having a strategy
in an extensive game. A characteristic feature is that under this interpretation agents may
have abilities they do not know they have. We have shown that one can characterize the
properties perfect recall and perfect memory with an atel∗ formula.
Future work could focus on extending the language, for instance with common knowledge.
An interesting question is what the complexity is of evaluating this logic over ﬁnite state
systems. Furthermore it would be interesting to see whether similar semantics can be given
for agents that do know each others’ strategy immediately, or for coalitions that are not
able to coordinate their actions. Finally it would be interesting to apply this logic to example
problems such as the Russian Cards problem [18] and the Dining Cryptographers problem [17].
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Abstract
We present in this paper a formal framework for argumentation-
based dialogues between agents. These latter manage the dialogues
with the help of three components: an argumentative component to
generate arguments, a social component to interprete arguments, and
a conventional component to manage the sequence of coherent moves.
We formalize the notion of dialogue-game to address the gap between
individual moves and the extended sequence of coherent moves that
arise between agents. The moves are not associated with an intention,
however the dialogues have a goal.
1 Introduction
During the last decade, many Agent Communication Languages (ACL) were
designed for the interaction in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS). These ACL do
not succeed to address formal inter-agent dialogues.
Most of the existing ACL are based on speech acts theory [8]. For ex-
ample, FIPA-ACL [7] or KQML [4] define communicative acts by pre/post
conditions bearing on the mental attitudes of agents. Many shortcomings
come from this approach. We have identified here three main shortcomings.
(1) The illocutionary force, i.e. the intention of the speaker, is considered as
the main characteristic of the speech act. This is the reason why the agents
must be understood in terms of mental concepts. (2) The institutional value
of the speech acts is implicit. Then, the communication has no social seman-
tics to be judged in a public perspective [9]. (3) This approach considers a
communicative act as an epiphenomenon. Therefore, the semantics of com-
municative acts is so rich that it is far too complex to determine an answer
by just inferring mental states[3].
By contrast, our work is inspired by formal dialectic [10]. We present in
this paper an extension of the framework for argumentation-based dialogues
between agents proposed by Parsons et al. [5, 1, 2].. The agents manage the
dialogues with the help of three components, each of them addressing one of
the previous issues. We formalize the notion of dialogue-game to address the
gap between individual moves and the extended sequence of coherent moves
that arise between agents. The moves are not associated with an intention,
however the dialogues have a goal.
Paper overview. Section 2 presents the argumentation-based reasoning
as defined in [1]. In accordance with this background, we modify the formal
framework for dialogues proposed by Parsons et al. [5] in section 3. The
agents share a knowledge language and a communication language (cf section
3.1) in order to reason together (cf section 3.2). We formalize the notion of
dialogue in section 4. Then, the proprieties of the dialogues can be studied
(cf section 4.2).
2 Argumentation system
An argumentation system as defined in [1] is a set of arguments with a con-
flicting relation and a preference relation from which could be extracted a
set of acceptable arguments.
The knowledges are factual judgments gather in a knowledge base, written
Σ. This base contains formulae of a propositional language, written L. `
stands for classical deduction and ≡ for logical equivalence.
In order to evaluate preferences between the judgments, the knowledge
base has a preference order captured by a preordering relation. This pref-
erence relation  denotes a binary relation that is reflexive and transitive.
This preference ordering makes it possible to deduce a stratification of the
base Σ into non-overlapping sets Σn  ...  Σ1 such that facts in Σi are all
equally preferred and are more preferred than those in Σj with i ≤ j. The
number of the highest numbered layer that has a member in a non-empty set
H is written level(H).
An argument is composed of a formula, called conclusion, and a set of
formulae, called support, from which the conclusion can be inferred.
Definition 1. An argument is a pair P = (H, h) where h is a formula of
L and H a subset of Σ such that:
1. H ⊆ Σ is consistent;
2. H ` h;
3. H is minimal, so no subset of H satisfying both 1 and 2 exists.
H is called the support of P , written H = support(P ) and h is the conclu-
sion of P , written h = conclusion(P ).
An argument P is trivial iff support(P ) = {conclusion(P )}. Let A(Σ)
denote the set of arguments built on Σ.
Since Σ can be inconsistent, arguments may conflict. The next definition
precises the notion of undercutting to capture these conflicts. An argument
is undercut iff there is one of the formulae of its support which is denied by
another argument.
Definition 2. Let P1 and P2 two arguments of A(Σ). P1 undercuts P2 iff
∃h ∈ support(P2) such that h ≡ ¬conclusion(P1).
Moreover, the preferences between arguments can be evaluated.
Definition 3. Let P1 and P2 two arguments of A(Σ). P1 is preferred to
P2 (written P1 pref P2) iff: level(support(P2)) > level(support(P1)).
These two orders make it possible to distinguish different types of relations
between arguments.
Definition 4. Let P1, P2 be two arguments of A(Σ) and S ⊆ A(Σ) be a set
of arguments.
  P1 defends itself against P2 iff P2 undercut P1 ∧ P1 pref P2. We
denote P1 defend itself P2;
  S defends P1 iff ∀P2 ∈ A(Σ) s.a P2 undercuts P1 and P1 does not
defend itself again P2 then ∃P3 ∈ S s.a. P3 undercut P2 and P2 does
not defend itself against P3. We denote S defend P1;
The notion of acceptability links the preference ordering and the under-
cutting relation.
Definition 5. Let AS = 〈A(Σ), undercut , pref 〉 be an argumentation sys-
tem. The set of acceptable arguments, written S is the least fixpoint of
a function F : S ∈ A(Σ) and F(S) = {P ∈ A(Σ); S defend P}.
The following section formalizes the framework for inter-agent dialogues
based upon this argumentation-based reasoning.
3 Dialogical system
A dialogical multi-agent system consists of a set of agents. They share a
knowledge language and a communication language. An agent is associated
with an argumentation system in order to deliberate. The arguments of its
peers must be taken into account to be interpreted and to generate counter-
arguments.
3.1 Common languages
Since the judgments of agents may be different, each agent has its own belief
base, ΣBi and its own preordering, i. These belief bases contain formulas
of a common knowledge language, written Lf. Consequently, the agents
share the same inference rule, denoted `f.
Dialogue agents utter messages each its turns. Each message has an iden-
tifier Mk. The syntax of messages is in conformance with a communication
language, CLf defined in a similar way of FIPA-ACL or KQML. A message
is also called dialogical move by reference to the game theory.
Definition 6. A dialogical move Mk ∈ CLf is defined by a 5-tuple,
Mk = 〈Sk, Hk, Rk,DGk, Lk〉 where:
  Mk is the identifier of the k
th move in the dialogue between the speaker
and the hearer. It can be referenced later in the dialogue;
  Sk = speaker(Mk) is the agent that utters the move;
  Hk = hearer(Mk) is the addressee;
  Rk = reply(Mk) is the identifier of the move to which Mk responds
(R1 = ∅);
  DGk = dialogue-game(Mk) is the dialogue game used to generate the
answer ;
  Lk = locution(Mk) is the locution composed of a performative and a
propositional content. The verb is one of the following: question, assert,
unknow, accept, challenge, withdraw.
A move uttered by a speaker is addressed to a hearer, i.e. one agent in
the audience that receives and interprets the move in order to respond. The
meaning of locutions is defined by the three components used to manage the
dialogue. (cf sections 3.2.1,3.2.2,4.1). We propose a dialogue-game in section
4.2.
Thanks to these two languages, we present here the two components used
by the agents to reason together. They take into account the arguments
of their peer, interpret them and generate counter-arguments: they argue
together.
3.2 Co-argumentation
During dialogue, agents take a stand for propositions. The commitment
store, written CSij, consists of the set of formulae perceived by the agent agi
to which the agent agj commits [10]. An agent is in conformance with the
following definition:
Definition 7. A dialogical agent agi ∈ AGf is a triple
agi = 〈Σ
B
i ,∪j 6=iCS
i
j,i〉 such as:
  ΣBi is a belief base;
  ∪j 6=iCS
i
j is the set of commitment stores built by the agent agi;
  i is the preordering relation on Σ
B
i .
The formulae in the commitment stores are taken into account to generate
arguments.
3.2.1 Argumentation component
The argumentation component precises the rational conditions of utterances
and the relative tactics.
Since agents reason together, their arguments are built on their own be-
liefs and on the commitments of the agents it is speaking to. Then, each
agent is associated with an extended argumentation system:
AS∗i = 〈Σi, undercut , pref
∗
i 〉
where Σi = Σ
B
i ∪ [
⋃
i6=j
CSij] the extended belief base
and pref ∗i the extension of the preference relation onA(Σi).
We denote S∗i the corresponding set of acceptable arguments. pref
∗
i will be
explained in section 3.2.2.
The rational condition of a locution depends on its performative and its
propositional content. An agent can assert a formula iff it has an argument
for it.
Definition 8. The predicate can assert(agi, H), called rational condition
for the assertion of a propositional content H by the agent agi, is defined
s.a.:
∀h ∈ H ∃P ∈ A(Σi) conclusion(P ) = h.
Contrary to [5], the rational condition for the assertion and the rational
condition for the acceptance of the same propositional content by the same
agent distinguish themselves.
Definition 9. The predicate can accept(agi, H), called rational condition
for the acceptance of a propositional content H by the agent agi, is defined
s.a.:
∀h ∈ H ∃P ∈ A(Σi) conclusion(P ) = h with (support(P ) 6= {h}∧
support(P )6⊆ ∪j 6=i CS
i
j).
Agents can assert propositions whatever they are supported by a trivial
argument or not. By contrast, agents do not accept all the propositions he
hears in spite of they are all supported by a trivial argument.
The other locutions (question(h), challenge(h), unknow(h), withdraw(h))
have no particular rational conditions.
Then, the rational conditions of utterances are not necessary mutually
excluded. These nondeterministic situations make it possible for agents to
choice. That is the reason why we define as Parsons et al. [5] a set of
argumentative tactics.
Definition 10. The predicate want assert(agi, H) called argumentative
tactic for the assertion of a propositional content H by the agent agi,
depends on the assertive attitude of the agent agi:
  if agi is thoughtful then want assert(agi, H) ⇔ ∀h ∈ H ∃P ∈ S
∗
i
conclusion(P ) = h;
  if agi is confident then want assert(agi, H) ⇔ can assert(agi, H).
The argumentative tactic for the acceptance is defined in a similar way.
Definition 11. The predicate want accept(agi, H) called argumentative
tactic for the acceptance of a propositional content H by the agent agi,
depends on the acceptance attitude of the agent agi:
  if agi is skeptical then want accept(agi, H) ⇔ ∀h ∈ H ∃P ∈ S
∗
i
conclusion(P ) = h with (support(P ) 6= {h} ∧
support(P )6⊆ ∪j 6=i CS
i
j);
  if agi is credulous then want accept(agi, H) ⇔ can accept(agi, H).
However the rational conditions of utterances are shared by all the agents,
the argumentative tactics are individual choices. The social component
makes it possible to interpret arguments.
3.2.2 Social component
This component provides the social semantics for the locution [9]. The move’s
meaning must not only have a private perspective to be expressed, but also
a public perspective in order to be interpreted.
In a similar way with [5], we associate a set of commitment stores to each
agent, which hold the commitments perceived during the dialogue. Commit-
ments stores are updated according to the following rules:
Definition 12. Updating rules.
Let Mk+1 ∈ CLf, s.a. speaker(Mk+1) = agj and agi ∈ AGf is in the audience.
  if Lk+1 = question(h) or Lk+1 = unknow(h) or Lk+1 = challenge(h)
or Lk+1 = withdraw(h) with h a formula of Lf then CS
i
j(Mk+1) =
CSij(Mk);
  if Lk+1 = assert(H) or Lk+1 = accept(H) with H a set of formulae of
Lf then CS
i
j(Mk+1) = CS
i
j(Mk) ∪H.
The performative withdraw (not present in [5]) has no effect on the com-
mitment stores but closes the dialogue (cf section 4.1.2). The arguments
which are received must be valuated.
Since the agents are more or less authoritative, the commitments are
considered in accordance with the estimated reliability of the agents from
whom the information is obtained. For this purpose, each agent agi ranks
the competence of the other agents with a strict total order on AGf, denoted
≺i. Contrary to[2], this preference relation defines a subjective power relation
between the agents.
The preference between formulae are evaluated in accordance with the
following cooperative principle of arguments adoption: ”agi will prefer agj’s
statements iff agj is regarded as more competent”. This principle defines 
∗
i
as a preordering relation on Σi and so pref
∗
i on A(Σi). Then, the preference
between arguments coming from different sources, the belief base (A(ΣBi )) or
the different commitment stores (A(CSij),(A(CS
i
k),. . . ), can always be eval-
uated.
Thanks to the formal framework described here, the agents argue to-
gether. They take into account the arguments of their peer, interpret them
and generate counter-arguments. However, the agents do not jointly reason
to reach common goals. We formalize the notion of dialogue-game to address
this gap.
4 Dialogue-game
Walton and Krabbe [10] have proposed a categorization of dialogues. This
classification is especially based upon the initial informational status of the
participants and the goals they share, also called the goals of the dialogue.
A dialogue-game describes the possible sequence of coherent moves to
reach a goal. The conventional component manages the sequence of moves.
4.1 Conventional component
In order to manage the sequence of moves, this component uses dialogical
rules, sequence rules, and related tactics.
4.1.1 Dialogical rules
The following basic rules regulate the dialogues whatever the dialogue-game
is. The first rule initializes the dialogue with a question on a topic. The
second one avoids redundancy of information in assertions [6]. Therefore, no
loop will happen in dialogues. The third rule takes care of turn-taking. The
fourth warrants to keep the same dialogue-game during the dialogue.
Definition 13. The moves M1,Mk+1 ∈ CLf (with k ≥ 0) are in conformance
with the following dialogical rules:
1. initialization
locution(M1) = question(p). p is called the topic of the dialogue ;
2. non-redundancy
locution(Mk+1) = assert(H) → ∀p ∈ H ∀l ≤ k locution(Ml) = assert(H
′),
p 6∈ H ′;
3. turn-taking
hearer(Mk+1) = speaker(Mk) ∧ speaker(Mk+1) = hearer(Mk);
4. dialogue-game keeping
dialogue-game(Mk+1) = dialogue-game(Mk).
We immediately deduce that a dialogue takes place between the speaker
and the hearer of the first move. A participant play one of the following
conventional roles: initiator (init), i.e. the agent beginning the dialogue
or partner (part), i.e. the agent it is speaking to. The agents that do not
participate directly are the bystanders of the dialogue.
All the agents use these four dialogical rules whatever the dialogue-game
is. However these rules are canonical, sequence rules specify the answers
allowed or not in a given situation. The following section enumerates a set of
sequence rules. The section 4.2 presents the dialogue-game using these rules.
4.1.2 Sequence rules
The sequence rules specify the answers that are (or not) allowed in a given
situation by constraining the locution and the reply field. The argumentative
tactics of the allowed moves are not necessary mutually excluded. These
nondeterministic situations renders a choice possible. That is the reason why
we define as Parsons et al. [5] a set of conventional tactics and attitudes.
Respond to a question. The rule of ”Question/Answer” allows the
hearer of a question (question(h)) to respond: either with a confirmation
(assert(h)), either with an invalidation (assert(¬h)), or with a plea of igno-
rance (unknow(h)).
In replying to a question, an agent that can either give its opinion, a con-
firmation or an invalidation, or plead ignorance is cooperative if it responds
to the request. Otherwise, it is egoist. An agent that can either respond with
a confirmation or with an invalidation is: positive if it confirms whenever
possible ; negative if it invalidates whenever possible.
Respond to an assertion. the rule of ”Assertion/Refutation”allows the
hearer of an assertion (assert(H)) to respond: either with a hearty welcome
(accept(H)), either with a refutation (assert(¬h), with h ∈ H), or with a
challenge (challenge(h′), with h′ ∈ H).
In replying to an assertion, an agent that can either give its opinion, an
hearty welcome or a refutation, or challenge is: argumentative if it challenges;
open-minded if it gives its opinion. an agent that can either respond with
a hearty welcome or with a refutation is: optimistic if it accepts whenever
possible ; pessimistic if it refutes whenever possible.
Respond to a challenge. The rule of ”Challenge/Argument”allows the
hearer agi of a challenge (challenge(h)) to respond: either with an argument
(assert(H), with H = support(P ), P ∈ A(Σi) s.a. h = conclusion(P ) ), or
with a withdrawal (withdraw(h′)) making reference to its first assertion.
In replying to a challenge, an agent patient respond with an argument
whenever possible. Otherwise, it is impatient.
Then, an algorithm selects the privileged responding move for each se-
quence rule. These algorithms are defined such as there is a single effective
responding move which is in conformance with the corresponding sequence
rule.
Closing the dialogue. The moves with performatives: unknow, accept
or withdraw close the dialogue.
A dialogue-game of persuasion consists of the combinaison of these se-
quence rules.
4.2 Dialogue-game of persuasion
The topic of persuasion dialogues is only discursive. The participants try to
reach an agreement, not a decision to act (or not to act). We aim at proving
the termination of persuasion dialogues whatever the initial situation is. By
contrast, the goals of a persuasion dialogue are reached if some particular
initial conditions are verified.
The figure 4.2 shows a persuasion dialogue-game in the extensive form
game representation where nodes are game situations and edges are associ-
ated with moves. For example, 2.3init denotes a game situation where the ex-
ponent indicates that the initiator is the speaker of the next move. 2.12,3.22,
and 4.22 denote game-over situations.
0init 1part
question(p)
2.1unknow(p)
2.2init...
assert(¬p)
2.3initassert(p)
3.1partassert(¬p)
4.1init
challenge(¬p)
5.1part
assert(H, (H,¬p) ∈ A(Σinit))
6.1init...
assert(¬h ∈ H)
6.2
accept(H)
6.3init
challenge(h ∈ H)
7.1
withdraw(¬p)
7.2part...
assert(H ′, (H ′, h) ∈ A(Σinit))
5.2
withdraw(¬p)
4.2
accept(¬p)
3.2
accept(p)
3.3part...challenge(p)
4.3
withdraw(¬p)
4.4init...
assert(H, (H, p) ∈ A(Σpart))
symmetry
symmetry
recursion
Figure 1: Persuasion dialogue in an extensive form game representation
4.2.1 Termination
The termination of persuasion dialogues can be warranted, whatever the (ar-
gumentative and conventional) attitudes and the initial informational status
of the participants are.
Theorem 1. A persuasion dialogue which takes place between two agents of
AGf and with a topic in Lf always terminates.
Proof. Thanks to the definition of the algorithms selecting the privileged re-
sponding move, the hearer can always respond whatever the sequence rule
is. The game situations 2.2init and 2.3init are equivalent by symmetry on the
propositional content of the previous assertion. The game situation 2.3part
is equivalent to the game situation 4.4init by symmetry on the propositional
content of the previous assertion even if the conventional roles are inverted.
The game situations 3.1part and 5.1part are equivalent by symmetry on the
propositional content of the previous assertion. Moreover, the second dia-
logical rule avoids redundancy of information in assertions. Then, no loop
will happen in dialogues. Σpart and Σinit are finite because the belief bases of
participants are finite. Consequently, the recursion is finite and the dialogue
closes. 
4.2.2 Success
The goal of a persuasion dialogue is to reveal the position of the participants,
to spread the participants’arguments and to verbally resolve the conflict.
Contrary to the termination of a persuasion dialogue, the goals are reached
if some particular initial conditions are verified.
Theorem 2. Let a persuasion dialogue take place between two agents of AGf
such as the topic p is a formula of Lf. If the initial informational status of
participants are such as they have conflicting thesis, even if it inverts:
  the initiator is convinced of ¬p:
[∃P ′init ∈ S
∗
init conclusion(P
′
init) = ¬p] ∧
[ 6∃Pinit ∈ Σinit conclusion(Pinit) = p];
  the partner is convinced of p:[
∃Ppart ∈ S
∗
part conclusion(Ppart) = p
]
∧[
6∃P ′part ∈ Σpart conclusion(P
′
part) = ¬p
]
.
Let a witness agent (denoted bystander) be a bystander of the dialogue with
an initially empty belief base.
If the partner is cooperative and the initiator is open-minded then the three
goals will be reached at the end of the dialogue:
1. revealing position:
p ∈ CSinitpart ∧ ¬p ∈ CS
part
init ;
2. spread of argument:
∃P ∈ A(CSinitpart) ∩ A(CS
bystander
part ) conclusion(P ) = p
∧ ∃P ′ ∈ A(CSpartinit ) ∩ A(CS
bystander
init ) conclusion(P
′) = ¬p;
3. resolving the conflict by verbal means: the witness agent is prone
to one of the participants’ thesis (even if inverts p with ¬p):
∃P ′ ∈ S∗bystander conclusion(P
′) = ¬p ∧
6∃P ∈ S∗bystander conclusion(P ) = p.
Proof. The partner is convinced of p and it is cooperative. Therefore, the
game situation 2.3init is reached. The commitment store is updated then the
partner has revealed its position. The initiator is convinced of ¬p and it is
open-minded. Then, the game situation 3.1part is reached. The commitment
store is updated then the initiator has revealed its position. Whatever the
participants’arguments are, each of them has spread a trivial argument for
its thesis.
In game-over situation 4.22 and 5.22, the witness agent has a trivial argument
for p and a trivial argument for ¬p. They undercut each other. Because the
sources of the arguments are different, only one is acceptable. Then, the
witness is prone to one of the participant thesis. In the game-over situation
6.22 and 7.12, P ′ = (H ′,¬p) is the only acceptable argument of the witness.
Therefore, this agent is prone to ¬p. The other game situations are equivalent
by recursion on the content of the previous move. Consequently, the witness
is prone to one of the participant’s thesis however the dialogue is closed. 
However we define the resolution of the conflict by verbal means in a
different way than Walton and Krabbe [10], we can demonstrate that these
two definitions are equivalent.
5 Conclusions
We have presented in this paper a formal framework for the argumentation-
based dialogues between agents. These latter manage the dialogues with
the help of three components: the argumentation component specify the
rational condition of utterances and the relative tactics ; the social component
provides the meaning of the locutions to be interpreted ; and the conventional
component manages the sequence of moves. We have formalized the notion of
dialogue-game to address the gap between individual moves and the extended
sequence of coherent moves that arise between agents. However the moves are
not associated with an intention, the dialogues have a goal. The termination
of the dialogue is demonstrated, whatever the initial status and attitudes of
the participants are. By contrast, the goals of a dialogue are reached if some
particular initial conditions are verified.
We are currently implementing this dialogical multi-agent system with
MAST1, which is an environment for the development of multi-agent ap-
plications. It provides some tools to design agents in a component-based
approach, in particular a component for inter-agent communication and an
interaction model of the agent-level components.
1http://www.emse.fr/∼vercoute/mast
We aim at extending this dyadic dialogue framework to a multi-party
one. At first, removing the restriction of two participants makes it possible to
have participants that may join and/or leave the system during the dialogue.
At second, the division of the multi-party dialogue among ontology-based
channels is not limited to unobtrusive observations but allows unsolicited
suggestions like in a newsgroup.
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Abstract
We introduce an algebraic approach to Dynamic Epistemic Logic. This approach has the
advantage that: (i) its semantics is a transparent algebraic object with a minimal set of primi-
tives from which most ingredients of Dynamic Epistemic Logic arise, (ii) it goes with the in-
troduction of non-determinism, (iii) it naturally extends beyond boolean sets of propositions,
up to intuitionistic and non-distributive situations, hence allowing to accommodate construc-
tive computational, information-theoretic as well as non-classical physical settings, and (iv)
introduces a structure on the actions, which now constitute a quantale. We also introduce
a corresponding sequent calculus (which extends Lambek calculus), in which propositions,
actions as well as agents appear as resources in a resource-sensitive dynamic-epistemic logic.
1 Introduction
Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) is a PDL-style logic to reason about epistemic actions and
updates in a multi-agent system. It focuses in particular on epistemic programs, i.e. programs that
update the information state of agents, and it has applications to modelling and reasoning about
information-flow and information exchange between agents. This is a major problem in several
fields such as secure communication where one has to deal with the privacy and authentication
of communication protocols, Artificial Intelligence where agents are to be provided with reliable
tools to reason about their environment and each other’s knowledge, and e-commerce where
agents need to have knowledge acquisition strategies over complex networks.
The standard approach to information flow in a multi-agent system has been presented in [8]
but it does not present a formal description of epistemic programs and their updates. The first
attempts to formalize such programs and updates were done by Plaza [21], Gerbrandy and Groen-
eveld [12], and Gerbrandy [10, 11]. However, they only studied a restricted class of epistemic
programs. A general notion of epistemic programs and updates for DEL was introduced in [4, 5].
However, in this approach the underlying logic on propositions is boolean. For computational
purposes one might want to relax this to an intuitionistic setting, hence conceiving propositions
as being structured in a Heyting algebra. On the other hand, continuous lattices are also mod-
els of partiality of knowledge [9], and are in general not distributive. Finally, actual physical
computational situations such as quantum computation require (at least) a non-boolean setting.
In this paper we generalize ‘boolean’ DEL by introducing the notion of an abstract epis-
temic system. This generalization goes hand-in-hand with the introduction of non-determinism
for states and actions and brings algebraic clarity to the semantics. The particular algebraic ob-
ject which we introduce is a refinement of previously used objects tailored to study concurrency
in computer science [1, 22] and the dynamics and interaction of physical systems [6]. Such an
abstract epistemic system consists of a quantale  of epistemic programs, a -right module 
of epistemic propositions, and each agent is encoded by an appearance map i.e. an endomor-
phism of the -structure. We show that the boolean DEL of [5] is a concrete example of
such an abstract epistemic system. The axioms of the modal operators follow immediately from
abstract properties of quantales and modules over them. Crucial notions of DEL are definable
abstractly and some new notions emerge naturally. The passage to a non-boolean theory also
provides a new insight into epistemic programs such as public announcement and, of a surpris-
ingly different status, public refutation. We sketch an analysis of the muddy children puzzle and
of a cryptographic attack in our setting and also provide a motivating example for the passage to
a non-boolean theory. We also provide a corresponding sequent calculus in which sequents will
typically look like


     

     

     

     

     

 Æ
where 

     

are propositions, 

     

are actions and 

    

are agents which re-
solve into a single proposition or action Æ. The fragment of the calculus restricted to actions is
the Lambek calculus [18], hence resource sensitive.
2 Epistemic propositions and epistemic programs
In this section we slightly recast and enrich the Dynamic Epistemic Logic of [5] in such a way
that it enables a smooth passage to the algebraic setting to be introduced in Section 4. Part of this
involves the introduction of non-determinism for both states and actions.
State models. For a set of facts  and a finite set of agents, a state model is a triple
  


 	

where  is the set of states,      the accessibility relation for each agent   , and
	     the valuation map which encodes satisfaction 
   	   	
. The “facts”
   are simple, objectives features of the world (“objective” in the sense of non-epistemic, i.e.
independent of the agents’ knowledge or beliefs), and the valuation map tell us what facts hold
in a given state 
  . Each accessibility relation can be repackaged as a map


     
 
 


      



 
called the appearance map of agent . The significance of the appearance maps is as follows: if
  


 then, whenever agent  is in state 
 he considers state  as a ‘possible world’. In other
words, if the actual state of the system is 
, agent  thinks  may be the actual state.
As an example,1 consider two players  and a referee . In front of everybody, the referee
throws a fair coin, catches it in his palm and fully covers it, before anybody (including himself)
can see on which side the coin has landed. There are two possible states here, state 
 in which
‘the coin lies Heads’ up (   ), hence 	
  , and state  in which the coin lies Tails
up (   ), hence 	  . We depict the state model  as


 






 


.
For every agent there are arrows between any two states (including identical states), which means
that nobody knows the ‘real state’.
We can also consider a case in which agents  and  can see the face of the coin, but agent
 cannot see it (although he knows that the others see it), so he is still uncertain if the coin is
heads or tails. In this case only agent  has several arrows between states whereas agents  and
 have only one arrow in each state, which means that if the coin is heads up they know it and
similarly for tails up. Hence PToss gets depicted as





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

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
.
An epistemic proposition  over a state model  is a subset  of , containing all the states at
which the proposition is ‘true’. The maps 	 and 

of the state model are extended to elements
of  as follows
	  

	
  
      

  




  
     
Note that we have to use intersection and not union in defining 	  since a fact is entailed by an
epistemic proposition when it holds at all the states of the proposition. This makes the passage
from  to  contravariant. In other words, the actual algebra of facts is 	, that is,
the complete boolean algebra  where the order is reversed i.e. 


	


	 

 

.
While facts are simple and non-epistemic, and thus cannot be altered by epistemic actions (see
further), epistemic propositions can express complex features of the world, which may depend
on the agents’ knowledge (and so may be changed by epistemic actions). However, notice that
each fact    corresponds to an epistemic proposition 


 
      	
, saying that
the fact holds in the current state.
In the Toss model,  and  are facts expressing the heads up or tails up of the coin. The
epistemic propositions that correspond to these facts are the states in which the fact holds. The
epistemic propositions are  
  
   
 . We depict an epistemic proposition over
a state model by double-circling the included states, hence

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represent the four epistemic propositions of Toss.
When a proposition  has exactly one state 
   (i.e.   
 is a singleton), we shall use
systematic ambiguity, identifying the proposition with the state and writing e.g.   .
1For a more elaborated example of an authentication protocol we refer the reader to [2].
Action models. Given a state model , an action model over  is a triple

 	


 	
similar to a state model except that we think of the elements of 	 as possible actions instead of
possible states and the valuation 	  	   assigns to each action  a precondition, i.e. a
proposition 	 definining the domain of applicability of : action  can happen in a state 

iff 
  	 ; e.g. a truthful announcement of a fact can only happen in those states where that
fact holds. Note that since  is boolean we can equivalently consider the states at which the
action cannot take place , denoted as    	 for each   	. The effect of an action
on states and appearance maps will be defined below in terms of an epistemic update product.
We introduce an action model over Toss. After catching the coin in his hand the referee might
secretly take a peek at the coin before covering it while nobody notices this. The action model is
now depicted as










where  stands for ‘cheating’ and  for ‘nothing happens’ and 	  
 . The action model
can be refined when replacing  by 

and 

where 	

   and 	

   , specifying
what the referee saw in case of deceit:
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An epistemic program  over an action model 	 is a subset  of 	; the 	 and 

maps are both
extended covariantly by continuity
	 

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
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The union in the definition of 	 maps for programs says that an epistemic program is applicable
where at least one of its actions is applicable. This makes the  map follow contravariantly
by boolean negation i.e.     	. Epistemic programs introduce non-determinism:
whenever 

 

then 

is obtained from 

by increasing nondeterminism;   

 


stands for “either action 

or action 

takes place”.
In our example with actions 

, 

and  the epistemic program 

 

 stands for the
non-deterministic action , in the sense that the outcome of the toss can be either. We depict
the program over an action by double-circling the including actions. Hence the picture of the
program   

 

 over

is
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As in the case of states and propositions, we use systematic ambiguity to identify determin-
istic programs    with their unique undferlying action .
Update. Given a state model  and an action model

over  we define their update product


to be a new state model given by
  	 

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hence   	    	 and 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
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

 

. In our example, after the cheating action


where the coin has lied Heads up,  and  think that nobody knows on which side the coin
is lying. But they are wrong! The system after this action can be updated by taking the update
product of the two models Toss and 

depicted above:
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Note that in general   	 and  are not necessarily disjoint.2
Definition 2.1 We define the update product of an epistemic proposition  over  and an epis-
temic program  over

as the epistemic proposition
   


	         
 


The proposition    provides the strongest postcondition for  with respect to epistemic
program : for each state in    the proposition  holds before running the . It can be
seen that      iff   	  , where  is the falsum (i.e. the trivially false epistemic
proposition over ).
Modalities. We define the epistemic modality for each agent    as the unary connective
which assigns to proposition    over  another proposition


 
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We read 

 as ‘agent  knows or believes  ’.3
We define the dynamic modality for each epistemic program  over

as the unary connec-
tive which assigns to proposition    over  another proposition
 

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Note that (as mentioned before) some states 
   can be themselves pairs of states and actions

  which make the above definition well defined. The proposition  provides the weakest
precondition for  with respect to the epistemic program : for each state in  the proposition
 holds after running .
2In fact later, the most important models we shall consider later (DEL models) are closed with respect to update
product, i.e.    .
3Taking either ‘knows’ or ‘beliefs’ depends on the context.
Sequential composition. The sequential composition
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

over  of two action models
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and
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
both over  means ‘first do
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
and then do


’ and is defined as
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Again note that 	

 	

and 	

(or 	

) are not necessarily disjoint.4 The action model over a
state model  contains an action skip in which nothing happens iff 5
skip  skip 	skip      skip  skip 
Notice the use of systematic ambiguity: we denoted with the same name (skip ) both the program
skip and its only action. It is easy to see that skip is a unit, up to isomorphism, both for update
product and sequential composition.
Definition 2.2 We define the sequential composition of two epistemic programs 

over


and


over


as the epistemic proposition 

 

 

 

over





.
Concrete epistemic systems. We now have all the tools to make the passage of DEL in the
sense of [5] to ‘concrete epistemic systems’ which we put forward as a stepping-stone towards
‘abstract epistemic systems’. A DEL model is essentially one that is closed under update product
and sequential composition (and contains a skip), while a concrete epistemic system consists of
all the epistemic propositions and all the epistemic programs of a DEL model:
Definition 2.3 A DEL model is a pair 

 where  is a state model and

is an action model
over  such that skip  	,   	   and 	  	  	.
Definition 2.4 Given a DEL model 

, a concrete epistemic system is the pair 	
which goes equipped with valuation 	, appearance maps 



and all other operations of the
DEL model extended to  and 	 as we showed above.
3 The algebra of programs and propositions
A sup-lattice  is a complete lattice with maps which preserve arbitrary joins as homomorphism.
Recall that each sup-lattice also has arbitrary meets, namely





	
       


for any   . Hence the designation ‘sup-lattice refers to the fact that we require structure-
preserving maps only to preserve arbitrary joins (cf. the designations locales and frames for
complete Heyting algebras [16]). We denote bottom and top of  by  and  respectively and
define its set of atoms as
             
4In fact later we only consider models where    .
5This action has been denoted as  in the preceding examples.
A lattice  is atomistic iff
    
	
       
Every sup-morphism     has a (unique) right Galois adjoint 

satisfying


  
  


and can be explicitly given as


      

	
    

  
The left Galois adjoint   moreover preserves arbitrary meets. We denote an adjoint pair by


 

. In computational terms, one can think of the left Galois adjoint 

as assigning weakest
preconditions with respect to the program  .
A quantale6 is a sup-lattice  equipped with a monoid structure    satisfying
 


	





	

  




	




  
	



  
Hence for all    the maps        and        preserve arbitrary joins and
hence they have Galois adjoints        and      explicitly given by
   
	
          
	
        
We refer to    and  as the residual operations. A quantale homomorphism is both a
sup-homomorphism and a monoid-homomorphism. Examples of quantales are: the set  of
all sup-endomorphisms of a complete lattice  ordered pointwisely; the set of all relations from
a set  to itself ordered by pointwise inclusion — this quantale is isomorphic to  ; the
powerset of any monoid with composition extended by continuity.
A -right module for a quantale  is a sup-lattice  which goes equipped with a module
action     , that is,
   
 

 

   

 

 
	



 
	

 

 
	



  
	



 
Again we have two right Galois adjoints    and    where
 
	


  

    


	
       


As for some examples, a quantale  is a -right module over itself with composition as the
tensor and a complete lattice  is a -right module with function application as the tensor.
6The term ‘quantale’ was introduced in [20]. For a survey on quantales we refer to [23]. For insightful categorical
perspectives on quantales and -modules we refer to [17] and [24].
Definition 3.1 [1] A system is a pair  with  a quantale and  a -right module.
A system is atomistic when both  and  are atomistic and the following equations hold
            


 

   

 

  
These conditions can be interpreted as the fact that ‘the atoms of both the quantale and the module
behave deterministically’.
Proposition 3.2 i. Epistemic programs 	 with

as

, sequential composition as  and
‘skip’ as  form a quantale.7 ii. Epistemic propositions  with  as  and update product
as  form a right 	-module. iii. The pair 	 is an atomistic system. The atoms
of the module  correspond to the states 
  , while the atoms of the quantale 	
correspond to the actions   	.
Proposition 3.3 i. The appearance maps 

   , and for all   	 the maps
       are all sup-homomorphisms. ii. The appearance maps 

 	 
	, and for all   	 the maps       	 	 are quantale-homomorphisms.
iii. For every epistemic proposition    and every epistemic program   	, we have


    

  

 
iv. For every state (i.e. atomic proposition) 
   and every action (i.e. atomic program)   	
we have that:
if 
    then 


   


 

 
The last property can be generalised by introducing a notion of coherence:
Definition 3.4 A pair   where  is an epistemic proposition and  is an epistemic program
is coherent iff

      
   
i.e. iff   	 for every   . This means that proposition  ensures the possibility of all
the actions subsumed by program . An equivalent definition which doesn’t refer to states or
actions is the following:


  

  

 

   

  or    
Proposition 3.5 If   is a coherent pair then we have


    

  

 
7This construction is implicit in the relational composition of dynamic actions in [14].
Proposition 3.6 i. For    the right Galois adjoint to appearance  

    
is knowledge 

 (=the epistemic modality). ii. For   	 the right Galois adjoint to
update      is the dynamic modality . iii. The right Galois adjoint to
appearance 

  	  	 introduces an epistemic modality 

 on actions. iv.
The right Galois adjoint to left- and right-composition       	  	 introduce
respectively weakest pre-specification  and strongest post-specification , and the right
Galois adjoint to    	  introduces , a variant on this.8
Proof. All follows by construction and basic facts on sets, cartesian products and relations. 
4 Abstract epistemic systems
The propositions of the previous section lead us to the following definitions.
Definition 4.1 A system-endomorphism    is a pair



    

  

where  is a sup-homomorphism,  is a quantale homomorphism and


   

 

 (1)
for all   and   .
Definition 4.2 An epistemic system is a tuple  



 where  is a system and




are system-endomorphisms.
Interpretation. The elements of the quantale  are to be thought of as the epistemic programs
and its unit as skip, the elements of the module  are to be thought of as the epistemic propo-
sitions, or if one wants, the not necessarily deterministic states, the labels    are the agents
with the endomorphisms 



as their appearance maps. The kernel of a program    is
        
and comprises the preconditions: it contains the epistemic propositions to which  cannot be
applied. The stabilizer
          
comprises the facts: it consists of those epistemic propositions which are stable under epistemic
actions. The satisfaction relation is included in the partial ordering of  : for a state   and
fact    we have    	   . All modalities and other right Galois adjoints
discussed and introduced in Proposition 3.6 arise also here as right Galois adjoints and hence
there interpretation still holds e.g. “knowledge 

is the adjoint to appearance 

”.
8The residual    assigns to its argument Æ the weakest program   Æ which one has to effectuate after
effectuating  such that the net effect is below Æ. The residual  assigns to its argument Æ the strongest program
Æ which one has to effectuate before effectuating  such that the net effect is below Æ. The right Galois adjoint
does  assigns to its argument Æ the weakest proposition  before effectuating  which guarantees  after.
For a discussion on pre- and post-specification we refer to [7, 15].
Nature of the modalities. We identify the basic properties of the modalities.
Proposition 4.3 In any epistemic system we have



   


 

  


 




  




  





Proof: Since 

is a right Galois adjoint it preserves arbitrary meets, that is 






 







, and hence it preserves the empty meet and binary meets, and is monotone. 
Since all other modalities preserve arbitrary meets the same result holds for them and for all
other right Galois adjoints. In an intuitionistic context where one might take  to be a frame
(i.e. a (complete) Heyting algebra with sup-homomorphisms) we can internalize the partial order
using the defining property of a Heyting algebra so we obtain
  

 


 





Hence in the special case that    and    we obtain the intuitionistic modal logic


of [26]. We conclude that intuitionistic epistemic systems, that is epistemic systems for
which  is a frame, generalize intuitionistic modal logic to multiple agents and dynamics in
terms of epistemic programs. If  is moreover a complete boolean algebra such as the powerset
of Section 2 then Kripke’s axiom K follows i.e.



 

 


 





Diamonds and corresponding rules arise in that case by duality.
Learning. The fact that eq(1) in definition 4.1 is an inequality expresses learning of agents.
Some of the clauses of the appearance of an agent on an update product might get eliminated
from the left hand side of eq(1) simply because some of the sub-action of the program might
not be applicable on some of the sub-states of the proposition. This implies that the agent learns
something new as the result of update (left hand side is stronger than the right hand side).
We can also force the equality by introducing the notion of coherence:
Definition 4.4 A pair   where   and    is coherent iff


  

  

 

   

  or   
In an atomistic system, every pair       of an atomic proposition and
an atomic action where   ! is coherent.
Definition 4.5 A strong system endomorphism is a system endomorphism where for all coherent
pairs   we have


   

 

 
A strong epistemic system is a tuple  



 where  is a system and 



are strong system-endomorphisms.
Theorem 4.6 Every atomistic strong epistemic system for which both  and  are completely
distributive boolean algebras can be represented as a concrete epistemic system.
Proof: It suffices to set   , 	   and   . The accessibility
relations arise from the appearance maps, satisfaction from   	
 	 
   for 
   and
   and preconditions from 	    for   	. 
5 Some dynamic epistemic situations
For a given epistemic system  



the following are some examples of some special
epistemic programs that can be defined in the system. Note that   

, where
        , and hence “being not in the precondition of ” exists as a proposition in
 for all   .
1. Public refutation of the proposition    is an epistemic program    with




 , that is: !"#$%&'(


, and for which  .
2. Private refutation to subgroup This is also a program that privately refutes a proposition
 to the subgroup " of agents.  is the same as before and 



  and




 , that is: !"#$%&'(








.
3. Failure test of a proposition  is a program  that tests when  fails. It is a particular
case of private refutation where  is refuted to an empty set of agents   and




 , that is: !"#$%&'(






.
4. Public announcement is also definable in our setting. However, while “being not in the
precondition of ” is a proposition in  for all   , this is not the case for “being in
the precondition of ”. To see this consider the lattice        with  such
that     where in the language of Section 2 we have 	   , which
can not be represented by a single element of  . The reason for this is that this lattice
is non-boolean. Hence public announcement of the proposition    is an epistemic
program    for which 

   and for which

 has a boolean complement




, satisfying 



 .
We now present some case studies. Given an epistemic system  



on which we
impose particular conditions which encode the desired state and action models.
Cheating. Consider the ’cheating’ scenario of the first section where the set of agents is  
. Recall that there are two possibilities in the state model Toss, 
 in which the coin
is Heads up and  in which it is Tails up. We model this abstractly by assuming as given an
epistemic system , with 
    and 

 . The facts are encoded as stabilizers, i,
e. we are given propositions    . All these are assumed to satisfy the following
conditions: 


  

  
  for all    
        ; the epistemic program


  has maps 



  



   and 



  

, and kernel 

  .
This program describes an instance of cheating where the coin is heads up. 
  

  is the
proposition 
 after it is updated by 

.
Let us reason about this scenario, using our algebraic setting, e. to prove that 


 

 .
Indeed by 



being system homomorphisms and eq(1) we have



 

  


 



  
     
   
and the same goes for 

. On the other hand



 

  


 



  
   

 
 

   

  
 

since   

. We have 
   iff 
 

   

and by the definition of  we
get 


  . Thus 




   and by adjunction we get 


 

 which means
after updating his initial state by taking a peek, the referee knows that the coin is heads up.
If the referee is honest he uncovers the coin without taking a peek. He then publicly refutes
the ‘coin being tails’. The epistemic program in this case is the public refutation of proposition
 where 

  

  

   and   . It follows that 
    

 , and
the same goes for  and . Hence all the agents know that the coin is Heads up after the public
refutation.
The muddy children puzzle. We refer the reader for the details of the general case to [8]. Here
we discuss the case of three children  playing in the mud with  and  having muddy
foreheads. Their father publicly announces that at least one of them has mud on his forehead and
asks once if they know that they are dirty. After they all simultaneously reply “No!” once, the
muddy children  and  will know that they are muddy. This simple case has only one round
(since the number of dirty children is 2), but the general case with ! dirty children shall have
!   rounds of ”No!” replies.
As before, we model this by postulating as given an epistemic system . The set of
agents  includes children . The module  includes all possible initial states 


with
"   being those children that are dirty. Since the children cannot see their own foreheads
(which might be dirty or not) we have 




  


 


for each child . Let #
	
be the
fact that no child has a dirty forehead and #

be the fact that child  has a dirty forehead, hence
#
	
  #

       , and also 


 #

for all   ". Let  be a round
of no answers of the 3 children, i.e.  is the public refutation of 

#

 

#

 

#

and
hence   

#

 

#

 

#

and 

   for each child . Let 

  be the
be father’s announcement that at least one child has mud on his forehead hence 

  #
	
and 



  

for each child . We have to show that after the first round of refutation  each
muddy child (e.g. ) knows that he is dirty, i.e. 


 

 

#

and similarly for child
. By adjunction on dynamic and epistemic modalities and module equation   

  


 

 

 we get





 

   #

 (2)
By the 

inequality (i.e. eq(1)) it suffices to show





 

 

  #

Again by eq(1) and the assumption 



  






 

  




 

update both sides by 

  





 

   




 

 
So to prove eq(2) it suffices to show





 

   #

Replacing 

by its value will get us



 


 

   #

hence



 

   


 

   #


The first disjunct is given by the assumptions 


 #

and #

being a fact and thus stable
under updates, i.e. #

 

   #

. For the other disjunct we shall show that 


 




#

  which gives us 




   and  #

. To see this use the adjunction
to get 




 

  #

, by eq(1) it suffices to show 




 



  #

. Now replace


with its values and get 







 #

which is equal to 









 
#

. This inequality holds since by assumption 


 #

and also 


 #

. Hence the
result follows.
Note that this proof can be straightforwardlly extended to the general case by induction on
the number of dirty children.
A cryptographic attack. Two agents  and  share a secret key so that they can send each
other encrypted messages over some communication channel. The channel is not secure: some
outsider  may interpret the messages or prevent them from being delivered (although he cannot
read them because he does not have the key). Suppose the encryption method is publicly known
but the key is secret. It is also known that  is the only one who knows an important secret
for example if some fact  holds or not. Suppose now that  sends an encrypted message to
 communicating the secret.  gets the message and he is convinced that it must be authentic.
Now both  and  are convinced that they share the secret and that  doesn’t. However suppose
that notices two features of the specific encryption method: first that the shape of the encrypted
message can show whether it contains a secret or it is just junk, second that without knowing the
key or the content of the message he can modify the encrypted message to its opposite i.e. if it
originally said  hold, it will now say that  does not hold. Now the outsider  will secretly
intercept the message, change it appropriately and send it to  without knowing the secret. Now
 and  mistakenly believe that they share the secret, while in fact  got the wrong secret
instead!  has succeeded to manipulate their beliefs.
We can encode this situation in an epistemic system. The agents include . Let

    satisfy 
   and    . The only agent that knows if  holds or not is  thus



  
 and similarly 

  . On the other hand  and  do not know this so 


 



  

  

  
  . Call the message in which  holds  and the one in which
it does not hold  . The epistemic actions that correspond to the cryptographic attack are the
following: $ in which the message  is intercepted, modified and sent to , " in which the
message  is intercepted, modified and sent to , $ in which  sends the message  to , "  in
which  sends the message  to , and finally % which corresponds to sending a junk message.
Thus $ " $ "  %   and     and          . In actions $ and "
agent  is uncertain about which message  or  has been sent so 

$  

"  $ ". On
the other hand, agent  is sure that he has sent a message (either that  holds or that it doesn’t)
to  and that  has received exactly the same secret i.e. 

$  $
 and 

"  "

. However
if  has been sent,  has received  so 

$  "
 and the other way around 

"  $

.
Further 

$

  

$

  $
 and 

"

  

"

  "
 and 

$

  

"

  $

 "

 %.
 also considers possible that only a junk message has been sent and that is why he sees % while
in $ and " . If a junk message has been sent,  and  are sure about it 

%  

%  %
while  is unsure if it was a junk message or  or  , thus 

%  $

 "

 %. The kernel
of each action is the states which they cannot be applied to i.e. $  $    and
"  "

   .
The epistemic program $" expresses the action of communicating the secret  or  in the
above scenario. Now let us update the state 
 with the epistemic program $  " and show that
after update, if  holds, then  knows that  knows that  holds i.e. 
  $  "  



 .
Since this is equal to 
 $  
 "  



 and 
    " we get 
 "  , so
it suffices to show that 
  $  



 . By adjunction 




  $   . By eq(1) we get



 $  


 

$, order preservation of 

will give us





 $  




 

$  




 



$
Now it suffices to show





 



$  
Replace the 

with its values and show 


  

$

   , do the same for 

and get

    $

  , hence 
  $    $   which is equal to 
  $   since
 

  $

. By the assumption 
   we obtain 
  $    $ which leads to

 $

  because  is a fact.
A non-boolean example. An intuitive example of an epistemic system  



where
refutations are first class citizens rather than announcements is the refutation of theories in sci-
entific practice. Hence the underlying lattice  is naturally non-boolean. Let the elements of
the module  be theories written in some logical language e.g. DEL; a theory being a consistent
set of sentences closed under logical deduction. For obvious reasons negating a theory &  
is in general itself not a theory — algebraically a theory should be conceived as a filter. The
join in  is the intersection of the sentences belonging to the corresponding theories while the
meet is the closure of their union. The quantale  consists of experiments performed by (groups
of) agents in order to check some testable consequences of theories. This experiment might be
public or private, and some of the outsiders might be deluded into rejecting, misunderstanding or
misinterpreting the outcome.9 The appearance 

 of a theory to an agent can be thought of
as the agent’s interpretation of the theory , and similarly the appearance 

 is the agent’s in-
terpretation of the outcome of an experiment . Following Popper’s conception, a positive result
of an experiment cannot provide a proof of a theory but a negative one provides a falsification of
the theory, hence we can refute it. For each such refutation    we have a kernel  
which tells us which theories can be refuted, namely those which satisfy &   .
6 The sequent calculus of epistemic systems
We define the objects of our sequent calculus by mutual induction on two sets, the set of formulas
denoted as   

and the set of epistemic programs denoted as   

, respectively
        
        

  

     
                  


where  is in the set of agents,  is in the set  of facts, 
 is in a set '

of atomic propositional
variables, and  is in a set '

of atomic action variables. We denote by 

the set of all -
formulas, 

the set of all -formulas, and  the set of agents. We have two kinds of sequents,
 -sequents  

Æ where   

 

 
 and Æ  

 

, and -sequents  

Æ
where   


 and Æ  

. To describe what these sequents mean, we extend the notation
to two operations
   

 

 

  

 

    

 

  

by putting        ,     

,     

,       , and
 

  

. For a sequent
  %

 ! ! !  %

  

 

 

 

 

we put

  ( %

 %

 %

 ! ! !  %

, where ( is the top element of  for  -sequents,
and the unit element of  for -sequents.10 Obviously we have
  

 

 



  

   

 



  


Define a satisfaction relation  on 

as    	   , similarly on 

we define
  

	   

, and finally on both as11
   	   coherent and    
Now a sequent   Æ (for either 

or 

) is said to be valid iff   Æ. We also allow se-
quents with empty consequents, denoted as   . We interpret such a sequent as being equivalent
to   , or in other words

  .
9E.g. arguments for Darwinism such as the discovery of fossils are interpreted by creationists as “the fossils have
been put in place by God”.
10Note that the top element of  is the unit for

on  (i.e. ) and that the unit element of  (i.e. 1) is the unit
for

on  (i.e. )
11For the definition of coherence refer to definition 4.4
The meaning of a sequent. To provide the reader with a way to “read” our sequents, we can
express the intuitive meaning of a sequent   Æ in the following inductive manner:
  

Æ means that agent  knows, or believes, that  

Æ holds. So this captures
features of ’s own reasoning: the sequent  

Æ is accepted by  as a valid argument.
  

Æ means that, after action  happens, the sequent  

Æ will hold.
  

Æ means that, in context  (i.e. in any situation in which  is true), the sequent
 

Æ must hold.
  

Æ means that   Æ is a tautology which implies that each agent (with no assump-
tion) knows all the tautologies (i.e. the necessitation rule of classical modal logic).
 Finally,  

Æ simply means that the sequent    

Æ holds.
For instance, the sequent    


 can be read as: in context , agent 
believes that after action  agent  will believe that, in context , proposition  must hold .
This reading shows that our sequent calculus expresses two forms of resource sensitivity.
One is the use-once form of linear logic [13] that comes from the quantale structure on epistemic
programs. This, as will be seen later, is encoded in the Lambek calculus rules on -sequents.
One could call these dynamic resources . The other form deals with epistemic resources : the
resources available to each agent that enable him to reason in a certain way (i.e. to deduct a
result from some assumptions). These resources are encoded in the way the context appears to
the agent in sequents, for instance  in the sequent   

Æ is the context and hence the


 is the resource that enables agent  to do the  

Æ reasoning. Note that  

Æ might
not be a valid sequent in the context , but it is valid in the context given by ’s appearance
to agent . To summerize, in our setting not only propositions, but also actions and agents are
treated as resources (available or not for other actions or for reasoning of other agents).
Sequent rules. The axioms for identity and  and  are the same as in any sequent calculus.
The operational rules for  -sequents are
  


 


 

Æ
  

Æ
  


 




 

Æ


 

Æ
 


  




 

Æ


 

Æ
 





Æ
  





Æ
 

  



 

 

  





Æ
   





Æ
 

 









  

 

Æ
 

Æ  Æ

 

Æ

 

Æ  Æ





Æ 





Æ
 





Æ
 



Æ  





Æ
   





Æ




 












 


 



Æ


 



Æ
where 

 




 




 

 Æ  



and if 

 

 ! ! !  

 then 

  


  ! ! !  

 . The operational rules for -sequents consist of Lambek calculus rules
plus rules for 

, namely
 


  




  

Æ


 

Æ

As structural rules we have M-Contraction, two M-Weakenings and M-Exchange, respectively
 



Æ
 



Æ
 

Æ


 

Æ




Æ
 



Æ
 





Æ
 

 



Æ

two rules expressing Invariance of facts (under epistemic actions) (rules which can be seen as
“Action Weakening’ and “Action Strengthening” in  -sequents)
 


  


  


 



where    (the set of facts), and finally several restricted versions of the Cut Rule: Proposi-
tional Cut and Action Cut in  -sequents, as well as Action Cut in -sequents, respectively
 

 



Æ




Æ
  

 


 

 

 



Æ




Æ

We end with encoding rules for concrete epistemic systems, where    and  
	. To encode a state model   




with the precondition 

 	


   and the
appearance maps are defined by 

 




  , we add the axioms 




 and 


  


for all   

and     

, and the rules
 

Æ






  

Æ



  

Æ
 

Æ
for each   

To encode an action model 	  



with 	

  

  and 



  	


 	 we add
the axiom 





and rules
 



 



 



 



 

Æ





  

Æ


  

Æ
 

Æ
for each   	

 

   

Æ



 

  

Æ

We can add one additional rule specifically for strong epistemic systems:12
   

  


  

 


12For the definition of strong epistemic system refer to definition 4.5
Soundness. One verifies that these rules are sound with regard to the model of section 4. Con-
cerns about completeness constitute on-going work.
7 Conclusion and elaborations
We have developed an algebraic axiomatics in terms of a simple mathematical object: a sup-
lattice  , which encodes states, epistemic propositions as well as facts; a quantale  (acting
on  ) which encodes update by epistemic programs; and a family of endomorphisms of the






  -structure encoding the agents in terms of their epistemic modalities.
From this structure many useful other modalities arise, including dynamic modalities and resid-
uals. This algebraic axiomatics generalizes Dynamic Epistemic Logic to non-boolean settings,
while still capturing the same concepts. Furthermore it provides an algebraic way of dealing with
epistemic scenarios such as the muddy children puzzle. We list some possible further elabora-
tions on this line of thought.
 We would like to have a more refined version of Theorem 4.6, one which exposes alter-
native but concrete variations on Dynamic Epistemic Logic which it then axiomatically
classifies.
 Also of interest would be investigations towards blending this algebraic approach with
coalgebraic epistemic features which are currently intensively studied e.g. [3].
 Part of the motivation of this work was a marriage of epistemics and resource-sensitivity
[19]. Although we only contributed in a very limited fashion to such a project in this paper
(quantales provide a semantics for non-commutative linear logic and hence we obtain a
linear structure on epistemic programs) it would be interesting to obtain a better handle on
resources in our model.
 Each system  can be equivalently represented as a -enriched category [24]. This
would allow a passage from a dynamic epistemic theory of programs to one about program
transformations when substituting the quantale by a one-object biclosed bicategory — a
quantale is a one-object biclosed bicategory which is locally thin. The two-cells in the
bicategory would then encode the program transformations.
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Abstract We present a model-theoretic approach for reasoning about secu-
rity protocols, applying recent insights from dynamic epistemic logics. This
enables us to describe exactly the subsequent epistemic states of the agents
participating in the protocol, using Kripke models and transitions between
these based on updates of the agents’ beliefs associated with steps in the
protocol. As a case study we will consider the SRA Three Pass protocol.
1 Introduction
In today’s world of e-commerce and the Internet, the role of security protocols is getting
increasingly important. The design of these security protocols is diﬃcult and error-prone
[Sch00, And01], which makes (automatic) veriﬁcation of protocols of crucial importance.
Since the late eighties, one line of research, amongst others, for reasoning about security
protocols is based on the use of the so-called BAN logic, proposed by Burrows, Abadi and
Needham in [BAN90]. This is an epistemic logic augmented by constructs that are relevant
for reasoning about security, such as the property of having the disposal of a cryptographic
key to be able to decode a message and therefore to know its contents. Although many useful
results having been reported (e.g., [KN98, AHV01, SW02]), due to their complexity and their
semantic underpinning the use of BAN logics to prove the correctness of security protocols
has so far not been very successful (cf. [AT91, BM97, WK96, SC01]).
In this paper we will apply insights from dynamic epistemic logics as recently developed by
Gerbrandy [Ger97, Ger99], Baltag [BMS99, Bal00], Van Ditmarsch [Dit00, Dit01], and Kooi
[Koo03]. Moreover, contrary to the traditional BAN logic approach, our approach is semantic
or model-theoretic. We use Kripke models to represent the epistemic state of the agents
involved in a protocol, similarly to the S5 preserving approach of Van Ditmarsch to analyze
certain kinds of games involving knowledge. From Baltag’s action models we import the idea
to describe belief updates of the agents by semantic operators transforming the Kripke models
at hand by copying and deleting parts of these models, although we use traditional Kripke
models rather than Baltag’s action models. To this end we need also operators for unfolding
∗Corresponding author: arjenh@cs.kun.nl
[25] J. Van Benthem, ‘Logic in action’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 20, 225-263, 1989.
[26] F. Wolter and M. Zakharyaschev, ‘The relation between intuitionistic and classical modal logics,
Algebra and logic 36, 73-92, 1997.
models, which is in its turn inspired by Gerbrandy’s work on possibilities. The diﬀerence
being that in our approach only partial unfolding is called for. We furthermore propose a
language to express belief updates in the context of security protocols as well as properties of
these updates, and give a semantics of this language in terms of the models mentioned and
the operators on them. Since our approach is model-theoretic, we believe that it may serve
as a starting point for the automatic veriﬁcation of (properties of) security protocols.
As a case study illustrating our approach we will consider the so-called SRA Three Pass
protocol and prove a property of it. It is not our intention to prove that the protocol is
completely secure (as it is not in full generality), but we will prove that if the agents partic-
ipating in the protocol are honest, then an intruder watching the communication does not
learn anything about the plain-text messages in a single run. Furthermore we show what the
intruder is able to learn about the agents participating.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we brieﬂy discuss some preliminaries and background regarding the updates
we will handle and the epistemic model we will use. First, we deﬁne objective formulas and
so-called o-seriality.
Definition 2.1. Fix a set P of propositional variables. The class of objective formulas is the
smallest class such that:
• all propositional variables or atoms p ∈ P are objective;
• if φ is objective, then ¬φ is objective;
• if φ1 and φ2 are objective, then φ1 ∧ φ2 is objective.
So, objective formulas do not involve beliefs. For our purposes it is important that every
agent distinguishes a world with the same ‘objective’ information. This leads to the notion
of an o-serial model.
Definition 2.2. A model M = 〈S, π,R1, ..., Rm〉 is o-serial iﬀ for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and
w ∈ S, there exists v ∈ S such that (w, v) ∈ Ri and for all objective formulas φ it holds that
(M,w) |= φ ⇔ (M,v) |= φ.
We use a, b, c, etc. as typical agents, taken from a class A. We use the notation {x}ka
to denote a message x encrypted with the cryptographic key ka of agent a. Furthermore,
B is used as a doxastic modal operator. For example, Baφ should be read as ‘a believes
φ’. We interpret formulas on standard Kripke models (M,s) = (〈S, π,R1, ..., Rm〉, s), where
(M,s) |= Biφ iﬀ ∀t ∈ S:Ri(s, t) → (M, t) |= φ.
We require the relations Ri to be o-serial, transitive and euclidean. This yields a class
of models that we will call Kt45, a proper subset of the class of models of the well-known
doxastic logic KD45. The lower case t refers to the axiom
Biφ ⇒ φ, (t)
for every objective φ. The system Kt45 is sound with respect to the class of o-serial, transitive
and euclidian models [Hom03]. We will show that the operations we introduce preserve Kt45.
The point is that in worlds of Kt45 models, we cannot both have Biφ and Bi¬φ, for an
objective formula φ. This is reasonable from our assumption that agents are conscious about
the protocol. Therefore, they will not infer objective contradictions. This objectivity is
captured locally for each state. As a consequence, the operations that we introduce can
restrict the set of states without destroying objective information.
For the analysis of security protocols below, we assume that we are omniscient about the
values of the variables in diﬀerent runs of a protocol. For example, the program variable p in
a protocol run has the value [[p]]. In the real world it is, obviously, always true that p = [[p]].
However, it is cumbersome to keep track of what is the real world in the operations on Kripke
structures that we employ below. Therefore, we assume that an interpretation [[·]] is given,
that provides the ‘real’ values of the program variables when needed. It might very well be
the case that p 
= [[p]] in a certain state. From now on, we will abbreviate p = [[p]] to p on
(thus transforming a program expression into a propositional variable). Similarly, ¬p is an
abbreviation of p 
= [[p]]. For example, agent a that learns Bbp∨Bb¬p, learns that agent b has
assigned a value to the program variable p.
The types of updates we consider are (i) public announcement of a variable, (ii) the private
learning of a variable and (iii) the private learning about the knowledge of other agents.
The ﬁrst type of update typically runs as follows: In an open network agent a sends a mes-
sage to agent b. From a security perspective, it is customary [DY83] to assume that all agents
in the network can read this message too. However, also in open networks private learning,
the second type of update, can take place. For example, agent b receives a message {x}k from
agent a. Here {x}k denotes a message with content x encrypted with the (symmetric) key k.
If b possesses the key k, then b privately learns the message content x (assuming that the
key k is shared among a and b). The ﬁnal type of update, learning about knowledge of others,
is probably the most interesting. It is realistic to assume that the steps in a protocol run
are known to all agents. Therefore, observing that an agent receives a message will increase
the knowledge of the other agents. For example, if agent a sends a message {x}k to agent b,
then agent c learns that b has learned the information contained in the message {x}k, but
typically, c does not learn x if c does not possess the key k.
Stronger types of updates we do not consider here. For example, we will not update the
beliefs of an honest agent such that it learns that an intruder has learned about others. In the
present paper, we restrict ourselves to updating beliefs about objective formulas and beliefs
about objective formulas.
3 Update constructions
In this section we describes various types of updates in detail. We will start by deﬁning an
update for propositions in subsection 3.1. In subsection 3.2 we will deﬁne a belief update for
agents that learn something about the belief of others. We do this in two slightly diﬀerent
ways by varying in the functions that describe a side-eﬀect for an agent.
3.1 Objective updates
The belief update of objective formulas we will use is based on [RHM02, BMS99]. The
construction works as follows: We will make copies of the states of the model such that the
old worlds in old(S) correspond to the information in the original model and the new worlds
in new(S) correspond to the new information.
Definition 3.1. Let a world (M,w) = (〈S, π,R1, ..., Rm〉, w), a group of agents B, and an
objective formula φ be given. Then expand(φ,B)(M,w) = (〈S′, π′, R′1, ..., R′m〉, w′), where
• S′ = {new(s) | (M,s) |= φ} ∪ old(S)
• w′ = new(w)
• for all p ∈ P: π′(old(u))(p) = π′(new(u))(p) = π(u, p)
• for 1 ≤ i ≤ m the relation R′i on S′ is minimal such that:
R′i(old(u), old(v)) ⇔ Ri(u, v)
R′a(new(u),new(v)) ⇔ Ra(u, v) ∧ (M,v) |= φ if a ∈ B
R′b(new(u), old(v)) ⇔ Rb(u, v) if b /∈ B
The following example shows how this works on a concrete model.
Example 3.1. Consider the model (M,s) in Figure 1 where π(s)(p) = true and π(t)(p) =
false. The operation we execute is that b learns p. This results in the model (M,u) in Figure
2 where π(u)(p) = π(v)(p) = true and π(w)(p) = false and new(s) = u, old(s) = v and
old(t) = w. The world new(t) is unreachable from the actual world and is therefore omitted
from the ﬁgure. (In fact, in all ﬁgures in this paper, we will omit the unreachable worlds.)
We can see that the belief of agent a has not changed: it still considers its old worlds
possible. The belief of agent b however, has changed. It now only considers the state u
possible where p holds.
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The update expand(φ,B) is based on a formula φ and a set of agents B. Roorda et
al. [RHM02] have given a characterization of the formulas that are altered by such an operation
with a single learning agent. Here we extend the deﬁnition for multi-agent purposes.
Definition 3.2. An update function (·)[φ,B] is called proper if
(M,w)[φ,B] |= p ⇔ (M,w) |= p
(M,w)[φ,B] |= α ∧ β ⇔ (M,w)[φ,B] |= α and (M,w)[φ,B] |= β
(M,w)[φ,B] |= ¬α ⇔ (M,w)[φ,B] 
|= α
(M,w)[φ,B] |= Baα ⇔ (M,w) |= Baα if a /∈ B
(M,w)[φ,B] |= Bbα ⇔ ∀u: ((Bb(w, u) ∧ (M,u) |= φ) ⇒ (M,u)[φ,B] |= α) if b ∈ B
Following Roorda et al. we have that expand(φ,B) is proper. Moreover, expand(φ,B)
is uniquely characterized by Deﬁnition 3.2 upto elementary equivalence, i.e. if (·)[φ,B] is a
proper update function, then (M,w)[φ,B] and expand(φ,B)(M,w) are elementary equivalent.
We collect the following properties of expand(φ,B).
Lemma 3.1.
• For all φ it holds that (M,w) |= φ ⇒ expand(φ,B)(M,w) |= BBφ.
• If (M,w) satisﬁes the Kt45 properties and φ is objective, then expand(φ,B)(M,w) sat-
isﬁes the Kt45 properties as well.
• expand(ψ,C)(expand(φ,B)(M,w)) and expand(φ,B)(expand(ψ,C)(M,w)) are bisimilar.
Note that in Lemma 3.1 φ ranges over arbitrary formulas, including non-objective ones.
However, for a non-objective formula Biφ, it can happen that, unintended, an agent increases
the objective knowledge encapsulated by the formula φ. This is illustrated by the next
example.
Example 3.2. Suppose we are interested in agent a learning the formula Bbp∨Bb¬p, but not
p itself. Consider the Kripke model (M,s) in Figure 3, where π(s)(p) = π(u)(p) = true and
π(t)(p) = false. This models the state where b knows that p is true. Agent a does not know
p or ¬p, and it does not know if b knows p.
If we apply the deﬁnition of the belief expansion function, it results in the model (M,v)
from Figure 4, where π(v)(p) = π(s)(p) = π(u)(p) = true and π(t)(p) = false. The reason
that it turns out like this, is because the only state where Bbp ∨ Bb¬p holds, is the state s.
Thus, all the other states have no corresponding new states. Figure 4 illustrates that a has
learned Bbp ∨Bb¬p, but also that a has learned p itself.
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Figure 3: (M,s)
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In the next subsection we will deﬁne a side-eﬀect function such that a will learn about
others, but does not learn any objective formulas itself.
3.2 Side-eﬀects
The main reason that an update of Bbp ∨ Bb¬p for agent a fails, is that it actually deletes
the wrong arrows. The belief expansion function deletes arrows of a to gain the states that
satisfy the updating formula. This is not what we intend. We want a to keep all the states it
considers possible, but at the same time we would like to update all the possible states of a
such that the formula Bbp∨Bb¬p holds in these states. Moreover, we do not want to change
the knowledge of other agents. In this section we deﬁne the functions that accomplish these
requirements.
A technical obstacle is that states can be shared among agents. It is obvious that if we
change a state with the intention to change the belief of one agent, then the belief of the
other agents that consider this state possible, is changed as well. Therefore, the ﬁrst thing to
do, is separate the states of learning agents from the states of agents that do not learn. This
procedure will be called unfolding. The functions newB and orig are generalizations of new
and old from the previous section, but the function orig is only deﬁned on the point of the
model (the actual world).
Definition 3.3. Given a model (M,w) with M = 〈S, π,R1, ..., Rm〉, a partitioning X of A,
we deﬁne a function unfoldX (M,w) = (〈S′, π′, R′1, ..., R′m〉, w′), where
• S′ = (⋃B∈X newB(S)) ∪ orig(w)
• w′ = orig(w)
• π′(newB(v))(p) = π(v)(p), π′(w′)(p) = true for all p ∈ P,B ∈ X
• the relation R′i on S′ is minimal such that
R′i(newB(u),newC(v)) ⇔ Ri(u, v) ∧ (B = C)
R′i(orig(w),newB(u)) ⇔ Ri(w, u) ∧ i ∈ B
where B, C range over X .
So for every group of agents B there is copy of the original states (viz. newB(s) for every
s ∈ S). This function does indeed preserve our Kt45 properties and it models the same
knowledge, which is captured in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2.
(a) If (M,w) is a Kt45 model and X a partition, then unfoldX (M,w) is a Kt45 model.
(b) For every model (M,w) and partition X , it holds that (M,w) and unfoldX (M,w) are
bisimilar.
Example 3.3 (unfold). Consider the Kripke model (M,s) in Figure 5 with π(s)(p) = π(u)(p) =
true, π(t)(p) = false. So, b knows that p is true, while a does not. Furthermore, a does not
know if b knows p. Now the operation we perform is unfold{{a},{b}}(M,s) which results in
the model (M ′, s) in Figure 6.
So we have split the knowledge of a and b. The state s is the original state, the primed
states model a’s knowledge and the double primed states model b’s knowledge. So the upper
half of the model represents the knowledge of a, and the lower half represents the knowledge
of b. Note that no states are shared, in particular because the point of the model is not
reﬂexive.
Now we give some preparatory deﬁnitions. First we deﬁne the notion of a submodel.
Definition 3.4. A model M = 〈S, π,R1, ..., Rm〉 is a submodel of M ′ = 〈S′, π′, R′1, ..., R′m〉,
written as M  M ′, iﬀ S ⊆ S′, π(s)(p) = π′(s)(p) for all s ∈ S, p ∈ P and Ri ⊆ R′i.
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Figure 5: (M,s)
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Next, we construct a submodel that represent the knowledge of an agent a.
Definition 3.5. Given a model (M,w) = (〈S, π,R1, ..., Rm〉, w) = unfold{{a},B}(M ′, w′)
such that {{a},B} is a partition of A, for some (M ′, w′), deﬁne the a-submodel suba(M) =
〈S′, π′, R′1, ..., R′m〉 where
• s ∈ S′ ⇔ newa(s) ∨ orig(s),
• for all p ∈ P it holds that π′(newa(s))(p) = π′(orig(s))(s) = π(s)(p),
• R′i(s, t) ⇔ Ri(s, t) ∧ s, t ∈ S′.
Clearly an a-submodel is a submodel in the sense of Deﬁnition 3.4. The restmodel is the part
of the model that is complements the submodel with respect to the accessibility relation.
Definition 3.6. Given a model (M,w) = 〈S, π,R1, ..., Rm〉 and a submodelN = 〈S′′, π′′, R′′1 , ..., R′′m〉
of M , deﬁne the restmodel restN (M) = 〈S′, π′, R′1, ..., R′m〉 where
• s ∈ S′ ⇔ s ∈ S ∧ ∃(u, v) ∈ R′i: u = s ∨ v = s
• π′(s)(p) = π(s)(p) for all p ∈ P
• R′i(s, t) ⇔ Ri(s, t) ∧ ¬R′′i (s, t)
We can see the a-submodel and restmodel deﬁnitions in action by taking the model of example
3.3 and applying the above deﬁnitions. See Figure 7. This exactly corresponds to the idea of
two submodels that represent knowledge of diﬀerent agents.
Now we would like to update the belief of some agents. To this end, we want to replace the
submodel that represents their belief by a new model. We will apply the following deﬁnition.
Definition 3.7. Given a model N = 〈S, π,R1, ..., Rm〉, a model M , a model N ′ such
that N  N ′  M with restN ′(M) = 〈S′, π′, R′1, ..., R′m〉, we deﬁne replaceN ′(N,M) =
〈S′′, π′′, R′′1 , ..., R′′m〉 where
• s ∈ S′′ ⇔ s ∈ S ∨ s ∈ S′,
• for all p ∈ P it holds that π′′(s)(p) = π(s)(p) for s ∈ S′′,
a, b
s′ a b u′
a, b
a b
a, b a, b
a, b a, b
a
b
s
s′′ u′′
t′
t′′
a
restmodel
a-submodel
Figure 7: a-submodel outline
• R′′i (s, t) ⇔ (s, t) ∈ Ri ∨ (s, t) ∈ R′i.
The idea is that once the belief is completely separated, we can not only safely change the
belief of a certain agent, but also preserve the Kt45 properties. The function atomsplit(p,b)
removes the arrows of b between states that have a diﬀerent valuation for p.
Definition 3.8. Given a model M = 〈S, π,R1, ..., Rm〉, we deﬁne a function atomsplit(p,b)(M) =
〈S′, π′, R′1, ..., R′m〉 as follows:
• s ∈ S′ ⇔ s ∈ S,
• π′(s)(p) = π(s)(p) for all p ∈ P,
• R′i(s, t) ⇔ Ri(s, t) (i 
= b),
• R′b(s, t)⇔ Rb(s, t) ∧ π(s)(p) = π(t)(p).
Finally we are in a position to deﬁne the actual side-eﬀect function that ties these things
together.
Definition 3.9. For a model (M ′, w′) such that (M ′, w′) = unfold{{a},A\{a}}(M,w) and
N = suba(M ′) we deﬁne side-effect(p,a,b)(M,w) = (replaceN (atomsplitp,b(N),M ′), w′).
Example 3.4. We continue Example 3.3. To the a-submodel of M we now apply atomsplitp,b
which results in the model (M ′′, s) in Figure 8. The arrow (t′, u′) has disappeared, since
π(t′)(p) 
= π(u′)(p). Therefore, u′ is not reachable anymore, and can be dropped. Notice that
a believes Bbp ∨Bb¬p, while a has learned nothing about p itself.
We have the following results.
Lemma 3.3.
(a) If (M,w) is a Kt45-model, then side-effect(p,a,b)(M,w) is a Kt45-model as well.
(b) Given a model (M,w), agents a, b, c, d, two propositions p, q ∈ P, it holds that
side-effect(p,c,d)(side-effect(q,a,b)(M,w)) and side-effect(q,a,b)(side-effect(p,c,d)(M,w))
are bisimilar.
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Figure 8: (M ′′, s)
(c) Given a model (M,w), agents a, b, c, a propositions p ∈ P and an objective formula φ, it
holds that side-effect(p,c,d)(expand(φ,a)(M,w)) and expand(φ,a)(side-effect(p,c,d)(M,w))
are bisimilar.
Next, we consider how the formulas are altered by the side-eﬀect function. We will partially
answer this by presenting a few interesting formulas that hold in the resulting model. We will
look at groups of agents instead of a single agent:
1. the group of agents that learn about other agents, ranged over by a;
2. the group of agents that is learned about, ranged over by b;
3. other agents, ranged over by c.
The fact that the agents a are the only agent that learn at all, is clear. The other agents
consider their old worlds possible; their belief has not changed. With this in mind, we present
a few properties of the side-eﬀect function.
Lemma 3.4. Let a, b and c be three diﬀerent agents. Given a model (M,w) and the model
(M ′, w′) = side-effect(p,a,b)(M,w), it holds that
(a) (M ′, w′) |= Ba(Bbp ∨Bb¬p);
(b) (M ′, w′) |= Baφ iﬀ (M,w) |= Baφ, where φ objective;
(c) (M ′, w′) |= BaCabc(Bbp ∨Bb¬p);
(d) (M ′, w′) |= Biφ iﬀ (M,w) |= Biφ for i 
= a.
In the above a is an agent that learns about another agent, viz. agent b; agent b is the agent
about whom is learned; agent c is an agent diﬀerent from a and b. In part (a) of the above
lemma, agent a obtains derived knowledge of an agent b. Part (b) states that no object
knowledge is learned. Part (c) phrases that agent a considers the rest of the agents as smart
itself. Finally, part (d) captures that other agents do not learn.
Property (c) is a reasonable assumption of a about the other agents. If one agent believes
that another agent knows the value of p, then it is reasonable to assume that another agent
will believe the same. On the other hand common knowledge might be too strong to assume.
Next, we address the issue that an agent a shares its belief about an agent b with other agents.
We represent this by linking a’s beliefs of those other agents back to the original (unmodiﬁed)
states. We distinguish four diﬀerent type of groups of agents.
1. the group A of agents that learn about other agents, ranged over by a;
2. the group B of agents that is learned about, ranged over by b;
3. the group C of agents of which agents a believe they have commonly learned about
agents in group b with, ranged over by c;
4. the group D of agents of which agents in a believe they have learned nothing about,
ranged over by d.
For simplicity of presentation, we assume that there is exactly 1 agent present in each group,
i.e. A = {a, b, c, d}. We deﬁne the new side-eﬀect operation 0-unfold (where 0 refers to
zero-knowledge). Note that the 0-unfold operation depends on the particular partinioning
of agents A. Since the operation s0-ide-effect will depend on the unfold operation, the
side-eﬀect function is also taken with respect to some chosen partitioning of the agent set.
Definition 3.10. Given a model (M,w) such that M = 〈S, π,R1, ..., Rm〉 and the set of
agents {a, b, c, d}, we deﬁne a function 0-unfold(M,w) = (〈S′, π′, R′1, ..., R′m〉, w′), where:
• S′ = newa(S) ∪ newbcd(S) ∪ orig(w)
• w′ = orig(w)
• π′(newB(v))(p) = π(v)(p) and π′(orig(w))(p) = π(w)(p) for all p ∈ P, B ∈ {{a}, {bcd}}
• R′i on S′ is minimal such that
R′d(newa(u),newbcd(v)) ⇔ Rd(u, v)
R′i(newa(u),newa(v)) ⇔ Ri(u, v) (i 
= d)
R′i(newbcd(u),newbcd(v)) ⇔ Ri(u, v)
R′a(orig(w),newa(v)) ⇔ Ra(w, v)
R′i(orig(w),newbcd(v)) ⇔ Ri(w, v) ∧ i = b, c, d
So instead of completely separating the knowledge of te agent a with the other agents, we
share the knowledge of a about d with the other agents. Since the other agents do not learn
anything, a does not gain knowledge about d. We present a lemma similar to Lemma 3.2.
Lemma 3.5.
(a) If (M,w) is a Kt45 model, then so is 0-unfold(M,w).
(b) For every model (M,w) it holds that (M,w) and 0-unfold(M,w) are bisimilar.
Due to the case distinction for R′a(orig(w),newB(v)) in Deﬁnition 3.10 above, it holds that
the knowledge of a about b is not interconnected with the knowledge of other agents about b
or of b itself. So we can ‘cut out’ the submodel containing the b arrows from the belief of a:
Definition 3.11. Given a model (M ′, w′) = 〈S′, π′, R′1, ..., R′m〉 such that (M ′, w′) =
0-unfold(M,w), for some (M,w), deﬁne b-sub(M ′) = 〈S′′, π′′, R′′1 , ..., R′′m〉 where
• S′′ = { newa(s) | s ∈ S }
• π′′(s)(p) ⇔ π(s)(p) for all p ∈ P
• R′′b (s, t) ⇔ R′b(s, t) for s, t ∈ S′′
• R′′i = ∅ (i 
= b).
The operation 0-side-effect is then given by 0-side-effectp(M,w) = (replaceN (atomsplit(p,b)(N),M ′), w′)
where N = b-sub(M ′).
Lemma 3.6. If (M,w) is a Kt45-model, then so is 0-side-effectp(M,w).
Similarly to Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.4 we have the following result.
Lemma 3.7. (a) If (M,w) is a Kt45-model, then so is 0-side-effectp(M,w).
(b) Given a model (M,w) and the model (M ′, w′) = 0-side-effectp(M,w), it holds that
(i) (M ′, w′) |= Ba(Bbp ∨Bb¬p)
(ii) (M ′, w′) |= Baφ iﬀ (M,w) |= Baφ for φ objective
(iii) (M ′, w′) |= BaCabc(Bbp ∨Bb¬p)
(iv) (M ′, w′) |= Biφ iﬀ (M,w) |= Biφ for i 
= a
(v) (M ′, w′) |= BaBdφ iﬀ (M,w) |= BaBdφ
Parts (i) to (iv) are compare to the properties given in Lemma 3.4. Part (v) states that the
knowledge of agent a about agent d has not changed, which exactly as desired.
Example 3.5 (side-eﬀect function). Recall the model (M,s) from Example 3.3 (Figure 5).
We now present this model with four agents {a, b, c, d} in Figure 9 such that π(s)(p) =
π(u)(p) = true and π(t)(p) = false. Now apply 0-side-effectp(M,w) and we gain the
model (M ′, s) from Figure 10 such that π(s)(p) = π(s′)(p) = π(s′′)(p) = π(u′′)(p) = true,
π(t′)(p) = π(t′′)(p) = false. Note that in this model, a still knows exactly the same about d
as it did before.
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Figure 9: (M,s)
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4 A logical language for security protocols
In this section we exploit the ideas of the previous section for a logical language to reason
about security protocols. The expand and side-effect operations are used for its semantics.
It is illustrated for the case of the SRA Three Pass protocol how the various steps of the
protocols change the initial knowledge of the agents involved and what Kripke-structure is
ﬁnally obtained.
Definition 4.1. Fix a set of proposition P, ranged over by p, and a set of agents A of
m elements, ranged over by a. The language LC is given by
φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ1 ∧ φ2 | Biφ | [σ]φ
σ ::= Priv(i → j, p) | Pub(i, p) | σ;σ′
The σ symbol denotes a (possibly composed) communication action. The action Priv(i →
j, p) is a private or peer-to-peer message p from i to j; the action Pub(i, p) means a public
announcement or a broadcast by i about p. In the latter every agent on the network learns p,
whereas in the former only j learns p. The bracket operator [σ]φ has the interpretation that
after executing the communication action, φ holds.
The subscript in LC refers to a set of so-called transition rules C. The transition rules
capture the updates, i.e. the expansions and side-eﬀects, necessary for the interpretation of
the constructs Priv(i → j, p) and Pub(i, p). The transitions rules enforce consistency among
the propositions that hold. For example, if an agent believes that the value of a message m
is [[m]] and possesses a key k(a), then it must believe that the value of the encryption Ek(a)(m)
of m has a value that corresponds with [[m]].
A transition rule has either the form Bip ⇒ β or Hip ⇒ β. Bip and Hip are conditions,
expressing that p must be believed by agent i or that p has been delivered to agent i, respec-
tively. The body β of a transition rule is a sequence of actions α1; . . . ;αn. Actions come in
two ﬂavours LBp and Si,jp. Here, LBp expresses that p is learned among the agents in the
set B and corresponds to belief expansion, whereas Sa,bp expresses the side-eﬀect that the
agent a has learned that agent b now knows about p.
As an example, we will have the transition rule Bb{x}k ⇒ Lab{x}k, when agents a and b
share the key k and a sends b the message {x}k. A typical application of an Hip ⇒ β
transition rule is in a protocol that uses a challenge. In the situation described above, agent a
sends the message x to agent b and agent b returns the message {x}k. Since it is shared,
a already can compute {x}k itself, so the delivery of {x}k does not teach a anything about
this value. But, since it must come from b, it does learn that b has the shared key and
authenticates b toward a. The transition rule in this case is Ha{x}k ⇒ Sa,bk, stating that
agent a, on observing {x}k, learns that agent b knows the right value of the key k.
The semantics for the language LC , provided in the next deﬁnition, follows the set-up of
[BMS99, Dit00]
Definition 4.2. Let C be a set of transition rules. For σ ∈ LC the relation [[σ]] on models
for A over P is given by
(M,w)[[Priv(i → j, p)]](M ′, w′) ⇔ (M,w) |= Bip ⇒ (expandp,j(M,w) p (M ′, w′))
(M,w)[[Pub(i, p)]](M ′, w′) ⇔ (M,w) |= Bip ⇒ (expandp,A(M,w) p (M ′, w′))
(M,w)[[σ;σ′]](M ′, w′) ⇔ (M,w)[[σ]](M ′′ , w′′)[[σ′]](M ′, w′) for some model (M ′′, w′′)
(M,w) p (M ′, w′) ⇔ if (x ⇒ β) ∈ Sel(M,w, p)
then (M,w) 〈β〉 (M ′′, w′′) p (M ′, w′) for some (M ′′, w′′)
else (M,w) = (M ′, w′)
end
(M,w) 〈〉 (M ′, w′) ⇔ (M,w) = (M ′, w′)
(M,w) 〈LBp;β〉 (M ′, w′) ⇔ expand(p,B)(M,w)〈β〉(M ′, w′)
(M,w) 〈Si,jp;β〉 (M ′, w′) ⇔ side-effect(p,i,j)(M,w) 〈β〉 (M ′, w′)
(M,w) |= p ⇔ π(w)(p) = true
(M,w) |= ¬φ ⇔ (M,w)  φ
(M,w) |= φ ∧ ψ ⇔ (M,w) |= φ and (M,w) |= ψ
(M,w) |= Biφ ⇔ (M,v) |= φ for all v such that wRiv
(M,w) |= [σ]φ ⇔ (M ′, w′) |= φ if (M,w)[[σ]](M ′, w′)
where
Sel(M,w, p) = {Bip ⇒ β ∈ C | (M,w) 〈β〉 (M ′, w′), (M ′, w′) |= φ 
↔(M,w) |= φ, (M,w) |= Bip }
∪ {Hip ⇒ β ∈ C | (M,w) 〈β〉 (M ′, w′), (M ′, w′) |= φ 
↔(M,w) |= φ }
The operation p applies a number of transition rules after the execution of a communication
action. For the transition rules of type Bip ⇒ β it is checked if the precondition Bip holds.
The selection Sel(M,w) is organized in such a way that no transition rule is applied over
and over again. The recursive deﬁnition of  therefore stops if no fresh transition rule can
be applied. In the deﬁnition of Sel it is checked if the belief of the agents changes under
the transition rules, preventing an inﬁnite chain of rewrites for p . Note that because of the
results of the previous section, the order of applying these transition rules does not matter.
5 The SRA Three Pass protocol
In this section we discuss how the machinery developed above works out for a concrete ex-
ample. Preparatory for this, in order to keep the models within reasonable size, we employ
two helpful tricks. The ﬁrst one is the disregarding of propositions not known to any agent.
Thus, if a proposition is not part of the model, then the interpretation is that no agent has
any knowledge about it. What we have to specify is how we add that proposition into the
model. We accomplish this by making two copies of the original states. One of them we
assign ‘positive’ and the other ‘negative’. In the positive states, the proposition will be true,
and in the negative states, the proposition will be false.
Definition 5.1. Given a model (M,w) = 〈S, π,R1, ..., Rm〉 we deﬁne the function addatomp
such that (M ′, w′) = addatomp(M,w) = 〈S′, π′, R′1, ..., R′m〉 where
• S′ = pos(S) ∪ neg(S)
• π′(pos(s))(q) = if p = q then true else π(s)(q)
• π′(neg(s))(q) = if p = q then false else π(s)(q)
• R′i(α(s), β(t)) ⇔ Ri(s, t), α, β = pos,neg
• w′ = pos(w)
We have the following property.
Lemma 5.1. Given a model (M,w) and (M ′, w′) = addatomp(M,w) it holds that i) (M ′, w′) |=
p, ii) (M,w) |= φ ⇔ (M ′, w′) |= φ for p 
∈ φ∗ with φ∗ the closure under subformulas of φ and
iii) for all i ∈ A: (M ′, w′) 
|= Bip.
The second trick helps to prevent the useless applying of rules which keeps the model in a
reasonable size.
Lemma 5.2. Given a model (M,w), the model (M ′, w′) such that (M,w)〈Lip;Sjip〉x[Pub(i, p)](M ′, w′)
(for some x, i, j) and the model (M ′′, w′′) such that (M,w)〈LAp〉(M ′′, w′′) are bisimilar.
That is to say, if an agent i learns p and then all other agents learn about i that it has learned
p, followed by the action where everyone learns p (commonly), then it is equivalent to say
that they have just learned p commonly.
Shamir, Rivest and Adelman have suggested the three-pass protocol [CJ97] for the transmis-
sion a message under minimal assumptions for commutative encryption. It is known to be
insecure and various attacks have been suggested. However, it serves an illustrative purpose
here. The protocol has the following steps:
1. a → b : {x}ka
2. b → a : {{x}ka}kb
3. a → b : {x}kb
Both agent a and b have their own encryption key, ka and kb, respectively. The encryption key
can be a symmetric key or a the private key of a private key-public key-pair for that matter.
Agent a wants to send message x to agent b through an insecure channel and therefore wants
to send x encrypted to b. It does this by sending x encrypted with its own key. Next, b will
encrypt this message with b’s key and sends this back. Since the encryption is commutative,
a can now decrypt this message and sends this to b. Finally, b can decrypt the message it has
just received and learn the value of x.
We consider three agents {a, b, i} where a and b are honest agents that will run this
protocol and i is the intruder that looks at the messages that are being transmitted through
the network. So we’re interested, if i does not actively attack the protocol, what i can learn
during the run of this protocol.
Next, we deﬁne the transition rules. The ﬁrst transition rule models the fact that agents
can encrypt with their own key: BjmK ⇒ LjmK+j;SijmK+j and, for j ∈ K, BjmK ⇒
LjmK−j ;SijmK−j , for all j ∈ A, where K is some set of agents, + a function that adds an
agent and − a function that deletes one. Here, mK represent a message successively encrypted
with the keys of the agents in K. In the modeling, we limit ourselves by deﬁning the list
of useful propositions. The propositions we want to consider here are P = {m,ma,mb,mab}
where ma abbreviates {x}ka = [[{x}ka ]] and mab abbreviates {{x}ka}kb = [[{{x}ka}kb ]].
We assume that
• encryption is commutative;
• every agent has its own key not possessed by any other agent;
• during the run of the protocol, the value of the keys do not change.
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m,¬ma
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b, i
Figure 11: Starting point
a, b, i b, i
b, im,ma ¬m,ma
Figure 12: after Pub(a,ma)
The next assumption we must make is about the knowledge state of the agents before
the run of the protocol. We will assume that a is the only agent that knows m and ma.
Furthermore, we will assume that the other agents know this about a. The corresponding
Kripke structure is in Figure 11.
The ﬁrst step is executed. That is, ma is propagated on the network, so all agents will
learn this value. Thus, we execute the action Pub(a,ma). If we discard the states that
become unreachable, this results in the model of Figure 12. Note that this model models
Bbma. This triggers one of the transition rules, that is, it triggers Bbma ⇒ Lbmab;Sibmab
since the antecedent holds in the point now.
m,mab
a, b, i
b, i
b, i
b, i
b, im,¬mab
b, i
¬m,mab
b, i
¬m,¬mab
a, b, i
a, b, i
b, i
Figure 13: added mab
a, b, i b, i
b, im,mab ¬m,mab
Figure 14: after Pub(b,mab))
We have not modelled mab yet, so this is the ﬁrst step. We will not repeat ma in the ﬁgure
since this holds in any state of the model. The function addatommab results in the model of
Figure 13. Observe that in the next step of the protocol LAmab (Pub(b,mab)) is executed,
since the message is being transmitted to all agents on the network. So with Lemma 5.2 it is
justiﬁed to skip the steps that are required by the transition rules. Thus, we get the model in
Figure 14. This results in the triggering of the transition rule: Bamab ⇒ Lamb;Siamb. This
is in fact a completely similar case as in the previous step of the protocol. Again we dismiss
the mab proposition since every agent has learned this.
a, b, i b, i
b, im,mb ¬m,mb
Figure 15: after Pub(a,mb)
We introduce mb and execute Pub(a,mb) because we can again skip the actions in the
transition rules (Lemma 5.2). So we end up with the model in Figure 15. The last transition
rule that is triggered is Bbmb ⇒ Lbm;Sibm. Again, we discard the proposition that holds in
every state: mb. We now only focus on the most interesting proposition m. First b learns m
which results in the model in Figure 16.
a, b, i
m
a, b, i
m
¬m
b
a, i i
b, i
Figure 16: after Lbm
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Figure 17: after Sibm
The second action for the transition rule is that i learns that Bbp∨Bb¬p. If we execute this
on the model we get the model (M ′, w′) which can be seen in Figure 17. Recall that we have
(M ′, w′) = [Pub(a,ma);Pub(b,mab);Pub(a,mb)](M,w). It holds that: (M ′, w′) |= ¬Bim,
(M ′, w′) |= Bbm and (M ′, w′) |= Bi((Bbm ∨Bb¬m) ∧Ba(Bbm ∨Bb¬m)).
6 Conclusion
Inspired by recent work on dynamic epistemic logics, we have proposed a logical language for
describing (properties of) runs of security protocols. The language contains constructs for
the two basic types of epistemic actions that happen during such runs. The semantics of the
language is based on traditional Kripke models representing the epistemic state of the agents
involved in the protocol at hand. Changes in the epistemic state of the agent system as a
result of the execution of a protocol are described by means of transition rules that precisely
indicate what belief updates happen under certain preconditions. These belief updates give
rise to modiﬁcations of the models representing the agents’ epistemic state in a way that is
precisely given by semantic operations on these models. We have illustrated our approach for
a well-known security protocols such as the SRA Three Pass protocol. We also have analyzed
the Needham-Schro¨der public key protocol and Andrew RPC, see [Hom03]. It should be
noted, that we focus here on e single protocol runs with passive intruder. A further research
goal is to extend our approach to deal with a setting of multiple protocols/multiple runs and
active intruder.
The semantic updates we used operate on traditional Kripke models as opposed to updates
in the approaches of Gerbrandy and Baltag. We believe that this will make it less troublesome
to integrate these updates into existing model checkers, which hopefully will lead to better
and new tools for verifying properties of security protocols.
Although future research will have to justify this, we are conﬁdent that our method can
be employed for a broad class of veriﬁcation problems concerning security protocols because
of the ﬂexibility of our approach using transition rules for epistemic updates.
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Abstract
Multi-agent conversations are built upon two components: agent communication
languages (ACLs) that specify the individual messages that can be exchanged and
interaction protocols (IPs) that specify the sequences in which these message can
be arranged. Although informative, the semantic definition proposed for the most
standard ACL (FIPA 1997) is complicated and contentious, while published IPs
tend to be ambiguous, incomplete, and unverified with respect to message seman-
tics. As a case study to clarify and help rectify these problems, we have investi-
gated verification of the contract net protocol when its messages are presumed to be
expressed in FIPA ACL. In order to help both informal comprehension and formal
verification we separate several concerns. We suggest a revised and simpler core
semantics for many of the FIPA ACL speech acts, using the same belief-intention
style of logic, although the underlying ideas are not dependent on this detail. An
extended form of propositional dynamic logic and statecharts is used to express
IPs. States are interpreted using mutual beliefs and intention, and properties such
as termination and consistency of joint beliefs are shown.
1 Introduction
Social interactions, such as cooperation, coordination and negotiation, are a fundamen-
tal feature of multi-agent systems. They are enacted through a variety of agent com-
munication languages (ACLs) and interaction protocols (IPs). An ACL (for example
KQML [3], FIPA ACL [4]) specifies the individual communicative acts (CAs), typi-
cally as classes of asynchronous messages modelled on the Theories of Speech Acts
enunciated by Austin [1] and Searle [12] . The 1997 semantic specification for FIPA
ACL is expressed using a logic of belief and intention and derived from work associ-
ated with Sadek [11]. This specification is informative has been criticised on various
grounds [10] [6], not least that it is unverifiable [16]. Relatedly, an IP (for example
the contract net protocol (CNP) [15] or an English auction protocol) specifies message
sequences that can lead towards a goal state. However to date, may of the published
specifications for these protocols suffer from ambiguities and incompleteness [8]. This
lack of precision can arise from the inherent inexpressiveness of diagrammatic rep-
resentations such as Petri-nets [7] and AUML [4], or from the level of abstraction
chosen when using informal language or formal logic. Such representations can never-
theless be informative and helpful for comprehension. Commitment-based semantics
have been used for modeling multi-agent interactions [17]. However this work remains
focussed on the creation, fulfilment and discharge of an agreement, tends to be cen-
tralised, through for example an instituion, and discourages interactions whose goals
are to share experience and model their environment. The legal issues also are often
not considered.
Against this background, we use the CNP (arguably the most widely adopted IP)
as a case study in this paper, to expose and apply a simpler semantics for an ACL, and
to provide a compatible semantics for the protocol, which itself is represented in ex-
tended propositional dynamic logic (PDL [5]) and statecharts. Together these allow us
to prove termination and consistency regarding some of the group’s beliefs when inter-
preting the CNP. At the same time, in the light of criticisms about ambiguities in ACL
semantics, our proposed semantics for an ACL and IPs serve as an example of how
belief semantics [2] can provide insight in the clear specification of agent interactions.
Thus, this paper addresses the unresolved problem of a suitable ACL semantics for
expediting agent interactions. Our first contribution is to show how to separate treat-
ment of message delivery, sincerity, and implicit protocol issues within the existing
style of FIPA-ACL logic (in the current work they are all implicitly assumed). This
separation of issues has enabled us to simplify verification of the contract net proto-
col with respect to the message semantics. Our semantics are not dependent on the
actual choice of ACL or the particular style of logic that we use. This means that a
protocol specified in extended PDL does not depend on the actual ACL being used or
the semantics of the ACL. The second contribution is also partly methodological. We
overcome the lack of expressiveness of weaker graphical representations by using an
enhanced form of statechart and extended PDL to represent the protocol both visually
and using a logical theory. Finally, we show how the definitions of the states allows
a semantic representation using a logic in the belief-intention style. This enables us
to derive more specific properties of the protocol in terms of joint beliefs. We refer to
a belief-intention style of logic but we do not provide a formal definition of any such
logic in this paper (see section 5). Monadic modal operators for a belief (Bi) and an
intention (Ii) of an agent i are used as intellectual props for deductive inference and
treated as independent except for explicit interaction axioms. A belief logic is a use-
ful ideal for giving epistemic status to the consistent but not necessarily true internal
propositions that can be used by a designer to express and reason about information
internal to an agent. Treating intention in a similar way is also a useful ideal for suc-
cinct reasoning about a goal state without getting into more temporal reasoning. The
durability of the Belief-Desire-Intention paradigm for practical deliberative agents also
provides a heuristic justification for this sort of reasoning.
The remainder of this paper is structured in the following way. In the next section
we provide an informal summary of the separate issues in simplifying reasoning about
the FIPA ACL. Section 3 critically analyses a representation of the CNP in Petri nets
and those aspects of the specification that cannot be captured with in this approach.
Section 4 develops a novel formal representation of the CNP in extended PDL and
extended statecharts. In section 5, we discuss the axioms and assumptions of the belief
logics and ACL. Sections 6 and 7, respectively, summarize our use of communicative
acts and interpret the states in the CNP. In section 8, we validate our approach by
proving desirable properties of the CNP in our framework. Section 9 presents our
conclusions and future work.
2 Issues in Reasoning about the FIPA ACL
As defined in FIPA-ACL 1997 there is a feasibility pre-condition (FP) and a rational
effect (RE) associated with each CA. The FP conjoins a sincerity condition (SC), with a
typically more complex Gricean condition (GC) to preclude a redundant message. The
RE expresses the condition that the sender may use in planning the communicative act.
The FIPA inform, (or KQML tell) is the basic CA. As a message it has parameter for
sender s, receiver r and propositional content φ. The SC is Bs φ and the RE is Br φ
The GC expresses the belief that the sender does not believe the receiver believes φ, or
is uncertain about it.
The obvious criticism is that the Gricean condition introduces inessential complex-
ity, even if the term “inform” is inappropriate without it, but there are deeper issues.
The semantic conditions as expressed are sender oriented, and there is no overt associa-
tion between the semantic conditions and the occurrence of the message itself, after all,
sincerity and non-redundancy are social conditions, not mechanical. Although these
concerns have been pointed out in [13], [16] we take a new step in removing much of
their impact by re-expressing the semantics in the belief-intention logic itself.
The key step is not obvious and indeed exploits an obvious ”hack” in the logic,
which is to avoid the detailed expression of temporality or causation by using the spe-
cial proposition done(a, act), for any agent a and action act. Using PDL notation,
we express done(a, act) as done(a.act). Now the propositions Is done(s.m) and
Br done(s.m) respectively can express that the sender agent s intends that m be sent,
and receiver agent r believes that m has been sent by s. These are the tightest pre-
and post-conditions we can express in the logic, and suggest the following PDL axiom
schema for such messages, assuming there is a sender s and a receiver r:
Isdone(s.m) ↔ [s.m]Brdone(s.m)
This causality style of schema is potentially verifiable in a logic that is grounded in
machine states, but for our purposes it enables us to separate the FP and RE from the
message transport. FIPA-like semantics are re-instated by assuming that the receiver
believes that the message transport post-condition entails the message RE
(Brdone(s.m) → BrREm), and that the pre-condition Isdone(s.m) is itself a primi-
tive plan by which the sender can attain the RE. The FIPA semantics do not assume the
sender to intend the RE, but one can take the view that the FP should be strenghened
to entail Isdone(s.m).
Indeed, each agent can access a common ontology of messages and infer from the
receipt of a message what it means, and this may vary with any other environmental
context that is available. We will simply drop the GC part of the FP, on the grounds that
it is really a social protocol for human communication which need not be presumed in
the context of any other interaction protocol, but retain the SC part as simpler FIPA-
like pre-condition, and allow the FIPA RE as a trustworthiness assumption (see section
5.2).
It turns out that the remaining FIPA-ACL messages that we use can be re-expressed
as special cases of the inform act in context. This was known when the standard was
prepared, but in some cases obscured and made erroneous by the inessential complexity
we have sought to remove. For example a propose message, sent by a potential CNP
contractor to the manager is an inform with the propositional content that if the sender
believes that the receiver intends that the action be done by the sender, then the sender
(will) intend this (too). So a sincere accept or reject requires belief by the manager
in the propositional content of such a proposal, and becomes an inform message with
content expressing the manager’s intention, so that the contractor can discharge the
conditional ”promise”. Given these issues in the semantics of ACLs, there also exist
issue in the current representations of IPs.
3 Issues in Representing IPs
To illustrate the required expressiveness of a specification language for realistic IPs,
we consider the CNP since this is probably the most widely used protocol in the field.
Figure 1, from [7], presents the CNP as a “Coloured” Petri Net. The interaction is
started by a manager issuing a call for proposals (cfp). Potential contractors respond
with proposals, which the manager either rejects or accepts. Accepted proposals can
be either cancelled by the manager or executed by the proposer, who later informs the
manager of success or failure of their execution. The manager may also re-select other
proposals or issue a new cfp.
However figure 1 is both ambiguous and incomplete:
• A manager has no means of deciding whether the overall contract net process
has succeeded or failed. For example, if out of n proposals, m are done and p
fail, the state of the overall process is undefined.
• This Petri net illustrates the same states and triggers for all three contractors.
This is schematically redundant and is particularly problematic in open multi-
agent systems; it would be hard to express the state of many contractors, which
join the interaction dynamically, without more formal techniques.
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Figure 1: Contract Net conversation with three contractors in Coloured Petri Net
• Even if roles are used, as in AUML [4], there is no binding of an action to
an agent’s identity. Thus the manager should only send acceptance messages
to those contractors who proposed, and only those proposers should inform the
manager of the result of their execution.
• A deadlock will occur if all contractors refuse to bid or if the manager does not
issue a new call. This is because for termination or for issuing a revised call, at
least one contractor has to send a proposal to the current call.
• Alternative actions cannot be distinguished. For example, instead of the manager
being able to both accept and reject each proposal, as in figure 1, it should either
accept or reject each proposal.
There are also other aspects missing in the CNP representation. It is not shown that
different contractors have different beliefs depending on what they sent and received.
Thus, since proposals are not broadcasted, a contractor will not know who else other
than itself has sent a proposal, whilst the manager knows all proposers. In turn, the
manager has to ensure that it accepts or rejects only those agents which sent a proposal
in the first place. Thus, there is a shared belief between a contractor and the manager,
(e.g. whether that contractor has sent a proposal or whether its proposal has been
accepted). In the same protocol, some states are public, some are private to an agent,
while yet others are mutually believed. Sometimes, the private states of an agent have
to be expressed; for example, the state when the manager is deliberating a proposal is
needed in order to show that: i) there is a specific set of contractors whose proposals a
manager has chosen to accept and another distinct set whose proposals are rejected; and
ii) contractors wait for the manager to finish its deliberation. These required features
of the CNP are captured through our representation in the next section.
Table 1: Semantics of Extended PDL
M, w |= p iff w ∈ V (p), p ∈ PROP
M, w |= [γ]A iff ∀w1(wRγw1 implies M, w1|=A)
M, w |= A(X) iff M, w |= A and X ∈ Ag group
M |= (γ1 :: γ2) iff Rγ1 ⊆ Rγ2
M, w |= none of(S) iff ∀A(A ∈ S implies M, w 6|= A)
M, w |= one of(S) iff ∃A1∀A2((A1 ∈ S and M, w |= A1)
and (A2 ∈ SandM, w |= A2))
implies A1 ↔ A2)
RAg group.γ ⊆ Rγ
RA? = {(w, w) : M, w |= A}
Rγ? = {(w1, w2) : (w1, w2) ∈ Rγ}
4 A Formal Representation for Interaction Protocols
Here we show how to represent IPs formally in extended PDL and graphically in ex-
tended statecharts. First, however we specify our extensions to PDL.
4.1 Extended PDL
We extend PDL to enable us to reason about the effect of processes on interaction states
(refer to [8] for more details and a complete axiomatisation). Specifically, let A denote
a formula and γ denote a process. In general, a formula may be in multi-modal logic,
including beliefs, desires and intentions, as well as actions. The formula [γ]A has the
intended meaning: A holds after executing process γ. (The formula [γ]A is also the
weakest precondition for γ to terminate with A). The syntax of the extended logic is
defined below, whereA denotes one agent or a set of agents and the term States denotes
set of formulae.
Formulae: A ::= p | ⊥ | A1→A2 | [γ]A | BAA | IAA | A(A) | γ1 :: γ2
| none of(States) | one of(States)
Processes: γ ::= $ | γ1; γ2 | γ1∪γ2 | γ∗ | A? | null | abort | A . γ | γ?
The complex process (γ1; γ2) denotes the sub-process γ1 followed by γ2, the pro-
cess (γ1 ∪ γ2) either γ1 or γ2 non-deterministically, while γ∗ denotes zero or more
iterations of process γ. A state test operator “?” allows sequential composition to fol-
low only if successful. A null process represents no execution, while an abort process
results in a failed state. We extend the program logic of PDL so as to express multi-
agent interactions. The semantics of the additional constructors are specified in table
1, and are based on a Kripke model denoted by M = (W, Rγ , V) [5]. We add types for
agents and roles. We assume throughout that each atomic formula p, agent and instance
of an atomic process $ can be denoted by a distinct identifying term. Set notation is
used to manipulate sets of agents and interaction states. The formula none of(B) holds
if none of the formulae in the set B are true. The formula one of(B) holds if only one
of the formulae in the set B is true.
An agent or a group of agents, A, may execute atomic actions or complex pro-
cesses, γ. So the term A.γ can be read as A executes process γ, as for example in
r:retailer.display means retailer r executes the display process, but the agent role may
be omitted. Using set notation, we can denote a joint process between two parties as
{r,c}.shopping. The formula A(A) allows state A to have an agent or a group, A, as
parameters. The semantics of M,w |= (γ1 :: γ2) states that all the worlds obtained
through execution of process γ1 are elements of the set of worlds possible through per-
forming γ2. For example,
EbayAuction::EnglishAuction means that all the rules in the English auction apply to
the Ebay auction.
4.2 CNP in Extended PDL and Statecharts
Figure 2 shows the CNP in an extended form of statecharts and each state is fully
defined in figure 4. The process [X\Y ] means the process of replacing occurences of
X with Y in the resulting state.
timedout
timeout
open
executing closed
M.re_select
to−be−accepted(C,A, p)
deliberating
M.cfp(G,pM )
k.refuse(M,pM ); timeout?
M.cfp(G,pM )
n.refuse(M,pM );
cancelled
refused(pM)
i.propose(M, pi);C\{i};p \{pi}
M.wait
j.propose(M, pj);
C\C∪{j};
p\p∪{pj}
∀i ∈ A, j ∈(C-A) (M.accept(i, pi)∩ M.reject(j, pj))
∀i ∈ A M.cancel(i, pi)
∀i ∈ B, j ∈ (A-B)(i.inform(M, done(i.pi)∩
j.failure(M, pj))
contract net(pM)
∧ failed(A-B, p)
informed(B, done(B.pB))
cfped(M, G, pM )
∀i ∈ C M.cancel(i, pi)∪
∀i ∈ A (i.pi)
completed(A,B, pB)
rejected(C-A, p)
accepted(A, p) ∧
proposed(C, p)
M.deliberate(C, A, p)
Figure 2: CNP in Extended Statechart Notation (see section 7 for interpretation of the
states
¬contract net↔[G.contract net process]closed (1)
contract net ↔ one-of ({ open , closed}) (2)
closed ↔ one-of({(failed∧informed), timedout, cancelled, refused}) (3)
open ↔ one-of({deliberating, executing}) (4)
deliberating ↔ one-of({cfped, proposed, to-be-accepted }) (5)
executing ↔ one-of({(accepted∧rejected), completed }) (6)
¬ contract net↔[M:manager.cfp(G ,pM )]cfped(M,G,pM ) (7)
Figure 3: Theory of CNP’s diagram structure in extended PDL
cfped(M,G,pM )↔(
[n:contractor.refuse(M,pM ); M.wait]cfped(M,G, pM )
∨ [n:contractor.refuse(M,pM ); timeout?] refused(pM )
∨ [i:contractor.propose(M,pi);C \ {i}; p\ {pi}]
(proposed(C, p) ∧∀i(i ∈ C ↔ BMdone(i.propose(M.pi))) ) (8)
proposed(C, p) ↔ [M:manager.deliberate(C,A, p)]
(to-be-accepted(C,A, p) ∧∀i ∈ A, ∀j 6∈ A(BM (i ∈ A) ∧BM (i 6∈ A)))
∨ [j:contractor.propose(M,pj );C \C ∪ {j}; p\p ∪ {pj}] (9)
to-be-accepted(C,A,p)↔ [∀i ∈ A, ∀j ∈ (C −A)(M:manager.accept(i, pi)∩ M:manager.reject(j, pj )]
(accepted(A, p) ∧∀i ∈ A(Bi(accepted(i, pi))))
∧ (rejected(C-A, p) ∧∀j ∈ (C −A).Bj(rejected(j, pj))) (10)
accepted(A, p)↔ [∀i ∈ A(i.pi)] (completed(A,B,p) ∧ (∀i ∈ B(Bisucceeded(pi))
∨∀j ∈ (A−B)Bj¬succeeded(pj))∨) [∀i ∈ A(M : manager.cancel(i, pi)∪
∀i ∈ C(M : manager.cancel(i, pi)]cancelled (11)
completed(A,B, p) ↔ [∀i ∈ B,∀j ∈ (A−B) [i.inform(M, done(i.pi)) ∩ j.failure(M,pj ]
(informed(B, done(B.pB)) ∧ failed(A-B, p)) (12)
open↔[timeout] timedout (13)
closed ↔[M:manager.cfp(G,pM )]cfped(M,G,pM ) ∨ [M:manager.re reselect]proposed(C, p) (14)
Figure 4: Definition of the states of the CNP in extended PDL
Figures 3 and 4 provide a corresponding logical theory of the protocol in extended
PDL. Axioms (1)-(7) in figure 3 specify the relation between the states as given in the
CNP diagram in figure 2. Axioms (8)-(14) both define the states and state transitions of
the CNP. In more detail, axiom (1) defines that a group of agents G adheres to the CNP
in a process instance called contract net process. Double implication in the action-
condition rules allows an agent to infer the history of an interaction. Axioms (2)-(6)
define the relations between parent and sub-states, as seen in the hierarchy of figure 2.
There are 5 other axioms (not shown here) for ensuring when a parent state is false,
none of its sub-states are true.
A manager may initiate a contract net process into a cfped state by issuing a call for
proposal to a group of contractors G, only if the interaction has not yet started (Axiom
7), leading to the cfped state. Contractors may refuse the manager’s cfp, and if the
manager receives only refusals by the deadline, the process terminates in a refused state
(Axiom 8). Otherwise, some contractors may refuse whilst others (proposers) send a
proposal, leading to proposed(C, p) where C is the set of proposers and p the set of
proposals, each associated to its proposer. Further proposals from other proposers are
added to the sets C and p. The expression ∀i(i ∈ C ↔ BM i.done(i.propose(M,pi)))
means that the manager’s beliefs include the identity of all proposers in C (Axiom 8).
Then the contractor deliberates to record those proposals it will accept as set A.
The condition ∀i ∈ A, j 6∈ A(BM (i ∈ A)) ∧ (BM (i 6∈ A)) ensures that the manager’s
beliefs include accepted and rejected proposers (axiom 9). The manager concurrently
sends an accept message to all chosen proposers in A, and rejections to those in (C-
A) (axiom 10). The manager can also cancel the cfp or reject all proposals through a
cancel message.
The action ∀i ∈ A(i.pi) and the state completed(A,B,p) express the fact that all
accepted contractors in A execute their proposals and if successful are implicitly part
of the set B. Each contractor privately believes whether it has succeeded or not in its
execution (axiom 11). Finally, the contract net process terminates after all contractors
in B have informed the manager of success, and the rest in (A-B) of failure (axiom 12).
In an open state, a timeout can occur at any point (axiom 13), while from the closed
state the manager can re-issue a call for proposal (axiom 14).
5 Beliefs and Intentions in a Group
Given the formal representation of the CNP in extended PDL, we now give meaning to
the actions and states in the protocol in terms of the beliefs and intentions of the group.
To do this, we use the modal operators for beliefs and intentions [2] [14]. Specifically,
an axiomatic system for belief may be defined in terms of axioms for consistency and
introspection [2]. We assume that each agent in a group has such a system of beliefs.
The formula Biα is read as agent i believes α, Iiα is read as agent i intends to do α, and
EGα is read as everyone in a group of agents, G, believes α, where α itself may express
an agent’s beliefs and intentions. The joint beliefs (Bi1α1 ∧ . . . Binαn) of a group are
the sentences that are consequences of the union of the individual beliefs of the agents.
We also re-use a modified version of the FIPA SL done operator [4]. Here, done(i.a)
(done(i,a) in FIPA SL) means that agent i has performed action a. Pre-conditions p for
doing a can be expressed as part of a (e.g. p?;a).
As mentioned in section 2, we ignore the Gricean condition involving uncertain
beliefs. We also specify intention axioms and other axioms for sincerity and trust that
hold in our environment. These axioms are independent of the ACL and the protocol,
but apply to reasoning about an interacting group of agents. Thus, although the seman-
tics or the ACLs may differ, these core axioms should nevertheless hold in all agent
interactions.
5.1 Belief and Intention Axioms
We assume the tradition axioms K, D, 4, 5 for belief (but not normality). They express
closure under implication, consistency, and positive and negative introspection. To-
gether they make iterated belief redundant, i.e. BiBiα ↔ Biα. In addition to a KD5
axiom for belief, we have axioms for intentions and beliefs about intentions. Like pos-
itive introspection for belief and knowledge, we assume an agent’s iterated intentions
collapse to a single intention (A1): IiIiα ↔ Iiα.
Axiom (A2) states that an agent i is aware of its intentions and, intends what it
believes it wants to intend: BiIiα ↔ Iiα.
We can have a stronger system where an agent is aware of what it does not intend
to do, which is some kind of negative introspection (A3): ¬Iiα → Bi¬Iiα.
An agent is rational, that is it does not intend what it believes it does not intend
(A4): Bi¬Iiα → ¬Iiα.
Intentions for negative intentions also collapse to not intending α (A5):
Ii¬Iiα → ¬Iiα.
An agent has control over its beliefs. If it intends to believe α, then it intends it
(A6): IiBiα → Iiα. This also implies IiBi¬α → Ii¬α.
From axioms (A1) and (A2), we obtain the following axiom, which can be further
simplified to: Iiα (A7): BiIiBiIiα ↔ BiIiα.
Definitions for common intentions may be formulated in the same way as common
knowledge and common beliefs. Axioms (A1) to (A6), except for axiom (A3) hold in
our framework, where α can itself include belief and intention modalities.
5.2 Assumptions
In this section, we formulate the axioms holding in our model. These are the foun-
dations of our reasoning and proofs and combined infer a sincere and trustworthy be-
haviour, and that messages are successfully delivered. All of these assumptions are
implicit in FIPA ACL. Although they may seem to require an ideal environment, our
goal in this paper is to provide a simple and well-founded semantics that work in such
a social context. Untrustworthy environments and relaxing these are avenues for future
work. Let s (sender) and r (receiver) represent two different agents interacting with one
another.
Sincerity Axioms: IsBrBsα → Bsα.
IsBrIsα → Isα.
Agents are sincere and the sender does not intend the receiver to believe what it does
not believe itself.
Trust Axiom: BrIsBrα → Brα.
This states that if r believes that agent s sent a message to agent r that α holds, then r
believes α. Receivers trust the sender. If α is a proposition or a belief formula, then r
also believes s believes α; that is, BrIsBsα → Brα ∧BrBsα (Trust Axiom 2).
Cooperative Axiom: BrIsIrα → (IrBsIrα ∨ IrBs¬Irα).
The agents are co-operative. Thus on receiving a message, an agent replies, even if it
is a refusal or a rejection.
Similar to the FP and RE of a CA, there are preconditions and postconditions when
sending a message, that are independent of the meaning of the CA. Our precondi-
tion states that a sender intends for the message to be sent. For example, the CA
s.inform(r,p) means that the sender s informs the receiver r that p holds. The FIPA
semantics define the FP of this CA as the sender believing p. However, we also need to
specify that the sender intends to send r the inform CA about p. The FP for sending all
the sender’s beliefs will hold. Let done(m) denote a sent message m containing a CA.
Let FP(m) denote the FP of the CA and RE(m) denote the RE of the CA being sent.
The axioms that apply to message exchange are:
Transport Precondition: Isdone(m). Before sending a message, sender s intends
to send it.
Transport Postcondition: Brdone(m). The receiver received the message.
Message Sending: Isdone(m) → FP (m).
Message Receipt: Brdone(m) → RE(m).
If the sender intends to send a message m, then the FP of the message (its commu-
nicative act) should hold and likewise for the receiver to believe the RE of the message
on receiving it. Given the above system for beliefs and intentions, we specify the se-
mantics of the speech-acts and states in the CNP in terms of the intentions of a message
sender and the receiver’s beliefs.
6 The Semantics of CNP Actions
We analyse the semantics of the most commonly used CAs, as given by FIPA in the SL
language, and discuss the incorrectness of these semantics with respect to the intended
meaning of the CA. As a remedy, we provide a simpler and more intuitive semantics
for the CAs in table 2. Let s and r denote the sender and receiver respectively.
Table 2: BIS Semantics for FIPA CAs
CA FP RE
s.inform(r, φ) Bsφ Brφ
s.propose(r, γ) Bs(BsIrdone(s.γ) Br(BsIrdone(s.γ)
→ Isdone(s.γ)) → Isdone(s.γ))
s.accept(r, γ) Bs(BrIsdone(r.γ) BrIsdone(r.γ)
→ Irdone(r.γ)),
BsIsdone(r.γ)
s.reject(r, γ) Bs(BrIsdone(r.γ) Br¬Isdone(r.γ)
→ Irdone(r.γ)),
Bs¬Isdone(r.γ)
s.request(r, γ) BsIsdone(r.γ) BrIsdone(r.γ)
s.agree(r, γ) BsIrdone(s.γ) , BrIsdone(s.γ)
BsIsdone(s.γ)
s.refuse(r, γ) BsIrdone(s.γ), Br¬Isdone(s.γ)
Bs¬Isdone(s.γ)
s.cfp(r, γ) BsIs( BrIs(
done(r.propose(s, γ))∨ done(r.propose(s, γ))∨
done(r.refuse(s, γ))) done(r.refuse(s, γ)))
6.1 Speech Acts Semantics in BIS Semantics
Henceforth, we refer to the SL semantics as “FIPA semantics” and we refer to our pro-
posed revised semantics as “BIS” (Belief Intention Semantics) semantics. As in FIPA
SL, we give the preconditions (FP) and postconditions (RE) holding, respectively, be-
fore sending and after receiving a CA. In general, the FP of a CA includes the intention
of the sender for conveying that CA and the RE of a CA includes the receiver’s beliefs.
To be compatible with the way FIPA semantics are expressed, using axiom (A2), we
prefix the intentions of a sender with its beliefs about those intentions, (e.g. BiIiBjα
instead of IiBjα). Table 2 presents our BIS semantics for most of the FIPA CAs. We
discuss below the semantics of some of the salient CAs.
6.1.1 s.inform(r,φ).
s informs r that φ holds.
Fipa FP:Bsφ∧ ¬Bs(Bifrφ ∨ Uifrφ)
inform RE: Brφ
BIS FP: Bsφ
inform RE:Brφ
In the FIPA semantics, the FP includes the fact that the sender believes φ and the
RE that the receiver believes φ. As mentioned in section 5.2, Bsφ is not strong enough
since we need to represent the intention of s to send the message. We could express
this as BsIsBrφ, the sender intends the receiver to believe φ. By the sincerity and the
trust axioms, in the BIS semantics (as shown in table 2), the FP and RE respectively
simplify to Bsφ and Brφ.
6.1.2 s.propose(r,γ).
s proposes r for s itself to do γ.
Fipa FP: Bsα∧ ¬Bs(Bifrα ∨ Uifrα)
propose RE: Brα where,
α = Irdone(<s, γ >) → Isdone(<r, γ >)
BIS FP: Bs(BsIrdone(s.γ) → Isdone(s.γ))
propose RE: Br(BsIrdone(s.γ) → Isdone(s.γ))
In the FIPA semantics FP, the sender s believes that if r intends s to do γ, then s will
intend it. However, s may not know what r intends and therefore cannot consequently
infer that it should intend to do γ. For s to be aware that r intends done(s.γ), it must
have received an accept to its proposal. As such, the FIPA semantics specifies s adopts
an intention by being privy to the individual beliefs of r. In our BIS semantics, both
the FP and the RE specify that s (the proposer) believes that r intends done(s.γ), for
s to adopt the same intention. Therefore, BsIrdone(s.γ) is the premise for s to adopt
the intention to do γ.
6.1.3 s.accept(r,γ).
s sends an accept proposal to r.
Fipa FP: Bsα ∧ ¬Bs(Bifrα ∨ Uifrα)
accept RE: Brα , where α = Isdone(<r, γ >).
BIS FP: Bs(BrIsdone(r.γ) → Irdone(r.γ)),
accept BsIsdone(r.γ)
RE: BrIsdone(r.γ)
The FIPA semantics for accepting a proposal do not consider the context of sending
an accept. As FP, s believes that it intends r to do γ. There is no notion in either the FP
or in the RE, that s is accepting a proposal that r must have sent. These FP and RE could
also hold in other speech-acts such as tell and does not distinguish an accept-proposal
from them. In our BIS semantics, we also include that both sender and receiver are
aware that r sent a proposal previously and it is up to s to accept it. Our FP and RE also
specify the context of the CA, this being an acceptance, there was a proposal before.
The other part is the choice of the sender to intend the receiver to do γ.
The same remarks as for accept-proposal apply to the FIPA semantics for reject-
proposal. The BIS semantics for reject can be found in table 2
6.1.4 s.cfp(r,γ).
s sends a call for proposal to r to do γ. In the FIPA semantics, the FP for a call for
proposal includes that both sender and receiver intend for the receiver to perform the
request. However, these intentions are premature given that r has yet to propose and s
to accept for r to do γ. It does not leave the possibility for refusal or rejection. The rest
of the semantics for cfp is so complicated that its meaning is unclear.
In our semantics, a call for proposal from s to r is equivalent to a request from
s to r for r to make a proposal to s. Thus s.cfp(r, γ) is equivalent to s.request(r,
r.propose(s,γ)).
Using our BIS semantics for s.request(r, γ), as shown in table 2, we can specify a
call for proposal by s as having FP BsIs(done(r.propose(s, γ))∨done(r.refuse(s, γ))).
This means that s intends that r either sends a proposal or refuses to do γ (because may
be r cannot do γ). In turn, the RE of a call for proposal is that r believes s intends r to
make a proposal or to refuse.
6.1.5 s.refuse(r,γ).
s sends a refusal to r for r to do γ. Again for the refusal CA, the FIPA semantics are
obscure. For example, the FP given by the FIPA semantics is:
Bs¬Feasible(< s, γ >) ∧Bs(BrFeasible(< s, γ >)∨
UrFeasible(< s, act >)) ∧Bsα ∧ ¬Bs(Bifrα ∨ Uifrα)
where α = β ∧ ¬done(< i, γ >) ∧ ¬Isdone(< s, γ >).
β is the reason for the refusal and γ is the action being refused. The predicate Feasible
is unclear and the formula α is hard to understand. In the BIS semantics, the precon-
dition for a refusal is that the sender s believes that r intends s to do γ and s does not
intend to do so. The RE is that the receiver then believes that the sender does not intend
γ.
6.2 Internal Actions
There are two internal actions in the CNP protocol — M.deliberate(C,A,p) from a pro-
posed state and i.p from an accepted state. The process i.p expresses that agent i
executes p and it semantics are given in terms of the semantics for extended PDL. In
the process M.deliberate(C,A,Act), the set C contains those agents which sent a
proposal, A contains the set of agents whose proposals M will accept and Act is the set
of proposals subscripted with their corresponding proposer. A manager internally per-
forms the M.deliberate(C,A,Act) process to select which proposals to accept. The
semantics can be found in table 3. The precondition requires that M believes that the set
C contains those agents which sent a proposal. The postcondition specifies that after a
deliberate action, the set A contains the contractors whose proposals M will accept and
the set (C-A), those who will be sent rejections.
7 The Semantics of CNP States
The interaction states of an IP specify the beliefs of an agent or group of agents. Given
this, the interaction states in the CNP can be grouped into three types: public, shared
and individual. Public states are believed by all the agents, shared states are mutually
believed by a particular subset of the group, and individual states are the beliefs of one
agent that others are unaware of. Internal actions are assumed to succeed. In the CNP,
state si is equivalent to done(ai). For example, the state cfped(M, G, p) can be written
as done(M.cpf(G,p)) and likewise for the other states. For the sake of readability, in
figure 2 we prefer to name a state as the past tense of an action leading to it, instead of
a parameterised done. Let a group of contractors be denoted by G and the manager by
M. Let EGα be read as everyone in a group of agents, G, believes α. We specify below
the semantics of the interaction states of the CNP, which together with the semantics
of the processes in the CNP, constitute the semantics of the protocol.
7.1 Public States
The public states in the CNP are cfped, timedout, open and closed (see figure 2). These
states are believed by the manager and all the contractors in G. The semantics of the
state cfped(M, G, p) is that everyone in the group GM, (where GM = G ∪ {M}) be-
lieves done(M.cpf(G,p)). That is:
EGM∀i ∈ G(done(M.request(i, i.propose(M,p)))). This entails that everyone be-
lieves the FP and RE of a call for proposal:
EGMIs(done(r.propose(s, p)) ∨ done(r.refuse(s, p))).
Similarly the semantics of the other public states are specified in terms of the beliefs
of the group GM.
7.2 Shared States
In the CNP, these shared states are mutually believed by the manager and a contractor.
For example, only the manager and a contractor sending a proposal believe and mutu-
ally believe that this particular contractor has sent the manager a proposal. The shared
states of the CNP are proposed, accepted, rejected, cancelled, refused, informed and
failed (see figure 2). Their semantics are given in terms of the beliefs of the manager
and a contractor. We explain the semantics of the proposed and accepted states. The
semantics of the other shared states are given in figure 3.
7.2.1 proposed(C,p).
Can be re-written as ∀i ∈ C(done(i.propose(M,pi)). The beliefs between M and
each i in C are given below. The FP and RE of the propose CA are:
BM (BiIMdone(i.pi) → Iidone(i.pi)) and
Bi(BiIMdone(i.pi) → Iidone(i.pi)) leading to the shared belief between i and M:
∀i ∈ C(E{M,i}(BiIMdone(i.pi) → Iidone(i.pi))).
7.2.2 accepted(A, p).
Every contractor i in the set A has been sent an acceptance message from M. This can
be re-written as ∀i ∈ A(done(M.accept(i, pi)).
From the FP and RE effect of accept CA, we have ∀i ∈ A:
E{M,i}(BiIMdone(i.pi) → Iidone(i.pi)), i and M believe i previously sent a proposal
to M.
E{M,i}IMdone(i.pi) holds i.e. both i and M believe M has accepted i’s proposal,
leading to the belief E{M,i}Iidone(i.pi), both believe that i has adopted the intention
to do γ.
7.3 Individual States
There are two individual states in the CNP process, to-be-accepted and completed,
as the private state of the manager and a contractor respectively (see figure 2). The
state to-be-accepted(C,A, Act) expresses the private belief of M that it will send an
acceptance to all contractors in C. The following holds in the manager’s beliefs for the
to-be-accepted(C,A, Act) state:
• BM∀i ∈ C(BiIMdone(i.pi) → Iidone(i.pi)), M believes that all agents in C
sent it a proposal.
• BM∀i ∈ A(IMdone(i.pi) ∧ IMBiIMdone(i.pi)). By axioms (A6) and (A1),
this is equivalent to BM∀i ∈ A(IMdone(i.pi)) M intends that all agents in A
execute their proposal and M intends to let them know about its acceptance.
• BM∀i ∈ (C − A)(¬IMdone(i.pi) ∧ IMBi¬IMdone(i.pi)), likewise for the
agents that M has decided to reject. Again by axioms (A6) and (A1), this is
equivalent to BM∀i ∈ (C −A)(¬IMdone(i.pi)).
8 Proving Properties of the CNP
We validate our semantics for the CNP and its CAs by proving useful properties of the
protocol. We do this by reasoning about the possible paths in the CNP. To this end,
figure 5 shows an interpretation of the CNP from its start with a call for proposal to its
completion with refusals, cancellations or informs. Figure 5 is derived from the CNP
statechart in figure 2 and includes all possible paths in the execution of the CNP (apart
from timeout). Let us refer to the states si in figure 2 as interaction states, and to the
states Si in figure 5 as execution states. An execution state, Si, represents the beliefs
of the manager and the contractors, given by the RE of the action leading to Si, the
FP of the next action, and the group beliefs in the interaction state si. The path S0
to S6 is the longest execution path in the CNP, and the beliefs holding at these states
are given in table 3. For example, the action cfp leads to state S1 in figure 5, and thus
in table 3, the state S1 gives the RE of cfp, the group’s beliefs of the cfped state, and
the FP of the next action propose. In table 3, let GM = G ∪ {M}. Let αi denote
BiIMdone(i.p) → Iidone(i.p) and let αj denote BjIMdone(j.p) → Ijdone(j.p).
S0
S1
S2
S3
S4
S7
S8
S5S6
M.cfp(G,pM )
n.refuse(M,pM );
i.propose(M, pi);C\{i};p \{pi}
∀i ∈ C M.cancel(i,pi)
j.propose(M, pj);
M.deliberate(C, A, p)
(M.accept(i, pi)∩ M.reject(j, pj))
∀i ∈ A, j ∈(C-A)
∀i ∈ A (i.pi)
j.failure(M, pj))
(i.inform(M, done(i, pi)∩
∀i ∈ B, j ∈ (A-B)
Figure 5: Flowchart showing CNP Interpretation
8.1 Termination
We prove that any interpretation of the CNP will terminate.
Theorem 1. In a CNP between a manager M and a group of contractors G, the for-
mula (cfped(M,G, pM ) → [PathsALL]closed) holds, where the process PathsALL
expresses all complete paths of execution in our framework.
Proof. We prove that the closed state is eventually reached from the cfped interaction
state. The simplest path is a timeout, which terminates. Let the process ρi lead to the
interaction state si and the execution state Si. The CNP defines that process ρi may be
Table 3: Execution Paths from State S0 to S6
S0 FPcfp ∀i ∈ G(BM IM (done(i.propose(M, p)) ∨done(i.refuse(M, p))))
S1
REcfp ∀i ∈ G(BiIM (done(i.propose(M, p)) ∨ done(i.refuse(M, p))))
Statecfped ∀i ∈ G(EGM IM (done(i.propose(M, p)) ∨ done(i.refuse(M, p))))
FPpropose Biαi
S2
REpropose BMαi
Stateproposed ∀i ∈ C(E{M,i}αi)
Predeliberate ∀i ∈ C(BMαi)
S3
Postdeliberate A ⊆ C ∧ ∀i ∈ A(BM IMBiIMdonei),
∀j ∈ (C −A)(BM IMBj¬IMdonej)
to-be-accepted ∀i ∈ C(BMαi), ∀i ∈ A(BM (IMdonei ∧ IMBiIMdonei)),
∀j ∈ (C −A)(BM (¬IMdone(j, pj) ∧ IMBj¬IMdonej))
FPM.accept(i,pi) BMαi, BM IMdone(i.pi)
FPM.reject(j,pj) BMαj , BM¬IMdone(j.pj)
S4
REM.accept(i,pi) BiIMdone(i.pi)
REM.reject(j,pj) Bj¬IMdone(j.pj)
Stateaccepted E{M,i}αi, ∀i ∈ A(E{M,i}IMdone(i.pi))
Staterejected ∀j ∈ (C-A)(E{M,j}αj ∧ E{M,j}¬IMdonej , E{M,j}¬Ijdonej)
Prei.p Beliefs of accepted state
S5
Post∀i∈A(i.p) Beliefs of completed state
Statecompleted ∀i ∈ B(Bi(done(i.pi) ∧ IiBMdonei)
∀j ∈ (A-B)∧Bj(¬donej ∧ ¬Ijdonej ∧ IjBM¬donej))
FPi.inform Bidone(i.pi)
FPj.failure(M,pj) Bj¬Ijdonej
S6
REi.inform BMdone(i.pi)
REj.failure(M,pj) BM (¬done(j.pj) ∧ ¬Ijdonej)
Stateinformed ∀i ∈ B(E{M,i}done(i.pi))
Statefailed ∀j ∈ (A−B)(E{M,j}(¬donej ∧ ¬Ijdonej))
followed by the process ρi+1. Let the notations in table 3 be used (e.g. for αi). Proving
termination for all processes in PathsALL implies proving that all paths in figure 5
terminate. Thus, we prove that all actions in the paths in figure 5 are feasible in their
source state (i.e, the FP of all processes ρi+1 may hold after action ρi and in interaction
state si). The premise is that the CNP has been started with a call for proposals. The
REcfp (RE of cpf) holds, stating that contractors should either reply with a refusal or
a proposal. But this is what is required by the CNP to trigger the next state, so the
process proceeds to the state proposed or refused, since the REcfp renders it possible.
Since refused is a sub-state of closed, all paths from refuse terminate. So using table
3, we now prove that the paths following a propose action terminate. That is, for all
actions ρi, after execution state S1, the FPρi+1 is possible from the interaction state si
and the REρi . This can be seen in table 3 where the pre-condition of deliberate holds
from the REpropose.
The FP of the action ∀i ∈ A(M.accept(i, pi)) holds since the state to-be-accepted
includes the belief ∀i ∈ C(BMαi) and ∀i ∈ A(BMIMdonei).
Similarly the FP of the reject action holds from the beliefs in the to-be-accepted state.
Thus, both acceptance and rejection processes can occur. Then the pre-condition of the
next action i.p hold by virtue of being the beliefs of the resulting interaction state from
an inform or failure.
From table 3 it can be seen that the FP of both accept and reject can be derived from
the state completed, leading to the sub-states of closed.
Corollary 1. After a call for proposal, the FP of all actions may hold from the FP and
RE of the previous action. That is, FPρi+1 from FPρi and the REρi
We can also show there are no deadlocks in the CNP interpretation. The corollary
holds because when proving theorem 1, we proved FPρi+1 is possible from the inter-
action state si and the REρi . From our semantics, interaction state si is itself defined
from the FP and RE of the action ρi leading to it.
8.2 A Failed or Succeeded CNP
We can also show that a CNP always terminates with the beliefs of whether the CNP
process has satisfied the goal of the interaction:
Theorem 2. The interpretation of the CNP terminates with either the shared belief
between a manager and a contractor i of either donei or ¬donei, or the group beliefs
of ¬done.
Proof. By theorem 1, a CNP interpretation always terminates. ¬done obviously holds
in the timedout state. Terminal states are refused, timedout, cancelled and (informed
∧ failed). Section 7 and table 3 both show that ¬done holds in states refused and
cancelled. It can also be seen that in the accepted and rejected states, E{M,i}donei
and E{M,j}¬donej respectively hold. Thus, all accepted contractors i believe donei
and all rejected contractors j believe ¬donej , while the manager appropriately believes
donei and ¬donej .
8.3 Consistent Joint Beliefs in a Group
Consistent joint belief about µ in group G entails that everyone in G believes µ and
no-one believes ¬µ. Below we show that for public and shared states, there are some
beliefs that are consistent between the agents in the group (for public states) or sub-
group (for shared states). Thus, there is a state of affairs which every agent in the
group (or sub-group) believes.
Theorem 3. In the CNP interpretation, for all public and shared states, there are some
consistent joint beliefs in, respectively, the group or sub-group. That is, for all states
public to G, and states shared between Gsub:
∃µ(EGµ ∧ (¬∃i ∈ G(Bi¬µ)))∧
∃β(EGsubβ ∧ (¬∃i ∈ Gsub(Bi¬β)))
Proof. In the public cfped state, it can be seen that:
∀i ∈ G(EGMIM (done(i.propose(M,p)) ∨ done(i.refuse(M,p)))).
Regarding shared states in the CNP, they have been formulated in table 3 in such a way
to show the joint beliefs between the manager and each contractor i. For example, ∀i ∈
B(E{M,i}done(i.pi)) in the informed state. Since individual beliefs are consistent,
then if everyone in that sub-group believes done(i.pi), no-one will believe the contrary.
The same is true for the other shared states accepted, failed, rejected and proposed.
9 Conclusions and Future Work
We believe there is a lack of consensus on a suitable ACL for agent interaction because
of the bewildering array of approaches to formalising an ACL’s semantics. Likewise,
there is a similarly strong need for formal specification and verification of interaction
protocols and their semantics. To highlight these needs and in attempting to satisfy
them, this paper uses the contract net protocol as a non-trivial case study. In our frame-
work, we formulate axioms for reasoning about an agent’s beliefs about its intentions
and present a simplified and revised semantics for the FIPA communicative acts that
appear in the contract net protocol. We accompany these ACL semantics with those
of the states and internal actions in the contract net protocol in order to obtain (for the
first time) a complete semantics for that protocol. In so doing, we can prove proper-
ties when interpreting the protocol such as termination and consistency in joint beliefs.
Even though the case study has raised several issues about ACL and IP semantics, it is
still incomplete and we intend that future work analyses other interesting open issues.
Future work includes relaxing the assumptions detailed in section 5.2 and analysing
properties such as liveness, completeness, complexity and decidability. A denotational
semantics for the speech-acts can be specified in addition to the given BDI semantics
and these semantics may be combined with our previous work [9] in modeling agent
interactions in imperfect communication environments for an analysis of the perfor-
mance of agent interactions in realistic environments.
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Abstract
We present Timed Reasoning Logics (TRL) as a framework that allows
one to model multiagent systems over time without assuming agents are log-
ically omniscient. TRL can be seen as a combination of syntactic epistemic
logics and temporal logics. This paper is primarily concerned with illus-
trating TRL concepts using a propositional natural deduction-style reasoner,
which derives consequences of its beliefs over time. We show the logic used
to model the reasoner, which we call TRL(ND), is sound, complete and de-
cidable.
1 Introduction
Timed Reasoning Logics (TRL) [1] are a family of logics that have been devel-
oped to address the problem of modelling time bounded reasoners, i.e. agents that
are able to produce plans or derive consequences of their beliefs but take time
to deliberate. Most research in epistemic and doxastic logics (see, for example,
[6, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25]) makes the strong assumption that, what-
ever reasoning abilities an agent may have, the results of applying those abilities to
a given problem are available immediately. Agents that reason using a classically
complete set of logical rules, such as the rules of classical natural deduction, cannot
then believe a formula without believing all logical consequences of that formula.
In some situations, this is a reasonable assumption to make. An agent may do a
∗This research is supported by the AHRB. Thanks to Natasha Alechina, Brian Logan and
Thorsten Altenkirch for commenting on earlier drafts of the paper.
very simple kind of deliberation in a non-time-critical environment, for example,
and we may safely ignore a small delay involved in deliberation.
However, there are many cases in which the assumption that results of deliber-
ation are available immediately is not permissible. One example in which the time
taken to deliberate is of critical importance is that of planning in a dynamic envi-
ronment: an agent may be able to produce a perfectly good plan to reach its goal
but, if planning takes longer than the time it takes the environment to alter signif-
icantly, the result may be irrelevant. Another example involves agents that verify
cryptographic protocols. An agent intercepting a coded message may have all the
“inference rules” necessary to break the code, eventually; but, in practice, it may
take millennia to actually derive the key and decode the message. Again, in mod-
elling a theorem-proving agent whose sole purpose is to check whether a formula
is a tautology, to assume that it already knows all tautologies defeats the purpose of
modelling. In general, TRL is concerned with modelling resource bounded agents
and proving results of the form agent i is capable of reaching conclusion φ within
time bound t.
Note that incorporating impossible and/or incomplete worlds (e.g. [11], [16],
[21]) does not help matters. Impossible worlds are ones at which both a formula
and its negation hold, for some formulas; incomplete worlds are ones at which nei-
ther hold. Such approaches have the effect of allowing a formula to be assigned
various subsets of the set {true, false} (and not just the classical singleton sets).
Such epistemic logics have relevance logic as their propositional basis. Alterna-
tively, φ may be assigned any subset of {true, false} except ∅; this results in an
epistemic logic with paraconsistent logic as its propositional basis. Both relevance
logic and paraconsistent logic have a subclassical consequence relation; the result-
ing epistemic logics therefore model an agent’s beliefs as being closed under that
relation. Although an agent’s beliefs will therefore be a proper subset of the beliefs
ascribed according to the standard possible worlds paradigm [12], the considera-
tions addressed above apply just as forcefully in these cases.
In this paper, we illustrate the basic concepts of TRL by considering a model
of a classical reasoner as an example. The reasoner we model derives formulas in a
step-by-step way using a system of natural deduction. The reasoner begins with a
set of initial formulas Γ and derives consequences over time; we say that a formula
is believed when an agent has derived it from the initial set. Now, a formula that
is easily derivable from Γ (i.e. for which the derivation is short) should take our
agent less time to add to its beliefs than formulas whose derivation from Γ requires
more computational effort. Since our purpose is to model the agent’s derivations in
a step-by-step manner, it would clearly be wrong to assume that, in believing some
formula φ at time t, our agent also believes all classical consequences of φ at t.
Reasoning in natural deduction requires assumptions to be made. Our model
of the natural deduction reasoner comprises many helper agents subordinate to the
main reasoner, where assumptions are modelled as the beliefs of these subordinate
agents. Our principal reasoner may not believe φ, but it can communicate with a
subordinate agent who does believe φ (as well as everything the principal agent
believes and nothing else) to discover what would happen to it’s beliefs if φ were
the case. For example, if the subordinate agent derives a contradiction from φ, then
the principal agent can infer ¬φ. This process can be iterated, to model assump-
tions within assumptions. We formulate this type of principal agent–subordinate
agent interaction along the lines of a reductio ad absurdum rule. For simplicity, we
restrict this exposition to a language whose only connectives are ¬ and ∧; how-
ever, we could just as easily use subordinate agents to introduce implications or
to eliminate disjunctions in a similar way to introducing negation. Although we
model a classical reasoner, an intuitionistic reasoner can be modelled just as easily
(by replacing reductio ad absurdum and double negation elimination with rules for
the introduction and elimination of implication and disjunction, for example).
We allow agent each agent to see inside the states of its subordinates in order
to extract the information it needs. This assumption is used here as a simplifying
feature; in general, there is nothing to stop TRL agents having private (unobserv-
able) beliefs which can only be communicated to certain other agents, or even to
none at all. In other words, although the specific example of TRL provided in this
paper requires a simplistic notion of agent communication, the concepts developed
allow for far more realistic models of communication in multiagent systems.
It should be emphasised that TRL is not conceived as an automated theorem
proving tool; the example involving a natural deduction reasoner is used here
merely to demonstrate how a simple system of time-bounded agents can be suc-
cessfully modelled, i.e. without assuming an agent’s beliefs to be closed under
some consequence relation at each timepoint. It is not the particular formalisation
of reasoning with assumptions that is of most interest here; attention should be
given to the general framework of modelling step-by-step reasoning. That is not
to say that the framework developed for modelling reasoning with assumptions is
of no interest. The same approach could be used to distinguish an agent’s firmly
held beliefs from working hypotheses in a formalisation of belief revision, for ex-
ample (although we would then be describing different sections of a single agent’s
architecture, rather than distinct agents).
TRL represents agents as repeatedly executing some fixed program at each tick
of the clock, matching a set of condition-action rules against the contents of its
working memory and firing a subset of these rules. Following standard rule-based
system terminology, the process of deciding which subset of rule instances is to
be fired at any given cycle is known as conflict resolution. TRL is capable of
modelling various rule application and conflict resolution strategies. The reasoner
we model in this paper fires every rule instance in its conflict set exactly once on
each cycle; we call this the all rules at each cycle strategy. Accordingly, we restrict
our exposition of TRL to those subsystems which use the the all rules at each cycle
strategy exclusively.1
One of the advantages of TRL is its separation of temporal and epistemic in-
formation: its rules either affect how an agent’s internal state changes over time, or
affect what agents believe relative to their own or other agent’s beliefs (section 4.2
below). The former kind of rule may incorporate features of more familiar tempo-
ral logics, such as operations on timepoints, whereas the latter can admit features
of epistemic logics, such as Konolige’s Deduction Model of Belief [13]. We may,
for example, model an introspective agent, who knows what he knows, in the sense
that he can introspect to discover whether he knows a particular formula, but for
whom this process takes time, and so the results of introspection are not available
immediately.
A major difference between TRL and approaches reliant upon possible worlds
semantics is that TRL represents an agent’s beliefs syntactically. Whilst this has
the advantage of allowing one to differentiate between syntactically different but
semantically indistinguishable formulas, it has been claimed that such accounts do
not preserve meanings of believed formulas in the right way. An agent modelled
in a syntactic account may believe, e.g., p ∧ q but not believe q ∧ p and so, it is
claimed, the meaning of ‘∧’ as conjunction is not preserved.2
Indeed, an agent with appropriate rules for conjunction and appropriate ca-
pacities should, according to any good model, be able to switch the order of con-
juncts in a believed conjunction. But consider two logically equivalent formulas
φ1 ∧ φ2 ∧ φ3 ∧ φ4 . . . ∧ φn−1 ∧ φn and φ2 ∧ φ1 ∧ φ4 ∧ φ3 . . . ∧ φn ∧ φn−1. To
arrive at belief in the latter on the basis of belief in the former, an agent may need to
permute n/2 conjuncts which, for large values of n, will take some degree of com-
putational effort; we could not assume that the permutations take place instantly.
In fact, we should be able to model the fact that the amount of effort required by
such an activity increases as n does. This is precisely the kind of example to which
TRL is well suited.
In asserting that agent i believes that φ (at time t), we mean that φ contributes
towards the characterisation of the internal state of agent i at t and, given other
appropriate information, gives us information pertaining to how i will act. We
therefore take one of the roˆles of ascribing a belief to an agent to be a (partial)
1We call such systems TRL(STEP), as this is the strategy implicit in step logic models [4]: see
section 2 below.
2Syntactic accounts of belief are sometimes referred to as sentential accounts in the philosoph-
ical literature, for they relate an agent to a believed sentence, rather than the believed proposition
expressed or state of affairs depicted by that sentence.
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description of how it will act in certain circumstances.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. We begin by reviewing
related research (section 2) and providing a brief outline of TRL (section 3). Sec-
tion 4 describes our example of TRL, namely our natural deduction reasoner, and
explains how we model it in TRL. We also show that the resulting logic, TRL(ND),
is sound, complete, and decidable. We then briefly comment (section 5) on how this
approach is preferable to other comparable logics for modelling resource bounded
agents and suggest several avenues for further research to take.
2 Other Relevant Work
The literature contains many attempts to provide a logic of limited or restricted
reasoning by attempting to avoid the logical omniscience problem: if φ logically
implies ψ and an agent believes φ, then it must believe ψ too (as a consequence, an
agent must believe all tautologies).3 Levesque’s [16] logic of implicit and explicit
belief restricts an agent’s explicit beliefs (the classical possible worlds notion) by
allowing non-classical (either incomplete or impossible) worlds to enter an agent’s
epistemic accessibility relation. Although agents need not then believe all classical
tautologies, they are nevertheless modelled as being logically omniscient in rele-
vance logic, i.e. believing φ results in the the belif that ψ whenever φ→ ψ is valid
in relevance logic. Such agents could hardly be described as resource bounded in
our sense (see [26] for more on this issue).
In [7], Fagin & Halpern propose an alternative approach to restricting possible
worlds semantics which involves a syntactic awareness filter, such that an agent
only believes a formula if it (or its subterms) are in his awareness set. Agents
are modelled as perfect (i.e. logically omniscient) reasoners whose beliefs are
restricted to some syntactic class compatible with the awareness filter. Belief in
all classical tautologies is again avoided but, as Konolige notes, this approach is
“is no more powerful than current sentential [i.e. syntactic] logics, and can be
re-expressed in terms of them” [14, p.248].
Konolige’s Deduction Model [13] represents beliefs as sentences belonging to
an agent’s belief set B, which is closed under the agent’s deduction rules. A deduc-
tion model assigns a set of rules to each agent, allowing representation of agents
with differing reasoning capacities within a single system. Resource boundedness
is thus accommodated by modelling an agents as having rules that are restricted in
some respect (a rule may only be applicable, for example, if matched antecedent
formulas are less than a certain length).
3The terminology logical omniscience was first introduced by Hintikka [12].
However, all these accounts provide what [2, p.1] call a “final tray model” of
belief: they tell us what a set of agents will believe after an indefinitely long period
of deliberation. Step logic [4], on the other hand, is an attempt to model agents’
reasoning as a process situated in time, by incorporating the notion of a step into
its rules of inference. Such rules are of the form:
t: φ1, . . . , φn
t+ 1: ψ
where t is a variable ranging over steps. As such, step logics can be viewed as
particular cases of Gabbay’s Labelled Deduction Systems [8]. The rules are intu-
itively interpreted as: if the agent’s set of beliefs contains φ1, . . . , φn at step t, then
it will contain ψ at step t + 1.4 Agents may lose as well as gain beliefs from step
to step; if required, monotonicity must be stipulated using a rule.
Within this general framework, particular step logics are characterised accord-
ing to three mechanisms: self-knowledge, i.e. an agent knowing what it does or
does not believe; time, allowing an agent to reason about its reasoning over time;
and retraction, or the ability to handle contradictions. The simplest such logic is
named SL0 and features none of these mechanisms. The other logics (SL1 to
SL7) studied in [5] become more progressively more complicated as their index
increases, each featuring a different combination of these mechanisms.
No semantics is given in [4] for any of these logics. A semantics for SL5 is con-
sidered in [18] and [3], based on Montague’s neighbourhood structures.5 This has
the effect of re-introducing a version of the logical omniscience problem: equiva-
lent formulas cannot be distinguished, and so a formula cannot be believed without
believing all equivalent formulas. This appears to be an unavoidable feature of
neighbourhood semantics and of accounts whose semantics is based on possible
worlds in general; see [26] for a more detailed critique of this approach.
[10] provides a proper semantics for step logics which does not suffer from
logical omniscience. However, their first-order theories are undecidable; they also
fail to separate the temporal from the epsitemic/doxastic aspects of reasoning, as
TRL does. We should be able enrich a theory with a calculus on timepoints, for
example, without affecting its epistemic properties.
The framework we propose borrows several notions from context logics (see,
for instance, [9]). Contexts may be thought of as localised theories, each containing
a language and a set of inference rules, but intuitively represent the points of view
4Note that an agents beliefs are represented as derived formulas in this language; a metalanguage
containing a belief predicate can then be defined such that bel(t, pφq) holds just in case φ is derived
at step t in the object language.
5Since the key idea is to model time, timelines replace sets of worlds; worlds thus become time
point constants, such that timelines are rays, i.e. infinite in one direction only.
of a set of agents. An example given in [9] involves two contexts, each of which
describes a different agent’s perspective of the same object; neither view uniquely
determines the other, but some combinations of views are impossible.
Contexts are connected to one another through inference rules known as bridge
rules. The semantic counterpart of a context is the local model, defined as non-
empty sets of classical models.6 Contexts are thus closed under the classical conse-
quence relation and, so interpreted, are not suitable for modelling resource bounded
agents in our sense.
However, one can take the idea of using bridge-style rules to establish rela-
tionships between contexts, understood as sets of formulas, without recourse to
classical localised models. One application is provided by the rules of step logic,
which establish relationships between the an agent’s set of beliefs at t and its beliefs
at t + 1. Another application, much discussed in the literature on context logics,
is in modelling the links between agents in a multi-agent system. In presenting
our framework of Timed Reasoning Logics in the following section, we combine
these two ideas to give us a system for modelling multiple resource bounded agents
whose reasoning is modelled as a process situated in time.
3 The General Approach: Timed Reasoning Logics
The goal of the Timed Reasoning Logics (TRL) project [1] is to develop a system
that can model the internal state of any number of agents at each stage of deliber-
ation. One criterion of success is that, if we were to stop an agent at some stage
of its deliberation and inspect its internal state, we should find there precisely the
formulas that our framework tells us we should.
The internal state of an agent i at time t is modelled by a finite set of arbitrary
formulas {φ1, . . . , φn}, which we call a TRL local state. Each local state is labelled
with the time t and agent name i that it models. Note that we do not require local
states to be internally consistent (in fact, states containing contradictory formulas
are vital for the way we represent reasoning with assumptions in TRL(ND): see
section 4 below). In this sense, TRL local states are more akin to the belief sets
of Konolige’s Deduction Model [13] than the local models of context logic, which
are closed under the classical notion of consequence. But whereas an agent’s belief
set B in the Deduction Model is closed under that agent’s deduction rules, which
has the effect of modelling the agent as deducing new beliefs instantaneously, TRL
local states are closed under no rules whatsoever. Rules play their roˆle in TRL by
6This allows for modelling incompleteness: in a given context, the agent may accept neither φ
nor ¬φ
linking local states together; i.e. by establsihing what one state must look like on
the basis of what another contains.
A TRL(ND) model is then a set of local states, each indexed by an element of
the index set I = A × N. Intuitively, TRL models can be viewed as a grid, with
timepoints along its horizontal axis and agent names forming the vertical axis. At
the intersection of t on the horizontal axis and i on the vertical axis, we find the
local model labelled with i and t, which is our representation of the contents of that
agent’s internal state at that time.
Each model has an obs function and a set of inf i functions (one for each agent
i). Intuitively, obs models communication between agents (which, in the case of
TRL(ND), amounts to simply looking into another agent’s state at a timepoint; see
section 4 below). Note that, since different agents may use different languages, or
even augment their language from timepoint to timepoint (e.g., by aquiring new
constants through observing the environment), we write Lit to denote agent i’s
language at timepoint t. obs takes an agent i and a timepoint t as its arguments and
returns a finite set of formulas in the agent’s language at that timepoint, Lit, which
are added to the agent’s local state instantaneously (i.e. at the same timepoint).
Each function inf i models agent i’s computation of a new state, mapping a finite
set of formulas in i’s language at t, Lit, to formulas in the language Lit+1.
TRL has two types of rule: those that model an agent’s internal deductive pro-
cess, and those that model how agents interact with one another (see section 4.2
below). We call the former type internal rules, which are of the form:
(i, t) : φ1 . . . (i, t) : φn
(i, t+ 1) : ψ
Semantically, we model these rules using a function inf i for each agent i (see
definition 1 below) and, for a set of TRL rules R, write Rinf to denote the set of
internal rules.
We call the latter type communication rules, which have the form:
(i, t) : φ
(j, t+ 1) : ψ
For simplicity, we use a very basic notion of communication between agents: an
agent simply looks into another’s state and observes the formulas stored there. We
model communication using an obs function, and so communication rules corre-
spond to constraints on obs . We therefore write Robs to denote the set of commu-
nication rules.
4 Modelling the ND Reasoner in TRL
In this section, present the example of the title; namely, a model of a classical
natural deduction style reasoner. We do so in a logic we call TRL(ND). Our aim in
this section is twofold. Firstly, we show that the model is faithful to the reasoner,
in the sense that theorems are derived in a step-by-step manner, i.e. beliefs are not
closed under a consequence relation at any particular timepoint, but any classical
tautology or consequence of a set of initial formulas Γ will be derived at some
timepoint. Secondly, we show TRL(ND) to be sound and complete with respect to
TRL semantics; and that our notion of derivability in TRL(ND) is decidable.
4.1 The Natural Deduction Reasoner
Our reasoner is an agent which can reason in the following system of natural de-
duction for propositional logic:
φ ψ
φ ∧ ψ ∧int
φ ∧ ψ
φ
∧elimL
φ ∧ ψ
ψ
∧elimR φ ¬φ⊥ ⊥
¬¬φ
φ
DNelim
[φ
.
.
.
⊥]
¬φ
RAA
The main issue we have to deal with in modelling ND is the problem of mod-
elling assumptions. The way we have chosen to do this in TRL is to model a
hierarchy of agents, each with the same reasoning abilities, where each agent is
labelled with a finite sequence of formulas from the language of the reasoner. The
agent labelled with the sequence 〈φ1, . . . , φn〉 represents a series of assumptions,
each within the scope of the previous one, beginning with the assumption that φ1
holds and continuing until the assumption that φn holds has been made.
The agents in the system are linked by TRL communication rules which model
how the ND reasoner makes and later closes assumptions. Observation rules also
force a subordinate agent 〈φ1, . . . , φn〉ψ to have same beliefs as the agent 〈φ1, . . . , φn〉,
the agent one step up the hierarchy, plus the extra belief that ψ. Accordingly, we
write iψ as the name of the agent representing the ND reasoner making an assump-
tion that ψ holds, within the scope of whatever assumptions have been previously
modelled by agent i. If the agent named iψ derives a contradiction, it then returns
this result to agent i at the next step, who will then believe the negation of ψ.
For example, suppose our agent wants to prove ¬(φ ∧ ¬φ), by first assuming
φ ∧ ¬φ and then deriving a contradiction. In our model, there will be an agent
named φ ∧ ¬φ at timepoint 0, who will apply first ∧elimL, then ∧elimR, followed
by the ⊥ rule to derive⊥ at timepoint 3. At timepoint 4, the agent labelled with the
empty sequence will observe that φ ∧ ¬φ has derived ⊥ and accordingly believe
¬(φ ∧ ¬φ). Since this agent represents beliefs with no assumptions, we say our
modelled agent has indeed derived ¬(φ ∧ ¬φ).
We can therefore consider the TRL(ND) system to be a (somewhat unusual)
multi-agent system. Our model of the ND reasoner is this entire multi-agent sys-
tem. However, when we consider what our modelled agent actually derives, we
restrict out attention those formulas found in the states of the agent labelled with
the empty sequence, which we denote ·, i.e. the formulas derived without any
assumptions.
In the next section, we give details of our model of ND in TRL(ND). Although
the definitions and proofs we give are specific to TRL(ND), much of what we say
goes for the TRL system in general.7 Wherever possible, we indicate where this is
the case.
4.2 TRL(ND) Syntax
In this particular example of TRL, all agents reason in the same propositional lan-
guageL, which does not change over time. (As noted above, TRL allows for agents
to have unique languages which may change over time). For every agent i and time
t, we can thus write L in place of Lit to denote that agent’s language. The well-
formed formulas of L (which represent the formulas found in the internal states of
each agent) are defined over a set of primitive propositions Φ along with ⊥, ¬ and
∧ in the usual way. Other formulas, such as implications, may also be added if
appropriate definitions are given, i.e. φ→ ψ := ¬(φ∧¬ψ); we only provide rules
for ⊥, ¬ and ∧ here.
In TRL(ND), we use labelled formulas in a language LTRL to distinguish be-
tween unlabelled formulas belonging to internal states of distinct agents at distinct
timepoints. Given a set of logical timepoints T (which we will assume to be the set
of natural numbers) and a non-empty finite set of agents (each represented as a fi-
nite sequence of formulas) A = {1, . . . , i, . . .}, (i, t) : φ is a well-formed labelled
formula of LTRL for some t ∈ T and i ∈ A whenever φ is a well-formed formula
of L.
Theorems of TRL(ND) are obtained from the following rules, each of which is
applied where applicable at every timepoint:
(i, t) : φ (i, t) : ψ
(i, t+ 1) : φ ∧ ψ ∧int
(i, t) : φ ∧ ψ
(i, t+ 1) : φ
∧elimL (i, t) : φ ∧ ψ(i, t+ 1) : ψ ∧elimR
7In fact, much of what is said goes for the system TRL(STEP), the subsystem of TRL which
exclusively uses the all rules at each step rule application strategy, of which TRL(ND) is a particular
example.
(i, t) : φ (i, t) : ¬φ
(i, t+ 1) : ⊥ ⊥
(i, t) : ¬¬φ
(i, t+ 1) : φ
DNelim
(iφ, t) : ⊥
(i, t+ 1) : ¬φ RAA
Most of these rules (which correspond to the rules of natural deduction above)
are self-explanatory. In RAA, iφ is the name of an agent which is just like i (i.e.
believes whatever i believes) but in addition believes a formula φ.
In addition, each agent reasons monotonically (since the reasoner ND does
too):
(i, t) : φ
(i, t+ 1) : φ
MON
Suppose the ND reasoner is given a set of unlabelled formulas ∆ from which
it is to infer new formulas. In TRL(ND), derivations always use labelled formulas
and so the TRL(ND) derivation will begin with a set of labelled formulas Γ, which
is formed by labelling each formula in ∆. To keep our account general, we should
not assume that all formulas in ∆ are introduced in the derivation at timepoint 0.
Indeed, we allow formulas in Γ to have any label (i, t); consequently, we need to
ensure that, at every step, all subordinate agents iφ inherit whatever beliefs i has at
that step. We also have to make sure that iφ believes φ:
(〈ψ1 . . . ψn〉, t) : φ
(〈. . . ψ1 . . . ψn . . .〉, t) : φ INHERIT
∗
(〈. . . φ . . .〉, t) : φ AX
∗ where (〈ψ1 . . . ψn〉, t) : φ ∈ Γ.
Together, we call the set of these rules RND. With the exception of RAA,
INHERIT and AX, which are communication rules (RobsND), the rules in RND are
internal rules (RinfND).
A labelled formula (i, t) : φ is derivable from a set of labelled formulas Γ
using RND, written Γ ` (i, t) : φ, if there is a sequence of labelled formulas
(i1, t1) : φ1, . . . , (in, tn) : φn such that:
1. each formula in the sequence is either a member of Γ, or is obtained from Γ
by one of the inference rules in RND; and
2. the last labelled formula in the sequence is (i, t) : φ, namely (in, tn) : φn =
(i, t) : φ.
Note that there is a special case of derivation, namely of a formula (·, t) : φ. Such
derivations tell us what the modelled ND agent believes: an ND agent starting
with a set ∆ of unlabelled formulas believes φ whenever ∃t.Γ ` (·, t) : φ, where
Γ = {(·, 0) : ψ | ψ ∈ Γ}.
Any formula that can be derived using the standard propositional natural de-
duction rules given in section 4.1, for which we write `nd), can be derived as a
formula labelled (·, t) for some t in TRL(ND) and vice versa. This establishes
that the reasoner modelled by TRL(ND) can, given enough time, derive any con-
sequence of the formulas ∆ it begins with, and nothing more:
Theorem 1 Let ∆ be a set of unlabelled propositional formulas, and φ an unla-
belled propositional formula in the agent’s language. Then ∆ `nd φ iff, for some t
there exists a derivation Γ ` (·, t) : φ where Γ = {(·, 0) : ψ | ψ ∈ ∆}.
The proof is given in the appendix, section A.
Corollary 1 For any finite set of labelled formulas Γ and a labelled formula φ, it
is decidable whether Γ ` φ.
Proof. Since for any unlabelled set of formulas ∆ and unlabelled formula φ it
is decidable whether Γ `cl φ in propositional natural deduction, it follows from
theorem 1 that it is decidable whether Γ ` φ. a
4.3 TRL(ND) Models
Definition 1 (Models) Let A be a finite set of finite sequences of formulas over L.
A TRL(ND) modelMA overA is a tuple 〈obs, {infi | i ∈ A}, {mit | i ∈ A, t ∈ N}〉
where:
1. each mit is a finite set of formulas in L such that mit+1 = inf i(mit) ∪
obs(i, t+ 1).
2. inf i is a function from finite sets of formulas in L to finite sets of formulas in
L and satisfies the following conditions:
φ1 ∧ φ2 ∈ mit =⇒ φ1, φ2 ∈ infi(mit)
φ1, φ2 ∈ mit =⇒ φ1 ∧ φ2 ∈ infi(mit)
φ,¬φ ∈ mit =⇒ ⊥ ∈ infi(mit)
¬¬φ ∈ mit =⇒ φ ∈ infi(mit)
φ ∈ mit =⇒ φ ∈ infi(mit)
3. obs is a function which maps a pair (i, t) to a finite set of formulas in L and
satisfies the following conditions:
⊥ ∈ miφt =⇒ ¬φ ∈ obs(i, t+ 1)
(i, t) : φ ∈ Γ =⇒ φ ∈ obs(〈. . . i . . .〉, t)
φ ∈ obs(〈. . . φ . . .〉, t)
Definition 2 (Satisfaction and Entailment) A labelled formula (i, t) : φ is true
in a TRL model, written M |= (i, t) : φ, iff φ ∈ mit. A formula (i, t) : φ is said
to be A-valid, written |=A (i, t) : φ, whenever MA |= (i, t) : φ for all models
MA over A. We say (i, t) : φ is an A-consequence of a set of labelled formulas Γ,
written Γ |=A (i, t) : φ, if (i, t) : φ is true in all models MA over A in which Γ is
true.
Again, there is a special case of truth in a model for TRL(ND), namely when
Γ |=A (·, t) : φ, which tells us what, according to our definition of truth, the ND
reasoner should believe at step t.
Since different derivations may rely on making different sequences of assump-
tions, there is a special class of model, comprising only those that ensure all such
assumptions are represented. However, we cannot simply assume that A contains
all possible sequences over L in models in this class, for this would allow the pos-
sibility of infinitely many formulas being introduced to a local state by the obs
condition corresponding to RAA. We thus need the notion of a sufficient model for
a particular derivation:
Definition 3 (Sufficient Models) A TRL(ND) model MA is said to be sufficient
for a pair (Γ, (i, t) : φ) if either Γ 0 (i, t) : φ or else there exists a derivation
Γ ` (i, t) : φ containing a sequence of labelled formulas
(i1, t1) : φ1
.
.
.
(in, tn) : φn
we have ik ∈ A ∈MA for every 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
Corollary 2 below establishes that the special case of consequence, Γ |=A
(·, t) : φ, holds for sufficient models MA whenever φ is a consequence (w.r.t.
the classical notion) of the formulas in Γ (minus their labels). In the following sec-
tion, we establish that TRL(ND) is sound and complete with respect to sufficient
models.
4.4 Completeness of TRL(ND)
The following definition and lemma apply to any system of TRL which uses the all
rules at each step rule application strategy; it is thus easy to see how completeness
and decidability proofs are constructed for systems of TRL other than TRL(ND).
Definition 4 (Minimal Model) A TRL(ND) model MA is a minimal model for a
set of labelled formulas Γ if, for every i, t and every formula φ, φ ∈ mit iff one of
the following holds:
1. there is a rule in RinfND whose antecedent formulas are matched by formulas
φk ∈ mit−1 and the consequent is (i, t) : φ, or
2. φ := ¬ψ and ⊥ ∈ miψt−1, i.e. RAA matches, or
3. i = 〈. . . ψ1 . . . ψn . . .〉 and (〈ψ1 . . . ψn〉, t) : φ ∈ Γ, i.e. INHERIT matches,
or
4. i = 〈. . . φ . . .〉, i.e. AX matches.
A minimal model for Γ thus only satisfies the formulas in Γ and their consequences.
Note that, for each of these conditions, there corresponds a rule in RND. We use
this fact to establish the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Let MA be a minimal TRL(ND) model for Γ which is also sufficient for
(Γ(i, t) : φ). Then for every formula φ, φ ∈ mit iff Γ ` (i, t) : φ.
Proof. The proof goes by induction on t. When t = 0, (i, 0) : φ ∈ mi0 iff either
(i, 0) : φ ∈ Γ or i = 〈. . . φ〉 (definition 4). In the former case, Γ ` (i, 0) : φ by the
definition of `. In the latter case, Γ ` (i, 0) : φ by AX.
Inductive hypothesis: suppose that for all agents j and all s ≤ t, φ ∈ mjs iff Γ `
(j, s) : φ. Now consider any φ ∈ mit+1; either φ ∈ inf i(mit) or φ ∈ obs(i, t+ 1).
In the former case, there is a rule in RinfND of the form
(i, s) : φ1, . . . , (i, s) : φn
(i, s+ 1) : ψ
such that ψ = φ and φ1, . . . , φn ∈ mit. By the inductive hypothesis, Γ ` (i, t) : φi.
Hence, by the same rule, Γ ` (i, t+ 1) : φ.
In the latter case, either condition 2, 3 or 4 of definition 4 holds. If 2 holds,
then φ := ¬ψ and ⊥ ∈ miψt (definition 4) and, by hypothesis, Γ ` (iψ, t) : ⊥.
Then Γ ` (i, t + 1) : ¬ψ by RAA. If 3 holds, then i = k j k′ for some (possibly
empty) sequences j, k, k′ and (j, t + 1) : φ ∈ Γ. Then by the definition of `,
Γ ` (j, t + 1) : φ and, by INHERIT, Γ ` (i, t + 1) : φ. Finally, if 4 holds then
i = 〈. . . φ . . .〉 and, by AX, we have Γ ` (i, t+ 1) : φ. a
Theorem 2 TRL(ND) is sound and complete w.r.t. sufficient models, i.e. for any
finite set of labelled formulas Γ, a labelled formula φ and a set of agents A such
that MA is sufficient for (Γ, φ), Γ ` φ iff Γ |=A φ.
Proof. Soundness (Γ ` φ ⇒ Γ |=A φ) is standard: clearly, the rules in RND pre-
serve validity in TRL(ND) models. For completeness, suppose Γ |=A φ. Consider
a minimal TRL(ND) model for Γ, MΓ. Since Γ |=A φ and our particular model
MΓ satisfies Γ, MΓ |=A φ. From Lemma 1, Γ ` φ. a
Corollary 2 For all models MA sufficient for (Γ, (·, t), for some t, Γ |=A (·, t) :
φ⇐⇒ Γ |=cl φ, where |=cl is the classical notion of consequence.
Proof. By theorem 1; soundness and completeness of TRL(ND) (theorem 2); and
classical soundness and completeness for natural deduction. a
Corollary 3 For any finite set of labelled formulas Γ, labelled formula φ and finite
set of finite sequences A, it is decidable whether Γ |=A φ.
Proof. From Theorem 2 above, the questions whether Γ ` (i, t) : φ and whether
Γ |=A (i, t) : φ are equivalent and so, from corollary 1, it is decidable whether
Γ |=A φ. a
5 Conclusions
We have shown that resource bounded (i.e. real) agents can be modelled as having
a complete set of rules without ignoring the time required to deliberate. Using the
general framework of TRL, we have presented a classical reasoner which takes
time to form new beliefs. We developed the logic TRL(ND) in which to model
this reasoner and demonstrated it to be sound, complete and decidable. We also
indicated how completeness and decidability can be shown for similar systems
of of TRL. The availability of complete semantics distinguishes TRL from step
logics, as presented in [2]; similarly, the decidability result distinguishes TRL from
general first-order approaches such as [10].
It is these features of TRL, as highlighted by our TRL(ND) example, that have
formed the primary focus of this paper. However, that is not to disregard the for-
malisation of assumptions developed here; as mentioned in the introduction, the
approach may have other applications (for example, in distinguishing an agent’s
firmly-held beliefs from working hypotheses). Another distinguishing feature of
TRL is its ability to model difference rule application strategies. The example here
of a classical reasoner used an all rules at each cycle strategy; in [1], a CLIPS-style
depth resolution strategy [24] is discussed. TRL thus allows one to model an agent
and derive results pertaining to which of a number of possible strategies would be
most effective, given the agent’s goals and limitations.
A more realistic account of multiagent communication can be achieved in TRL
by partitioning agent belief states into private and public sections. An agent may
then perform deductive reasoning in private, and choose whether to allow other
agents access to the results. Modification of what are here called communication
rules allows representations in which only certain agents can access the beliefs
of a given agent. Importantly for the current project, such representations can be
built without modification of the underlying TRL framework, by adding an extra
parameter (either private or public) to each agent name-sequence.
Semantically, an agent would then be treated as two distinct local states, one
for private formulas and one for the publicly observable ones. Internal rules then
pertain to private formulas; extra rules must be added to deal with the moving
of formulas from private to public storage. A goal of further research is thus to
present concrete representations of multiagent communication along these lines.
A variation on this theme would be to model contingent communication between
groups of agents, where agents communicate only to other agents within the same
group (i.e. the “public” part of an agent’s state is observable only to agents in the
same group).
We can also model communication with a delay involved, such that a message
is not guaranteed to arrive at the timepoint immediately after being sent. We could,
for example, investigate how different rule application strategies behave when the
delivery time of sent messages in a multiagent system is not constant, or differs
depending on the sender or recipient of the message, e.g., where some agents in
the system are close together and some are far apart.
Another goal of further research is to represent speech acts in TRL. Enriching
TRL in this way would allow models of communication in which agents explicitly
query, command and share beliefs amongst one another. One way in which this can
be achieved is to augment the labelling language, which currently contains only
agent and time parameters, with force parameters. The notion of force is intended
to indicate how the propositional content of an utterance is used in a speech act;
i.e. whether it is used to query, command or as declarative information. An agent’s
internal rules would then have to be suitably embellished to deal with different
kinds of speech act; for example, a helpful agent should respond to a query ?φ
with either φ, ¬φ or “I don’t know,” depending on its beliefs at that timepoint. It
appears that this would be a very fruitful extension of TRL from the point of view
of modelling communication within multiagent systems.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Let ψ¯ = 〈ψ1, . . . , ψk〉 and Γ = {(0, ·) : φ | φ ∈ ∆}. ‘If’ direction: we
show Γ ` (ψ¯, t)φ =⇒ ∆∪{ψ1 . . . ψk} `nd φ for any t, of which the ‘if’ direction
is the special case where ψ¯ = ·. The proof is by induction on t. When t = 0, either
φ ∈ Γ or else φ = ψj≤k. In the former case, we have φ ∈ ∆ and so ∆ `nd φ. In the
latter case, ψj `nd φ and so ∆ ∪ {ψ1 . . . ψj . . . ψk} `nd φ. Induction hypothesis:
Γ ` (ψ¯, s) : φ =⇒ ∆, ψ1, . . . , ψk `nd φ for all timepoints s < t. Now assume
Γ ` (ψ¯, t) : φ. φ must have been obtained in TRL(ND) using one of the following
rules:
- ∧int, i.e. φ := φ1 ∧ φ2, so Γ ` (ψ¯, t − 1) : φn and by hypothesis ∆ ∪
{ψ1 . . . ψk} `nd φn. By the ND rule ∧int, we have ∆ ∪ {ψ1 . . . ψk} `nd
φ1 ∧ φ2.
- ∧elimL or ∧elimR. Then Γ `( ψ¯, t−1) : φ1∧φ2 s.t. φ = φn, n ∈ {1, 2}. By
hypothesis, ∆ ∪ {ψ1 . . . ψk} `nd φ1 ∧ φ2 and so, by ND ∧elimL or ∧elimR,
∆ ∪ {ψ1 . . . ψk} ` φn.
- ¬elim. Then Γ ` (ψ¯, t− 1) : ¬¬φ and by hypothesis, ∆ ∪ {ψ1 . . . ψk} `nd
¬¬φ. By the ND rule ¬elim, we obtain ∆ ∪ {ψ1 . . . ψk} `nd φ.
- RAA Then φ := ¬χ and Γ ` (ψ¯χ, t − 1) : ⊥. By hypothesis, ∆ ∪
{ψ1 . . . ψk, χ} `nd ⊥, i.e. ∆∪{ψ1 . . . ψk} `nd χ⊥. Consider the derivation
in which χ is an assumption; applying ND RAA, discharge the assumption
and write ¬χ. Hence ∆ ∪ {ψ1 . . . ψk} `nd φ.
- INHERIT Then, for some j, (j, t) : φ ∈ Γ, hence φ ∈ ∆ and so ∆ ∪
{ψ1 . . . ψk} ` φ.
- AX: Then φ := ψj , 1 ≤ j ≤ k, and so ∆, ψ1, . . . , ψk, φ `nd φ.
‘Only if’ direction: we show ∆ ∪ {ψ1, . . . , ψn} `nd φ only if, for some t, Γ `
(〈ψ1, . . . , ψn〉, t) : φ. The proof is by induction on the length l of the derivation
of φ. When l = 0, ∆ ∪ {ψ1 . . . ψk} `nd φ either if φ ∈ ∆, in which case we
have (ψ¯, 0) : φ ∈ Γ, or else φ = ψk, k ≤ n; either way, Γ |= (ψ¯, 0) : φ.
Induction hypothesis: Γ ` (ψ¯, t) : χ, for some t, whenever ∆, ψ1, . . . , ψn `nd χ
in a derivation of length k < l. Suppose ∆ ∪ {ψ1, . . . , ψn} `nd φ. Either φ ∈ ∆,
in which case (·, 0) : φ ∈ Γ and hence Γ ` (·, t) : φ, or else φ is obtained using
one of the natural deduction rules. For ∧int, ∧elimL, ∧elimR and ¬elim, the proof is
trivial. For RAA, suppose φ := ¬χ. Then ⊥ is derived from an assumption χ in the
derivation, i.e. ∆, ψ1, . . . ψk, χ `nd ⊥. By hypothesis, we have Γ ` (ψ¯χ, t) : ⊥
for some t and so, by the TRL(ND) rule RAA, Γ ` (ψ¯, t) : ¬χ. a
